VZCZCXRO6083
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKUK #0080/01 0971407
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 071407Z APR 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0595
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0559
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0623

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR POL, PAO, ROL COORDINATOR, NCT, IRMO, USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/7/2016 
TAGS: PINS PGOV KDEM KCOR KISL PINR IZ IR
SUBJECT: MORE PROTESTS AHEAD IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
 
REF: (A) Kirkuk 78  , (B) Kirkuk  79 , (C) Kirkuk 69 
 
KIRKUK 00000080  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Acting Regional Coordinator, , REO 
Kirkuk, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (S)  SUMMARY.  A freelance press interpreter says some who 
participated in the violent Halabjah protests could now be 
inclined to become KRG insurgents because the PUK is giving them 
few other options.  Our contact said he had heard reports that 
some protestors had fled to the mountains or Iran; he said that 
this was the first time protestors against the KRG had sought 
refuge in the mountains.  He said the PUK's response to the 
Halabjah events reminded the Kurdish public of the former 
regime.  Students from the PUK-administered territory were 
likely to stage future protests, especially in Kalar and across 
several cities when school was out.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  This is the third in a series of cables reporting an 
in-depth look at the March 16 violent protests in Halabjah. 
This cable discusses prospects for violence elsewhere in the 
Kurdistan Region.  The other two cables (refs A and B) reported 
on the events leading up to and during the day of the protests 
and on the subsequent security crackdown.  RC(A) and IPAO on 
March 28 met with Yerivan Adham Sa'id, a free lance press 
interpreter and native of Halabjah, who was present during the 
entirety of the Halabjah events and supported the 
demonstrations.  Sa'id was the freelance interpreter for the 
March 17 New York Times story, a subsequent National Public 
Radio story and was a major source for reftels. 
 
Hard Response Creating Dissidents 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S)  Sa'id said that some of those who participated in the 
Halabjah protest could now be inclined to become KRG insurgents 
because they had few other options.  The students were ambitious 
and politically active, yet the KRG was now branding them as 
criminals, prohibiting them from gaining jobs in the future. 
Sa'id said he had heard reports that some protestors had fled to 
the mountains or Iran; he said that this was the first time 
protestors against the KRG had sought refuge in the mountains. 
The PUK appears to be pursuing a tough response to the 
protestors.  Sa'id said PUK officials during a March 22 or 23 
press statement had used words like "revenge" and "severe 
punishment."  Sa'id said such language reminded people of the 
Saddam Hussayn regime.  Sa'id said that KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani 
further angered people in Halabjah by publicly saying on March 
27 that the KRG had nothing to do with Halabjah reconstruction: 
the Iraqi Government was responsible for compensating Halabjah 
victims and rebuilding the city. 
 
Protests Likely Elsewhere 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  When we asked Sa'id what was inciting Kurdish 
university students to protest, he said students saw the 
differences between those who benefited from the government and 
those who did not.  He said most Kurdish students attended 
college in the big cities where, often for the first time, they 
experienced upgraded services and came into contact with family 
members of government leaders driving new cars.  The students 
then returned to their homes with nothing to do and angered at 
the economic bifurcation. 
 
¶5.  (C)  When asked where we could anticipate more 
demonstrations, Sa'id pointed to Chamchamal and especially Kalar 
because services were poor, and students from there spoke of 
protesting.  Sa'id said he had heard reports of students' 
wanting to demonstrate around April 7 or 8, during the 
commemoration of the former regime's 1988 Anfal campaign.  Kalar 
students demonstrated on September 14 - the day before Kurdish 
universities' first day of classes - and Sai'd said they were 
determined to regroup because the situation had not improved. 
He thought the cities of Ranya (two hours northeast of As 
Sulaymaniyah, near the Iranian border) and Darbanikhan (45 miles 
west of As Sulaymaniyah) also were vulnerable because the 
government had neglected services there, due to corruption. 
Sa'id said students were likely to demonstrate during their 
June-August summer break. 
 
PUK Students More Politically Active 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  When asked why the majority of student demonstrations 
were occurring on PUK-administered territory, Sa'id judged that 
PUK supporters viewed the PUK as more corrupt than the KDP.  PUK 
supporters were upset that Barzani and the KDP were taking 
control of all of the Kurdistan Region, while Talabani remained 
 
KIRKUK 00000080  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
in Baghdad.  Sa'id said that the students saw the PUK as more 
corrupt than the KDP: PUK officials were taking as much as they 
could now because they feared losing their positions to the KDP. 
 The KDP also had been more diligent in providing services, 
roads, and buildings than the PUK.  PUK supporters had expressed 
frustration that their legal system was unclear and 
inconsistent.  For example, the KRG in As Sulaymaniyah had a law 
that sanctioned the death penalty when people destroyed state 
property, yet Talabani refused to sign Saddam's death sentence. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Moreover, Sa'id said the PUK had more internal problems 
than the KDP.  The Kurdish people referred to the PUK as the 
"Three Emirates": Jalal Talabani, Nushirwan Mustafa, and Kosrat 
Rasul.  Sa'id thought that if the PUK eliminated its corruption, 
the party would split.  People had hoped Barham Salih would end 
PUK corruption, but that hope had faded after his move to 
Baghdad.  Nushirwan Mustafa was the PUK leader most inclined to 
eradicate the party's corruption; Rasul was more traditional. 
Talabani, Mustafa, and Rasul as of March 28 had said nothing 
publicly regarding the Halabjah incident. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (S)  We often have heard that a new graduate must have a 
party affiliation to get a professional job in the Kurdistan 
Region.  However, we cannot confirm Sa'id's claim that some 
protestors now may feel their hopes for a career are over, and 
they must head to Iran or permanently oppose the PUK and KDP. 
If true, that would be significant, but it is probably too early 
to judge how ham-fisted the parties choose to be. 
 
¶9.  (C)  We doubt the PUK expects the KDP to take over the KRG 
or is basing actions on that.  We suspect Sa'id thinks the grass 
is greener in KDP areas.  In reality, the lack of protests in 
KDP areas may simply reflect that the KDP has been more 
effective at preventing or suppressing dissent.  Sa'id's 
comments confirm what we have heard from senior PUK staffers 
that some party supporters resent Talabani's role as Iraqi 
President and his lack of focus on the north.  Sa'id's take that 
Kurdish universities are training grounds for political activism 
is plausible. 
 
¶10.  (C)  We since have heard that any protests may come on 
various anniversaries later in April, rather than April 7-8. 
University breaks (which come, e.g., for commemorations) 
probably have as much to do with these protests as location or 
lack of delivery on services; we therefore can anticipate more 
demonstrations in the summer when students return home from 
school. 
ORESTE