VZCZCXRO3942
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKUK #0100/01 1151334
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 251334Z APR 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0598
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0636
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0664

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, ROL COORDINATOR, IRMO/IPCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/25/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KISL PHUM PINS PINR PREL IZ IR SY TU
SUBJECT: SADRISTS SEEK TO BLOCK KURDISH DESIGNS FOR KIRKUK 
 
KIRKUK 00000100  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: JBIGUS, PRT LEADER, REO Kirkuk, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  The Sadr group is searching for ways to 
impede progress on the Kurdification of Kirkuk.  A Sadr 
representative in Kirkuk said the Sadrists, who represented 
about 75 percent of the Shia Arab population in Kirkuk, were at 
odds ideologically with the Badr Organization on Kirkuk issues. 
He also said the Sadrists in Kirkuk had no problems with the 
MNF-I; their problems were with the Kurds.  The Sadr 
representative warned that the Sadrists would not accept Kirkuk 
going to the Kurds and were willing to fight against any group 
that tried to remove Kirkuk from Iraq.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Rejecting Article 58 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  IPAO's on 17 April met with Office of the Martyr Sadr 
(OMS) representative Dr. Abdul Karim Khalifa al-Hassan to 
discuss political issues in Kirkuk.  Hassan rejected Article 58, 
saying it contradicted "all rules on human rights."  He 
complained that since the Iraqi Constitution draft had kept TAL 
Article 58, it also should have retained Article 53, which 
prevented Kirkuk from becoming part of Kurdistan.  Hassan 
advocated reinstating Article 53 in the final Constitution. 
When asked why the Sadrists voted yes on the October 2005 
Constitution referendum, he responded that although the Sadrists 
in the south favored the Constitution, the Sadrists in Kirkuk 
did not. 
 
Da'wa/Sadrists Rival Badr/Kurds in Kirkuk 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Hassan said that more Sadrists and Da'wa members lived 
in Kirkuk than Badr affiliates.  He claimed the Sadrists 
represented about 75 percent of the Shia Arab population in 
Kirkuk.  Hassan said he grouped Da'wa and Sadrists together 
because the two groups shared the same ideology of working 
against Kurdish designs for Kirkuk and favoring administrative 
federalism in Iraq.  He said the Badr Organization, in contrast, 
coalesced with the Kurds and, like the Kurds, advocated ethnic 
federalism. 
 
Kurds, not MNF-I, are Main Nemesis 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Hassan pointed out that Shia Arabs in Kirkuk had not 
committed any terrorist attacks.  He said OMS leader Muqtada 
al-Sadr had given clear orders not to attack MNF-I forces in 
Kirkuk; but instead to focus on protecting Shia Arabs from the 
Kurds.  Hassan proposed that if the Sadrists ever attacked MNF-I 
forces in Kirkuk, Iraqi authorities could imprison him. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Hassan said the Sadrists in Kirkuk had no problems with 
the MNF-I; their problems were with the Kurds.  Hassan argued 
that the Kurds would not be satisfied with Kirkuk oil fields 
alone, but would seek to annex other Iraqi oil territory into 
the KRG.  Hassan complained that the Kurds since Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) had transferred approximately 250,000 of their 
people, many of whom were PKK members, to Kirkuk.  He claimed a 
PKK community now resided in the northeast area of Kirkuk city. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Hassan said Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) forces in Kirkuk were 
gathering more support from the south.  Hassan warned that the 
Sadrists would not accept Kirkuk becoming part of the KRG and 
were willing to fight any group that supported that stance, 
stating, "this is our faith."  He claimed JAM members from Sadr 
City in Baghdad were armed and willing to come to Kirkuk to 
block a Kurdish takeover.  Hassan added that the Shia Arabs had 
the right to defend themselves, saying he was confident the JAM 
could occupy Kirkuk, as it had done in parts of southern Iraq. 
 
Seeking External Help on Kirkuk 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Hassan said he favored allowing the international 
community (i.e. UN) to decide Kirkuk's fate.  He insisted, 
however, that the large influx of Kurds that arrived in Kirkuk 
following OIF needed to return to the north before finalizing 
any decision.  When asked if he would be willing to accept a UN 
decision that gave Kirkuk to the Kurds, Hassan said he would 
support that decision, as long as the international community 
thoroughly and thoughtfully researched it.  He said non-Kurd 
groups in Iraq had formed a consultative committee to work to 
keep Kirkuk part of Iraq, but the committee members had not yet 
implemented any major decisions or plans. 
 
Biographic Note 
 
KIRKUK 00000100  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Hassan was born in Kirkuk.  His father moved to Kirkuk 
from Al Basrah when the British began exploring oil in Kirkuk. 
Hassan earned a Ph.D. in Philosophy.  He is responsible for 
general relations in Kirkuk for the OMS. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Hassan appears to recognize that the Kurds are well on 
their way to taking Kirkuk and is exploring ways to impede the 
process.  Hassan's suggestion that a sufficient number of JAM 
members from the south would be willing to go to Kirkuk and be 
able to defeat the Kurds militarily is an overly bold statement 
at this point.  Despite Badr assertions to the contrary, the 
Sadrists seem to be the dominant Shia Arab group in Kirkuk 
province. 
BIGUS