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INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000806 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/C/P, CA/VO/L/C, WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2036 
TAGS: CVIS PREL PGOV KCOR KCRM EFIN NU
SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA 
INELIGIBILITY FINDING--TOMAS EDUARDO CORTEZ MENDOZA 
 
REF: A. 04 STATE 45499 
     ¶B. 04 MANAGUA 1349 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 36 
     ¶D. 04 MANAGUA 2740 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST:  Embassy is seeking a 
security advisory opinion under section 212 (f) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, proclamation 7750, 
suspending the entry into the United States of Tomas Eduardo 
Cortez Mendoza, born in Nicaragua on November 30, 1971. 
Cortez is currently a Sandinista (FSLN) judge in Managua's 
seventh criminal court.  He is a protQgQ of corrupt Supreme 
Court Justice Rafael Solis, and was appointed to his current 
position thanks to his patronage.  Solis, Cortez and other 
Sandinista (FSLN) judges use their positions to benefit FSLN 
leader Daniel Ortega and his party's political and economic 
interests. 
 
¶2.  (C) With the FSLN controlling an overwhelming majority of 
the judiciary via corrupt judges like Cortez, the Sandinista 
party is virtually assured of winning any legal dispute, can 
threaten opponents with incarceration and conviction on 
trumped up charges, and can fill party coffers by extorting 
legitimate businesses and allowing international drug and 
arms traffickers and other criminals to go free in return for 
bribes.  Judge Cortez has a long record of disregarding the 
facts and the law, and has been implicated in one judicial 
corruption scandal after another in recent years.  His 
corrupt acts have made banner headlines, and his involvement 
in freeing international drug traffickers and corrupt former 
government officials is increasing.  He is also the FSLN's 
"judge of choice" for all criminal matters; he has regularly 
absolved prominent Sandinistas accused of crimes and has 
brought politically-motivated criminal charges against those 
who oppose the FSLN. 
 
¶3.  (C) Although the Attorney General's office 
(Procuraduria), the office of the National Prosecutor 
(Fiscalia), and others have called for multiple 
investigations of Judge Cortez's corrupt acts, no 
investigation has ever taken place, thanks to the fact that 
Judge Cortez enjoys the protection of Supreme Court (CSJ) 
magistrate Solis and the FSLN, who have blocked all efforts 
to launch an investigation.  As long as Judge Cortez enjoys 
their protection, he is effectively untouchable in Nicaragua. 
 The ongoing political and financial corruption of which 
Cortez has been an integral part has caused enormous damage 
for U.S. national interests in the stability of democratic 
institutions in Nicaragua (including the judiciary), U.S. 
foreign assistance goals, and the international economic 
activities of U.S. businesses. 
 
¶4.  (C) Because he remains both one of the chief proxies of 
Rafael Solis and his corrupt cronies in the Supreme Court and 
the FSLN, and one of the FSLN's primary means of filling 
party coffers, Cortez continues to damage all of these 
national interests, and to sustain Ortega's stranglehold on 
the judiciary and the country as a whole.  Moreover, Cortez's 
involvement in drug trafficking and official corruption cases 
has all played out in public.  The spectacle has made more 
obvious than ever that justice can be bought and sold in 
Nicaragua, and that those involved are untouchable so long as 
they enjoy the political protection of Daniel Ortega or rival 
party leader Arnoldo Aleman.  Unfortunately, numerous judges 
at all levels, handpicked for the bench because of their lack 
of ethics and judicial independence, are emulating Cortez's 
example, severely undermining the entire system of justice 
and the U.S. and Nicaraguan fight against international drug 
trafficking.  For all of these reasons, post recommends that 
the Department make a 212(f) finding against Tomas Eduardo 
Cortez Mendoza and that no (rpt no) further travel to the 
United States be allowed.  The following provides information 
requested in reftel A, paragraph 16.  END SUMMARY AND ACTION 
REQUEST. 
 
CORTEZ A PROXY OF CORRUPT SUPREME COURT JUSTICE RAFAEL SOLIS 
AND FSLN JUDICIAL "FIXER" LENIN CERNA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) As the Department's recent annual Human Rights 
Reports on Nicaragua have noted, almost all judges appointed 
to the country's Supreme Court (CSJ) owe their loyalty to 
either Aleman or Ortega, and their decisions on all sensitive 
cases are blatantly partisan and political.  Once loyalists 
of Aleman or Ortega are appointed to the CSJ, they are then 
responsible for appointing and promoting lower court judges, 
and they fill the ranks of the judiciary with corrupt 
followers such as Tomas Cortez.  In 2001, Judge Cortez was 
 
promoted from judicial legal assistant to full-time criminal 
court judge thanks to the patronage of CSJ magistrate Rafael 
Solis, whose corruption is well known and whose visa was 
revoked under 212(f) in 2004 (reftel B). 
 
¶6.  (C) Like Solis, Cortez both serves as an instrument of 
the FSLN on politically sensitive issues, and exploits his 
office to sow corruption in the judiciary, "fixing" judicial 
decisions in return for bribes for his personal benefit and 
to fill FSLN coffers for use at election time.  According to 
credible Embassy sources, the FSLN's use of the judiciary to 
obtain money from international drug traffickers in return 
for having Sandinista judges set them free is organized by 
Lenin Cerna, the 1980s head of the Sandinista regime's State 
Security Directorate, with the approval of Daniel Ortega. 
Although post cannot document the entire money trail in such 
cases, credible contacts state that using the judiciary to 
free corrupt ex-officials and international arms and drug 
traffickers is one of the FSLN's primary sources of income. 
Post also has credible reports that Daniel Ortega's proxies 
are negotiating agreements with international drug 
traffickers whereby traffickers will be allowed to operate 
unimpeded on the country's Atlantic Coast if Ortega is 
elected president in 2006. 
 
¶7.  (C) Cortez maintains a strong personal connection to the 
FSLN "family", as he is married to Lenina Cerna, the niece of 
Lenin Cerna, the architect of the entire FSLN system of 
judicial corruption, bribes and campaign finance.  Although 
such a family connection to the leaders of a major political 
party obviously constitutes a conflict of interest in cases 
concerning the party and would lead an honest judge to recuse 
himself from such cases, Cortez has never done so.  In 
practice, this personal connection makes Cortez one of the 
FSLN's most reliable judges and the party does all it can to 
ensure that Cortez hears all politically sensitive cases 
involving both FSLN leaders and their opponents. 
 
CORTEZ'S LONG RECORD OF JUDICIAL IMPROPRIETY AND HIS 
INCREASINGLY BOLD ACTS OF CORRUPTION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) Tomas Cortez is a Sandinista judge presently serving 
in Managua's seventh criminal court.  In recent years, his 
name has surfaced regularly in association with judicial 
irregularities.  He has a long record of disregarding the 
facts and the law, dismissing evidence without explanation 
and allowing defendants in all manner of criminal cases 
(everything from drug trafficking, to official corruption and 
money laundering, to fatal traffic accidents) to go free. 
Each and every time that Cortez has been publicly accused of 
any act of wrongdoing, CSJ magistrate Solis has leapt to his 
defense, using increasingly tortured legal "reasoning" to 
justify his acts. 
 
¶9.  (C) In 1999 and 2000, when Cortez was still a judicial 
assistant in Managua's seventh criminal court rather than a 
judge, thirteen revolvers seized by police in several 
investigations and legally placed in Cortez's hands as 
evidence simply "disappeared."  Cortez was legally 
responsible for the firearms, but was unable to offer any 
explanation for what happened to them.  However, after their 
"disappearance" several turned up somehow legally registered 
to new owners, who claimed that a third party had sold them 
the guns.  The CSJ's disciplinary commission opened an 
investigation of Cortez's role in the "disappearance" and 
resale of the firearms, but CSJ magistrate Solis ensured that 
the investigation never progressed, and that it did not block 
Cortez's appointment as a full-time criminal court judge in 
¶2001. 
 
¶10.  (C) In September 2003, Edgard Antonio Vargas Solis, the 
son-in-law of Humberto Ortega--the former Sandinista Army 
Commander and the brother of FSLN leader Daniel Ortega--was 
involved in a traffic accident that killed two men.  Although 
police and prosecutors presented strong evidence that 
reckless driving on the part of Vargas caused the accident 
and the deaths of the two men, Judge Cortez ruled that the it 
was the driver of the other car, one of the dead men, who 
caused the accident, and absolved Vargas of any wrongdoing. 
Family members of the deceased and the media accused Judge 
Cortez of disregarding evidence and of altering police 
diagrams of the accident. 
 
¶11.  (C) In December 2003, Haroldo Montealegre, a notoriously 
corrupt banker with close ties to ex-President Aleman (and 
whose visa was revoked for money laundering under INA 
212(a)(2)(I) in 2002), came before Judge Cortez in one of his 
many criminal cases relating to his looting of Banco 
Mercantil (BAMER).  Montealegre's looting of the bank forced 
 
the GON to intervene to bail out defrauded depositors in 
¶2001.  In this particular case, prosecutors accused 
Montealegre of fraud, embezzlement, insider trading, and 
falsification of documents, and had a strong paper trail to 
document their accusations.  However, Cortez dismissed the 
criminal charges as having been "improperly filed", and 
ordered the government to return to Montealegre all the 
assets that it had seized from him when the bank collapsed. 
This "clean slate" given Haroldo Montealegre by Judge Cortez 
allowed him to be a candidate for the presidential nomination 
by the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) in 2006. 
 
¶12.  (C) In February 2004, William Hurtado, an FSLN militant 
and former member of the Sandinista state security apparatus, 
shot and killed journalist and radio personality Carlos 
Guadamuz in Managua.  A former Sandinista himself, Guadamuz 
had broken with Daniel Ortega and used his radio program to 
criticize Ortega, Dionisio "Nicho" Marenco (the current Mayor 
of Managua), and other FSLN leaders on a wide range of 
issues, including rape charges brought against Ortega by his 
stepdaughter.  Although the involvement of Ortega and Marenco 
in the Guadamuz murder was never proven in court, the killing 
was carried out in classic FSLN assassination style and 
removed a thorn in the side of both men at a time when 
Marenco was running for the mayor's office.  Prior to his 
killing, Guadamuz had filed a criminal complaint against 
Ortega and Marenco for making death threats against him. 
While this criminal case had languished in Judge Cortez's 
court for four years prior to Guadamuz's murder, two days 
after he was killed, Cortez finally took up the case, only to 
immediately dismiss it because the person who had filed the 
complaint was now dead.  In this way, Judge Cortez helped 
Ortega and Marenco to clean up a "loose end" in the Guadamuz 
case and clear the way for Marenco's election as mayor in 
November 2004. 
 
¶13.  (C) In October 2004, one of the many corruption cases 
brought against Byron Jerez, Arnoldo Aleman's Director of 
Taxation and his chief partner in corruption (and whose visa 
was revoked by the Department under INA 212(a)(2)(I) in 2002) 
came to Judge Cortez's court.  This particular case, known 
locally as "los camionetazos" (roughly translatable as the 
"Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) scandal"), involved Jerez's 
purchase of 23 luxury SUVs for his family using official 
government credit notes issued by the Directorate of Taxation 
under his signature.  Prosecutors estimated that Jerez robbed 
the Nicaraguan state of at least USD 750,000 in this case, 
and they presented the entire paper trail (no less than 
13,000 documents), including all of the purchase documents 
signed by Jerez.  Prosecutors had previously seized the 
vehicles in question from Jerez's residence.  However, when 
the case came to trial, Judge Cortez dismissed all the 
evidence as "improperly presented", leaving the jury with 
nothing on which to convict Jerez and his co-conspirators. 
The jury thus found Jerez not guilty, and he subsequently 
brought a civil case against the Nicaraguan state, demanding 
the return of all 23 vehicles.  In March 2006, another FSLN 
judge, Ligia Rivas, ruled in Jerez's favor in the civil case, 
ordering the GON to return the vehicles to Jerez.  Sandinista 
judges have similarly "absolved" Jerez in several other 
corruption cases brought against him by the GON, and post has 
received credible, confidential reports that Jerez paid large 
bribes to the FSLN campaign finance machine and its judges 
for these verdicts.  Jerez's money reportedly financed much 
of the FSLN's 2004 municipal election campaign. 
 
¶14.  (C) In 2005, when former Managua Mayor Herty Lewites 
broke with the FSLN and declared that he would run for 
President on his own since Daniel Ortega had violated FSLN 
party statutes and declared himself to be the party's 
candidate for the 2006 presidential elections, the FSLN 
political machine immediately moved against Lewites and 
brought numerous politically-motivated charges of corruption 
against him.  When Lewites defended himself and accused the 
FSLN of defamation and of plotting his murder (the latter in 
the aftermath of a suspicious incident in which a mysterious 
vehicle nearly ran down Lewites), party officials brought 
criminal charges of libel and slander against him.  This case 
went to Judge Cortez, who immediately ruled that there was 
enough evidence to put Lewites on trial.  When other FSLN 
officials brought still more charges against Lewites, they 
were ultimately gathered together and heard by a different 
Sandinista judge, who found Lewites guilty and slapped him 
with a fine. 
 
¶15.  (C) In April and May 2005 the Daniel Ortega launched 
several weeks of violent protests against the Bolanos 
administration.  These protests by FSLN-affiliated unions, 
transportation collectives, and student groups were nominally 
to protest rising gasoline prices, but actually served as a 
 
means to pressure the GON at a time when the FSLN was seeking 
to force it to accept numerous constitutional reforms that 
would strip powers from the presidency and transfer them to 
the National Assembly, where the FSLN has much greater 
influence.  During the violent protests and riots, FSLN 
agitators attacked police officers and burned police 
vehicles.  Several of those involved in these attacks were 
arrested and went on trial in July--in Judge Cortez's court. 
Not surprisingly, Judge Cortez dismissed all the evidence 
against the FSLN thugs (including police eyewitness testimony 
and video filmed by local television stations) and found the 
rioters not guilty on all charges. 
 
¶16.  (C) In the fall of 2005, Nicaragua witnessed its most 
notorious case to date of judges freeing international drug 
traffickers in return for bribes.  This case is still under 
investigation, but confidential, credible sources involved in 
the case have revealed that at least four different Supreme 
Court magistrates, including Rafael Solis, were involved in a 
plot to free Colombian drug traffickers and money launderers 
Leyla Bucardo and Jorge Eliezer Hernandez, along with USD 
609,000 that police seized when they arrested the 
traffickers, in return for large bribes to all the judges 
involved in the case and for a sizable contribution to FSLN 
electoral coffers (reftel C).  Along with nearly a dozen 
other judges and lawyers, Judge Cortez played a part in this 
case.  When she was arrested, trafficker Leyla Bucardo 
carried a falsified Nicaraguan identity document ("cedula"), 
leading prosecutors to bring charges of document fraud and 
identity theft against her.  While other judges handled the 
money laundering case, the document fraud and identity theft 
charges went to Judge Cortez.  Cortez dismissed all evidence 
and found Bucardo not guilty, despite the fact that police 
and prosecutors presented the fake identity document that 
Bucardo carried and presented at the time of her arrest 
(which she did without the consent of the legitimate owner of 
the identity document) and had a solid case against her. 
 
¶17.  (C) During the early morning hours of December 11, 2005, 
a vehicle owned by the FSLN struck another vehicle and killed 
two young men in the other car.  Eyewitnesses reported that 
the person driving the FSLN vehicle was Rafael Ortega, Daniel 
Ortega's son and the director of FSLN-owned television 
station "Channel 4", but, in order to protect the Ortega 
family, the FSLN pulled a switch and claimed that another 
driver was behind the wheel.  Police forensic experts and 
NGOs that investigated the case reported that the substitute 
driver showed no signs of "seat belt burn" or other injuries 
consistent with involvement in a serious accident, while 
Rafael Ortega was subsequently seen in Managua with a cast on 
his arm and other bandages that clearly could have resulted 
from involvement in such an accident.  However, police and 
prosecutors, fearing Daniel Ortega's power, refused to 
investigate the switch or to bring charges against Rafael 
Ortega.  When the case of negligent homicide against the 
substitute driver came to the court of Judge Cortez in March 
2006, family members of the two young men who died tried to 
persuade the judge to accept the eyewitness evidence against 
Rafael Ortega and make him a defendant in the case, but Judge 
Cortez dismissed all the evidence of Rafael Ortega's 
involvement and of the switch of drivers, and insisted that 
the case would go forward against only the substitute driver. 
 After dismissing the evidence of Rafael Ortega's 
involvement, Judge Cortez allowed his substitute judge 
("suplente") to finish the case, and the substitute judge 
found the substitute driver guilty of negligent homicide in 
April.  The families of the two young men killed in the 
accident announced that they intend to appeal the case to the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights since it is clearly 
not possible for them to obtain justice in Nicaragua. 
 
¶18.  (C) Although post cannot document that Judge Cortez and 
the FSLN received money from the drug traffickers, money 
launderers and other corrupt individuals in the cases 
described above, post does have credible reports that Cortez 
is part of the FSLN campaign finance machine, and has 
benefited personally from the arrangement as well.  Indeed, 
his repeated ignoring of the law and the facts and his 
nonsensical rulings, always to advance whatever political or 
financial interest the FSLN may have in the litigation before 
him, offer no real other explanation.  Both credible media 
sources and individuals involved in the cases described here 
attribute Judge Cortez's actions to bribes and loyalty to the 
FSLN, but this particular form of corruption is almost 
impossible to document in Nicaragua.  Post has every reason 
to believe that Judge Cortez is one of a growing number of 
FSLN magistrates who take bribes in return for using their 
positions to free international traffickers and corrupt 
individuals of all sorts without bothering to explain their 
dubious (or outright illegal) reasoning. 
 
 
SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECT ON U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶19.  (C) Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza has used his judicial 
position to serve the political interests of Daniel Ortega 
and the FSLN as they seek to undermine the GON and the 
constitutional order, has helped to free drug traffickers and 
corrupt former government officials, and has returned their 
seized money to them, reportedly in return for bribes.  All 
of these corrupt acts have had serious adverse effects on 
those U.S. interests specified in the Presidential 
Proclamation as well as U.S. foreign policy priorities 
highlighted in the Embassy's Mission Program Plan (MPP).  The 
Embassy has encouraged Nicaragua to prosecute officials for 
corruption and has provided financial and technical support 
in corruption cases, but almost all of these cases have 
failed because of the willingness of Judges like Cortez to 
free corrupt individuals in return for bribes. 
 
¶20.  (C) The Embassy has also provided a great deal of 
resources and training to the Nicaraguan police and military 
in order to increase their capabilities to intercept, arrest, 
investigate and prosecute international drug traffickers. 
This training and support has been increasingly successful, 
with Nicaraguan law enforcement capturing increasing 
quantities of drug shipments, drug traffickers, bulk cash 
smugglers and laundered drug money each year.  Unfortunately, 
the corruption of Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza and other 
Nicaraguan judges has not only enabled many of the drug 
traffickers to go free, but also to recover drug money and 
other drug properties seized by police, undermining the hard 
work of the police, military and prosecutors and the very 
rule of law.  Although Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza is just 
one part of Nicaragua's judicial corruption problem, his 
corrupt actions, and his total impunity, both of which have 
been thrown in the face of the public for years, have 
reinforced widespread attitudes that justice can be bought 
and sold in Nicaragua.  Lower court judges like Cortez are 
increasingly emulating and following the directives of their 
corrupt Supreme Court (CSJ) counterparts and freeing drug 
traffickers and their money in return for bribes. 
 
¶21.  (C) Stability of Democratic Institutions:  The Embassy's 
top priority is strengthening and consolidating democracy 
through the development of transparent, accountable and 
professional governmental institutions, including the 
judiciary and the Controller General's Office.  Our MPP 
states that, "... abuse of power, corruption and 
politicization of many state institutions, especially the 
judiciary, have impeded the consolidation of democracy and 
economic growth."  A criminal justice system subject to 
political and corrupting influences undermines democracy and 
has led to serious political instability.  Manipulation of 
the independence of the judiciary encourages and attracts 
organized criminal organizations, because they realize that 
bribing judges is a suitable cost of their illegal business 
in exchange for acquittals and continued impunity.  The 
actions of Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza on behalf of the 
FSLN, corrupt former government officials and international 
drug traffickers have contributed directly to the widespread 
belief in Nicaragua that power and wealth come from political 
bosses and can be bought and sold.  This pattern has 
undermined confidence in the entire political system and all 
the institutions of the state.  A politicized and corrupted 
judiciary is the biggest roadblock to the development of a 
sustainable anti-corruption strategy.  When Nicaraguans see 
top government officials like Cortez enriching themselves and 
their families over a period of many years and going 
completely unpunished, they lose faith in all the country's 
democratic institutions. 
 
¶22. (C) Individuals like Cortez, who have benefited both 
financially and politically because of their subservience to 
Ortega and who have been able to spread the benefits of their 
corruption to family and associates, are widely seen as 
examples of officials untouchable by the law.  The resulting 
total impunity for corrupt individuals has bolstered the 
widespread attitude that even a democratically elected 
government is incapable of providing for the public good. 
The resulting cynicism has undermined confidence in democracy 
and all government institutions and significantly reduced 
confidence in the administration of justice.  Judge Cortez's 
politically-motivated corruption in support of the FSLN and 
its leaders has been particularly damaging to the credibility 
of Nicaragua's institutions, as overwhelming evidence of many 
of his corrupt acts has been front page news for 
years--without Cortez having suffered any legal consequences. 
 His case has demonstrated to the entire country that corrupt 
officials can commit any corrupt act, and be caught at it, 
 
without suffering any legal consequences as long as they 
enjoy the support of Ortega or Aleman. 
 
¶23.  (C) Thanks to well-placed corrupt cronies like Cortez, 
Ortega and Aleman retain near total control of all the 
institutions of the state, except for the presidency. 
Without co-dependent enablers such as Cortez, Ortega and 
Aleman would not be able to protect themselves and their 
cronies from prosecution in Nicaragua for their numerous acts 
of corruption, nor be able to perpetually threaten to remove 
President Bolanos from office.  Because everyone in 
Nicaragua, from Ortega and Aleman's co-conspirators, to 
members of their political parties, to ordinary citizens, 
knows that the two party bosses have the ability to protect 
anyone they wish from prosecution, or bring (usually 
trumped-up) charges against anyone who opposes them, everyone 
in Nicaragua has a strong incentive to comply with the wishes 
of the two corrupt ex-presidents. 
 
¶24.  (C) Foreign Assistance Goals:  One of the top three USG 
foreign assistance goals in Nicaragua is strengthening 
democracy.  The chief goals of USAID assistance in this area 
are battling corruption and effecting judicial reform.  The 
actions of corrupt judges like Cortez and his patron, Rafael 
Solis, have directly damaged progress in both of these areas. 
 In December 2003, the USG froze USD 49 million of judicial 
assistance in response to endemic judicial corruption, 
highlighted by what appeared to be an imminent fraudulent 
"not guilty" verdict for Arnoldo Aleman, due to backroom 
dealing between Ortega and the corrupt ex-president.  Thanks 
to corrupt judges such as Cortez, Ortega possesses the means 
to protect allies from the consequences of their corrupt acts 
and the power to sanction and silence opponents.  This power 
has enabled him to retain total control of the FSLN caucus in 
the National Assembly, and he uses this power to negotiate 
the very future of the country with Aleman. 
 
¶25.  (C) Control of the entire court system, from the CSJ to 
criminal court judges like Cortez, gives Ortega the ability 
to use nominally legal means to arrest and intimidate anyone 
he wishes.  In a vicious circle that guarantees their 
political power, Ortega and Aleman use co-dependent cronies 
such as Cortez in the judiciary and other state institutions 
to ensure their control of the National Assembly, which, in 
turn, ensures their control of all the other institutions of 
the state that are under the Assembly's supervision, 
including the judiciary, the Controller General's Office 
(Contraloria), and the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), among 
others.  For as long as Cortez and people like her remain in 
the judiciary, it will be an integral part of Nicaragua's 
corruption problem, rather than what it should be, a key 
institution aiding the government in its anti-corruption 
fight. 
 
¶26.  (C) Moreover, the persistent efforts of Sandinista 
judges to weaken President Bolanos and/or remove him from 
office have so damaged the country's stability, that the 
future of international aid programs in Nicaragua has been 
called into question.  In October 2005, the efforts to remove 
the President and his ministers from office had gone so far 
that Deputy Secretary Zoellick informed the Nicaraguan media 
and the political class that if Ortega, Aleman, and their 
cronies in the judiciary and other state institutions went so 
far as to remove the President, the Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) and other USG aid programs would be terminated 
(reftel D).  The Department's 2006 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR) highlighted judicial 
corruption as one of the single greatest factors undermining 
anti-drug trafficking efforts in the country. 
 
¶27.  (C) International Activity of U.S. Businesses:  Corrupt 
Nicaraguan institutions hamper U.S. investment in Nicaragua 
and discourage U.S. exporters from establishing 
agent/distributor relationships.  U.S. investors and 
business-people are reluctant to risk their resources in 
Nicaragua, knowing they could easily be subjected to the 
vagaries of a corrupt judiciary or the whims of politicians 
should they become involved in any commercial dispute, real 
or trumped up.  By shamelessly serving only the interests of 
Daniel Ortega and the FSLN, sowing corruption in the 
judiciary, by taking bribes to enable drug traffickers and 
corrupt former government officials to escape with their 
proceeds, and by undermining the GON's anti-corruption 
campaign, Cortez has ensured that U.S. and international 
business-people continue to regard Nicaragua as a risky 
investment prospect. 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR FINDING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶28.  (C) Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza has been informed of 
the fact that he may be covered by Presidential Proclamation 
number 7750, under section 212 (f) of the INA. 
 
¶29.  (C) Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza has been issued several