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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0833/01 1071823
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171823Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5975
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000833 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/C/P, CA/VO/L/C, WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2036 
TAGS: CVIS PREL PGOV KCOR KCRM EFIN NU
SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA INELIGIBILITY FINDING--DAVID EUGENIO ROBLETO LANG
 
REF: A. 04 STATE 45499 
     ¶B. 04 MANAGUA 2808 
     ¶C. 04 STATE 242524 
     ¶D. 05 MANAGUA 345 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST:  Embassy is seeking a 
security advisory opinion under section 212 (f) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, proclamation 7750, 
suspending the entry into the United States by David Eugenio 
Robleto Lang, born in Nicaragua on November 26, 1957.  David 
Robleto is currently a prominent coffee grower, but he is 
also a political and business associate of former President 
Arnoldo Aleman, who was convicted of corruption in December 
2003 and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for his 
crimes.  Robleto was a public official during the Aleman 
administration, serving as Minister of External Cooperation 
(1997-1999), Minister of Transportation (1999-2001), and 
Director of the Nicaraguan Telephone and Mail Regulatory 
Institute (TELCOR) (2001-2002) in Aleman's cabinet. 
Previously, Robleto served as Aleman's alternate ("suplente") 
on the Managua city council when Aleman was Mayor (1990-1996). 
 
¶2.  (C) As Minister of Cooperation, Minister of 
Transportation, and Director of TELCOR, Robleto committed 
numerous acts of corruption benefiting himself, Aleman and 
other close associates.  While president, Arnoldo Aleman was 
the linchpin in several high-level corruption schemes that 
defrauded the Nicaraguan state of reportedly over USD 100 
million.  Since Aleman left office in 2002, Robleto has 
returned to the private sector, but he remains an active 
supporter of Aleman in the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) 
and helps the ex-president to retain total control of the 
party.  The massive corruption of which Robleto was an 
integral part caused serious damage for U.S. national 
interests in the stability of democratic institutions in 
Nicaragua, U.S. foreign assistance goals, and the 
international economic activities of U.S. businesses. 
 
¶3.  (C) Along with other corrupt associates, Robleto and 
Aleman continue to damage all of these national interests by 
working to overturn the fraud and money laundering 
convictions of the corrupt ex-president, undermine the 
government of President Enrique Bolanos, and place all of the 
country's government institutions under their control.  For 
all of these reasons, the Department has already found 
Arnoldo Aleman to be ineligible to enter the United States 
under INA 212 (f).  Post recommends that the Department now 
issue a 212 (f) finding against David Eugenio Robleto Lang. 
The following provides information requested in reftel A, 
paragraph 16.  END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. 
 
ARNOLDO ALEMAN'S CORRUPTION ALREADY DOCUMENTED AND HIS VISA REVOKED
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -- - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C) Arnoldo Aleman, who until January 10, 2002, served as 
Nicaragua's President, is currently serving a twenty year 
sentence for being the linchpin of several high 
level-corruption schemes to defraud the Nicaraguan government 
of reportedly over USD 100 million while he was President. 
The elaborate financial schemes orchestrated by Aleman 
involved the transfer of public funds from the accounts of 
various government agencies to the accounts of shell  foreign 
corporations set up for the sole purpose of defrauding the 
GON.  Aleman and several of his associates have been 
convicted of various corruption crimes against the state, 
including embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, 
money laundering, and conspiracy to commit these crimes. 
Reftel B described Aleman's corruption activities in detail, 
as well as the mass of evidence against the ex-President.  In 
reftel C, the Department issued a 212 (f) finding against 
Aleman.  Prior to this decision, the Department had already 
revoked the visas of Aleman and three of his main 
co-conspirators for money laundering under INA 212 (a)(2)(I). 
 The Department has subsequently revoked the visas of nearly 
a dozen of Aleman's family members and political associates 
involved in his massive corruption. 
 
ROBLETO'S ROLE IN ALEMAN'S CORRUPTION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (C) David Robleto is a founding member of the PLC, as well as a long-time friend and associate of Arnoldo Aleman. When Aleman served as Mayor of Managua from 1990 to 1996, Robleto served as his alternate on the city council. As Robleto proved a loyal instrument of Aleman's will, Aleman brought Robleto into his cabinet as soon as he took office as president in 1997. Robleto served in one cabinet position after another from the beginning of Aleman's administration to the end, holding the posts of Minister of External Cooperation (1997-1999), Minister of Transportation (1999-2001), and Director of TELCOR (2001-2002). In at least the latter two of these three cabinet jobs, Robleto is known to have participated in, and benefited from, Aleman's massive corruption schemes.
 
THE COERCO ROAD CONSTRUCTION SCHEME 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) As president, Aleman was notorious for using corrupt 
proxies to loot government ministries, independent agencies, 
and state-owned companies.  One of Aleman's most well-known 
corruption schemes involved the looting of the Regional 
Businesses Corporation (COERCO), a state-owned development 
company that carried out a wide variety of infrastructure 
projects as a subcontractor for the Ministry of 
Transportation and Infrastructure (MTI).  In 2001, Aleman 
appointed Victor Guerrero (whose visa the Department revoked 
under INA 212(f) in 2005) to serve as Director General of 
COERCO, at a time when David Robleto was Minister of 
Transportation and Guerrero's immediate supervisor.  Aleman, 
Robleto, Guerrero and several other conspirators fashioned an 
elaborate road construction scheme intended to defraud the 
Nicaraguan state for their own personal benefit.  Much of 
this scheme was already described in reftel D, but the 
information is repeated here for the convenience of the 
Department. 
 
¶7.  (C) Several times during his presidency, Aleman announced 
that he would ensure the paving of a 35 kilometer highway 
between the isolated Atlantic Coast town of Puerto Cabezas 
and the River Wawa, which would effectively connect Puerto 
Cabezas to the rest of the country for the first time.  The 
project finally began in 2000-2001, with a budget of 27 
million cordobas (USD 1.7 million) but it turned out to be 
nothing more than a massive corruption scheme designed to 
benefit President Aleman and several of his cronies, 
including Robleto, Guerrero, Director of Taxation Byron 
Jerez, and Rural Development Institute (IDR) Director Eduardo 
Mena.  The Department revoked Jerez's visa under INA 
212(a)2(I) in 2002 and Mena's under 212(f) in 2005. 
 
¶8.  (C) First, Aleman and his PLC deputies in the National 
Assembly privatized a state-owned stone-making company called 
Materials and Construction, Inc. (MAYCO) and placed it in the 
hands of one of their partners, Sebastian Martinez Reyes. 
Martinez Reyes then transferred three huge paving-stone 
producing machines to the Nicaraguan Concrete, Inc. 
(Concrenicsa), owned by none other than Aleman, Robleto, 
Jerez, and Mena, and had the three machines trucked from 
Managua to Puerto Cabezas.  Next, Victor Guerrero entered the 
picture.  With the approval of Robleto and as the newly 
appointed Director of COERCO, which was responsible for 
contracting to carry out the highway project, Guerrero 
authorized a contract with Concrenicsa to provide the paving 
stones for the first five kilometers of the new highway. 
 
¶9.  (C) Robleto and Guerrero authorized the contract without 
the normal solicitation procedures mandated by Nicaraguan law 
and despite the fact that the price offered by Concrenicsa 
per paving stone (7 cordobas) was double the price of such 
stones in Managua (3.7 cordobas).  Robleto and Guerrero also 
failed to obtain the legally-required approval of the 
Controller General's Office (Contraloria) for the contract. 
With the approval of Robleto and Guerrero, COERCO ultimately 
paid Concrenicsa 6.5 million cordobas (400,000 USD) of state 
funds for the purchase of over 900,000 paving stones. 
 
¶10.  (C) Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the 
quality of the paving stones provided by Concrenicsa proved 
to be very low.  Construction costs on the highway also 
proved dramatically higher than anticipated.  By mid-2001 the 
Aleman government abandoned the entire Puerto Cabezas highway 
project after a total of 2 (out of 35) of the planned 
kilometers of road had been paved.  All of the 27 million 
cordobas budgeted by COERCO for the entire length of the road 
were gone.  As if this theft of GON funds were not enough, 
Concrenicsa ended up keeping not only the 6.5 million 
cordobas it had been paid, but also 600,000 of the 900,000 
paving stones that it was supposed to have sold and delivered 
to COERCO. 
 
¶11. (C) Subsequently, Concrenicsa was "bought out" by a "different" construction company, Concrete and Construction, Inc. (Concretosa) also owned by Aleman, Robleto, Jerez, and Mena. Concretosa thereby "inherited" the 600,000 paving stones left in the hands of Concrenicsa. It used some of the stones for other (GON-financed) construction projects and sold off the rest to other companies. Thus, in the end, the entire 27 million cordoba Puerto Cabezas highway project produced virtually nothing for the Nicaraguan people, but greatly enriched Aleman, Robleto, Jerez, and Mena. None of this would have been possible had it not been for David Robleto and Victor Guerrero, who, as Minister of Transportation and Director of COERCO, respectively, personally approved all of the transactions associated with the failed construction project.
 
CASCO AND CHANNEL SIX 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) Later in 2001, with the end of the Aleman 
administration approaching and with Aleman seeking to steal 
as much money as possible before leaving office, both for his 
own benefit and to fund the PLC electoral campaign, the 
president transferred Robleto from the Ministry of 
Transportation to TELCOR.  At TELCOR, Robleto was a key 
participant in one of Aleman's most infamous corruption 
schemes, the theft of 1.3 million USD in state funds that 
were nominally to be spent for the modernization of the 
state-owned Channel Six television station.  This case was 
reported previously in reftel B, but is repeated here for the 
convenience of the Department. 
 
¶13. (C) In August 2001, then-president Aleman asked 
government agencies to help finance modernization of the 
state-owned television station Channel Six.  The 
modernization project was awarded to CASCO, a Mexican 
consulting firm that would act as an intermediary with TV 
Azteca, the Mexican company tapped to provide the new 
equipment, technical expertise, and training for the 
modernization process at Channel Six.  As a result of 
Aleman's request, the state telephone company (ENITEL), then 
headed by Aleman-crony Jorge Solis (whose visa the Department 
revoked under INA 212(a)(2)(I) in 2002, issued at least five 
checks totaling approximately $570,000 to Channel Six.  All 
five checks were immediately endorsed over to CASCO.  The 
Tourism Institute (INTUR) contributed a $350,000 check to 
Channel Six, which was subsequently endorsed to CASCO.  The 
Airport Authority (EAAI) contributed a $150,000 check, which 
was cashed by Channel Six, and $79,000 was turned over to 
CASCO.  TELCOR Director David Robleto contributed $500,000 to 
the project, transferring the money via the Ministry of 
Finance, headed by another Aleman crony, Esteban 
Duque-Estrada (whose visa the Department revoked under INA 
212(a)(2)(I) in 2002).  Of this 500,000 USD, at least 300,000 
USD was diverted to CASCO.  Thus, from August to November 
2001, four government agencies transferred $1,299,000 to 
CASCO, a company that, according to the testimony of various 
witnesses, provided no services to modernize Channel Six. 
 
¶14. (C) CASCO was a subsidiary of a company called SINFRA, 
owned by Alejandro Lopez Toledo, a Mexican national who had 
personally negotiated the CASCO contract to modernize Channel 
Six with Aleman.  From August to September 2001, Lopez Toledo 
ordered that a total of $500,000 in three transactions be 
transferred from SINFRA's account at Banco de la Produccion 
(BANPRO) in Nicaragua to one of the accounts of the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Foundation (FDN) in Panama.  As 
reported in reftel B, the FDN was a shell organization opened 
and owned by Aleman and used solely to launder stolen GON 
funds before they were transferred to private accounts owned 
by Aleman, his family, and his cronies.  Lopez Toledo 
specifically asked that two transactions, totaling $300,000, 
be sent from BANPRO's correspondent bank, Bank of America in 
Florida, through Citibank in New York, to the FDN account. 
The remaining $200,000 were sent through Banco Internacional 
de Costa Rica.  In short, four GON agencies transferred, 
through CASCO, a total of $500,000 to the FDN account. 
 
¶15.  (C) During the 2001 electoral campaign, David Robleto 
served as one of the PLC's treasurers.  After the Aleman 
administration left office and questions were raised 
regarding the ex-president's money laundering activities and 
his use of state funds for PLC electoral campaigns, 
documentation emerged showing that Robleto personally 
received at least USD 50,000 from the Nicaraguan Democratic 
Foundation (reftel B) in August 2001 and immediately 
deposited it in a PLC party account in the Banco de la 
Produccion (BANPRO). 
 
¶16. (C) In early 2002, after the Aleman administration left office, ten individuals, including Byron Jerez, Esteban Duque-Estrada, and David Robleto, were provisionally convicted for fraud, embezzlement and criminal conspiracy for their roles in defrauding the government in the Channel Six scandal. Although several people provided testimony at trial indicating that Aleman ordered, approved, and was kept informed of the entire scheme, he was not prosecuted because of his parliamentary immunity. Subsequent to the lifting of Aleman's immunity, the Nicaraguan Attorney General charged the ex-president with orchestrating the Channel Six money-laundering scheme.
 
¶17.  (C) During the trial, prosecutors documented that, as 
Director of TELCOR, Robleto had, at Aleman's bidding, 
personally transferred 500,000 USD to the Ministry of 
Finance, where Duque-Estrada subsequently transferred it to 
CASCO.  When the investigating judge ordered the arrest of 
the conspirators, Robleto and Duque-Estrada fled the country. 
 The only defense his lawyers offered, acting on his behalf 
in his absence, was the argument that the evidence against 
Robleto had been "improperly" obtained.  Documents and 
computer records presented by prosecutors showed clearly that 
Robleto had personally transferred the 500,000 USD to the 
Ministry of Finance and that at least 300,000 USD 
subsequently went to CASCO and on to the FDN.  In May 2002, 
Judge Ileana Perez found Robleto, Duque-Estrada and several 
of the other Channel Six conspirators guilty and ordered 
their assets seized.  However, both Robleto and Duque-Estrada 
remained at large. 
 
¶18.  (C) However, as is often the case in Nicaraguan 
corruption prosecutions, after the principal Channel Six 
conspirators were convicted, the political negotiations 
began.  Aleman knew that the investigation of Channel Six and 
other brewing scandals would eventually lead to him, and that 
he could be prosecuted if his immunity were lifted.  Seeking 
to protect himself, he cut a deal with Sandinista leader 
Daniel Ortega whereby an FSLN appeals court judge would 
overturn the Channel Six verdict.  Judge Juana Mendez, one of 
Ortega's most notorious judicial fixers, handled the appeal. 
 
¶19.  (C) In March 2003, by which time Aleman had lost his 
immunity, Mendez ignored the mountain of documentary evidence 
against Robleto and the other Channel Six conspirators, and 
accepted the argument of their lawyers that prosecutors had 
failed to prove any acts of corruption.  This deal "absolved" 
Robleto, allowed him to return to Nicaragua, and protected 
Aleman from any Channel Six fallout.  Ironically, it was the 
same judge, Juana Mendez, who convicted Aleman of corruption 
in a different case in December 2003, and assigned him a 
twenty year prison sentence when negotiations between Aleman 
and Ortega for yet another not guilty verdict failed. 
Because of his flight from justice and the subsequent 
protection of Aleman, David Robleto never spent one day 
behind bars for his role in the Channel Six scheme. 
 
¶20.  (C) Since the Aleman  administration left office in 
2002, Robleto has returned to the private sector, running a 
coffee production business, but he has remained active in the 
PLC and, in his capacity as a PLC convention member, has 
served as one of Aleman's enforcers of party loyalty.  Aleman 
uses the 700 voting members of the national PLC convention to 
provide a fig leaf of democracy in the party, but all the 
convention members, including Robleto, owe their positions to 
Aleman and serve as little more than rubber stamps for 
Aleman's decisions, as was demonstrated once again in March 
2006 when the PLC confirmed Aleman's choice for the 2006 PLC 
presidential nomination. 
 
SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECT ON U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶21.  (C) The massive corruption of Arnoldo Aleman, David 
Robleto and their other associates, specifically their theft 
of tens of millions of dollars from Nicaraguan institutions 
and their efforts to launder some of the money in U.S. banks, 
had serious adverse effects on those U.S. interests specified 
in the Presidential Proclamation as well as U.S. foreign 
policy priorities highlighted in the Embassy's Mission 
Program Plan (MPP).  The Embassy has encouraged Nicaragua to 
prosecute officials for corruption and has provided financial 
and technical support in corruption cases, including that of 
Aleman himself.  President Bolanos has made the imprisonment 
of Aleman, the recovery of stolen assets and a wider 
anti-corruption campaign the cornerstones of his presidency. 
Since his conviction, Aleman, who still has vast political 
influence in the country, has worked incessantly through 
Robleto and other corrupt associates in the PLC and other 
institutions to further undermine all of Nicaragua's 
democratic institutions, including the presidency, the 
National Assembly and the judiciary, all in an effort to have 
his conviction erased, regain the frozen assets they stole 
from the Nicaraguan state, and maintain political power. 
 
¶22. (C) Stability of Democratic Institutions: The Embassy's top priority is strengthening and consolidating democracy through the development of transparent, accountable and professional governmental institutions, including the judiciary. Our MPP states that "... abuse of power, corruption and politicization of many state institutions, especially the judiciary, have impeded the consolidation of democracy and economic growth." A judicial system subject to political and corrupting influences undermines democracy and could lead to instability. The actions of Arnoldo Aleman, David Robleto and their associates have contributed directly to the widespread belief in Nicaragua that justice comes from political bosses and can be bought and sold. This has undermined confidence in the system. In addition to working for Aleman's release from imprisonment, Aleman and Robleto's actions have helped other corrupt figures, including Robleto himself, to elude justice. Additionally, a judiciary free of corruption is necessary for improving the ability of the GON to investigate and prosecute those suspected of international criminal activities that can have a direct impact on United States homeland security, such as money laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking or terrorism.
 
¶23.  (C) Foreign Assistance Goals:  One of the top three USG 
foreign assistance goals in Nicaragua is strengthening 
democracy.  The chief goals of USAID assistance in this area 
are battling corruption and effecting judicial reform. 
Aleman and Robleto's actions have directly damaged progress 
in both of these areas.  In December 2003, the USG froze USD 
49 million of judicial assistance in response to endemic 
judicial corruption, highlighted by what appeared to be an 
imminent fraudulent "not guilty" verdict for Aleman, due to 
backroom dealing between Sandinista (FSLN) leader Daniel 
Ortega and the corrupt ex-president.  Thanks to corrupt 
members of the PLC such as Robleto, Aleman retains near total 
control of the party and its caucus in the National Assembly 
and uses this power to negotiate with Ortega.  Without 
co-dependent cronies such as Robleto in the PLC and the 
Assembly, Aleman would not be able to  control the PLC caucus 
and use it to negotiate with Ortega and corrupt all the other 
institutions of the state that are under the Assembly's 
supervision, including the Controller General's Office, the 
judiciary, and the Supreme Electoral Council, among others. 
 
¶24.  (C) International Activity of U.S. Businesses:  Corrupt 
Nicaraguan institutions hamper U.S. investment in Nicaragua 
and discourage U.S. exporters from establishing 
agent/distributor relationships.  U.S. investors and 
business-people are reluctant to risk their resources in 
Nicaragua, knowing they could easily be subjected to the 
vagaries of a corrupt judiciary or the whims of politicians 
should they become involved in any commercial dispute, real 
or trumped up.  By stealing over a hundred million dollars 
from the Nicaraguan state and subsequently trying to 
manipulate the presidency, judiciary, and the National 
Assembly behind the scenes in order to erase Aleman's 
conviction and keep their ill-gotten gains, Aleman, Robleto 
and their associates have contributed directly to the erosion 
of confidence of the business community in all of Nicaragua's 
democratic institutions. 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR FINDING 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  (C) David Eugenio Robleto Lang has been informed of the 
fact that he may be covered by Presidential Proclamation 
number 7750, under section 212 (f) of the INA. 
 
¶26.  (C) David Eugenio Robleto Lang has been issued numerous 
visas over the years, but he does not presently possess a 
valid visa.  On April 3, 2006, he applied for a new B1/B2 
visa at Embassy Managua, but his application was refused 
under INA P212(f) in order to allow time for post to submit 
an advisory opinion request to the Department. 
 
¶27.  (C) Post recommends that the Department make a 212f visa 
ineligibility finding for David Eugenio Robleto Lang and that 
no (rpt no) further travel be allowed to the United States. 
TRIVELLI