VZCZCXRO9161
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ
DE RUEHUP #0741/01 1011013
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111013Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8979
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BUDAPEST 000741 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/NCE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR SOCI HU
SUBJECT: HUNGARY'S ELECTIONS: ANALYST SEES CHIEF OPPOSITION 
PARTY AS UNLIKELY TO WIN ELECTION (C-RE6-00145) 
 
REF: A. STATE 22644 
 
     ¶B. BUDAPEST 733 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) Policy research institute "Political Capital" 
Director Krisztian Szabados offered April 10 some thoughts on 
the April 9 first round of the elections and what they 
portend for round two on April 23: 
 
-- the three round-one winners were the governing MSZP with 
more absolute votes than FIDESZ, its junior coalition partner 
SZDSZ, which did better than expected, and the junior 
opposition party MDF, which surprised everyone by polling 
more than five percent to remain in Parliament; 
 
-- MDF, whose campaign "Political Capital" had managed, would 
not agree to cooperate with FIDESZ; 
 
-- FIDESZ's campaign had been technically well run, but 
poorly conceived.  Its U.S. campaign managers had misjudged 
the nature of the Hungarian electorate; 
 
-- MSZP had both managed to provide critical support to its 
coalition partner SZDSZ and, unlike in 2002, alone collect 
more votes that FIDESZ.  With the first round, Prime Minister 
Gyurcsany had consolidated his hold on the party and "put an 
end to the Kadar era," i.e., the popular expectation that the 
government will meet all of its population's needs; 
 
-- A victory April 23 would give the MSZP a "mandate" to 
introduce austerity measures. 
 
--------------------------- 
FIDESZ Facing Uphill Battle 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Policy research institute "Political Capital" 
Director Krisztian Szabados April 10 offered his thoughts on 
the results of the April 9, first round of Hungary's 
parliamentary elections.  (Note: The April 9 contest saw the 
governing MSZP-SZDSZ coalition more than hold its own --ref 
b-- against chief opposition party FIDESZ, which now faces an 
uphill battle to unseat Prime Minister Gyurcsany and his 
team. After being written off by polling companies and 
observers here, the junior opposition party MDF clawed its 
way back into Parliament, while junior governing coalition 
party SZDSZ also crossed the five percent threshold to 
another four years on Hungary's political center stage.) 
 
----------------------- 
MDF Returns to the Fray 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Szabados saw "three winners" of the April 9 first 
round: 
 
-- MSZP which, unlike in 2002, this time had alone received 
more votes than FIDESZ; 
-- SZDSZ which, to the surprise of all, had won a solid 6.5 
percent of the popular vote; 
-- MDF, which against odds had returned to Parliament. 
 
Szabados noted as a footnote that this election round had 
seen significantly fewer "lost votes," i.e., votes cast for 
parties that did not make it into Parliament, than in 2002: 
3 percent on April 9 vice 11 percent four years ago. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Szabados, whose "Political Capital" had designed 
MDF's ultimately successful campaign, described the party as 
deriving its support in this election equally from left and 
right.  This meant, he said, that even if MDF ultimately 
decided to throw its support to FIDESZ, much of its 
electorate would not follow.  (Note:  although Szabados 
claimed he had "research" to prove his contention, it seems 
unlikely that a significant number of left voters would 
support the conservative MDF.  When approached after his 
presentation, Szabados contended that those "left" voters who 
had supported MDF did so out of a disinterested desire to see 
a legitimate right-wing party well established in Hungary. 
This seems counterintuitive.) Later in his presentation, 
Szabados categorically excluded the possibility of a 
FIDESZ-MDF compact.  MDF President Ibolya David had told him 
April 10 that she would not cut a deal with FIDESZ, "even if 
they offered me the UN." 
 
--------------------------- 
 
BUDAPEST 00000741  002 OF 003 
 
 
FIDESZ's Strategy, Mistakes 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Szabados predicted that FIDESZ would use the time 
between rounds of the election --the second round will occur 
April 23-- to stoke the emotions of the electorate, run a 
strongly negative campaign, and allege electoral fraud, as it 
did in 2002.  He expected MSZP to keep the pressure on FIDESZ 
this time around, however, and he pointed to the early 
evening April 10 MSZP rally in downtown Budapest as proof. 
(It has been alleged that MSZP had been too passive in 
similar circumstances in 2002.)  Szabados also claimed that 
the FIDESZ cadres were exhausted.  He pointed to FIDESZ 
candidate and campaign manager Antal Rogan and spokesman 
Peter Szijjarto, whose were visibly fatigued when shown on 
television late April 9, as examples. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Szabados laid much of the blame for FIDESZ's failure 
at the feet of its American campaign advisers, whom he 
described as "stupid" and "detached from reality."  In his 
telling, FIDESZ had adopted a campaign strategy similar to 
that used by the Polish Law and Justice Party and the U.S. 
Republican Party; but the success of both strategies was 
contingent on the existence of a religious right, and 
"Hungary is not a religious country."  Later in his 
presentation, noting that Hungary is, however, a "macho" 
country, Szabados contended that Prime Minister Gyurcsany had 
"humiliated" Orban in their April 5 debate. He recalled that 
Orban had spent much of that contest staring into the camera, 
instead of confronting Gyurcsany directly.  That failure to 
become combative with Gyurcsany had cost Orban the vote of 
some of Hungary's male voters, Szabados thought.  Szabados 
believed that FIDESZ's earlier efforts to court voters from 
the left had been similarly unsuccessful. "(FIDESZ President 
Viktor) Orban is just not credible with the left," he 
contended. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Szabados commended FIDESZ's technical administration 
of its election.  Its large-scale door-to-door campaigning 
and telephone call banks were new in Hungary, but not enough 
for a electorate "in no mood to change governments." 
 
¶8. (SBU) Asked what the future held for Orban, should FIDESZ 
lose this election, Szabados predicted that Orban would 
resign, but that he could return to politics within two 
years. A loss, he thought, would offer MDF an ideal 
opportunity to build a genuine, conservative party. It was 
possible that an alliance with the Christian Democrats, now 
cooperating with FIDESZ could be arranged. 
 
--------------------- 
MSZP Turns the Corner 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Szabados believed that MSZP had engineered 70 
thousand "tactical" votes for SZDSZ to ensure that the Free 
Democrats would make it into Parliament.  That, he asserted, 
had accounted for SZDSZ's improved showing in Budapest.  With 
this election, Szabados said MSZP had ended the Kadar era in 
Hungary.  FIDESZ's strategy had been "pragmatic." It had 
asked voters what they wanted --increased pensions, more 
roads, etc.-- then promised it to them.  Gyurcsany, in 
contrast, had addressed the electorate as adults; aware that 
each new program came with a price tag. The response  on 
election day suggested he had largely succeeded with his 
message, and his success had changed the MSZP. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Gyurcsany's success had registered, Szabados 
thought, on the MSZP's old guard.  He described the MSZP's 
Imre Szekeres and Katalin Szili dogging Gyurcsany around the 
MSZP's campaign nerve center the evening of April 9.  Still, 
he thought the party remains potentially fractious, and 
suggested that a slim majority in Parliament could continue 
to be an important source of external discipline. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Although the MSZP and the SZDSZ had quickly agreed 
on a joint strategy for round two of the elections, Szabados 
did not exclude difficult inter-party relations as a 
government was being formed.  SZDSZ Minister of Education 
Balint Magyar had been "the first minister sacked during a 
campaign debate," he said, referring to Gyurcsany's comment 
in his April 5 debate with Orban. (Gyurcsany said, "We need a 
Socialist minister of education...")  That could set the 
stage for tough inter-party bargaining to come. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Victory April 23 would give Gyurcsany a mandate to 
introduce austerity measures, Szabados thought. It was likely 
the Prime Minister would opt for a "stealth austerity 
package."  Immediate, very public cuts would jeopardize 
 
BUDAPEST 00000741  003 OF 003 
 
 
MSZP's performance in the all-important October local 
elections, and that could not be tolerated. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In the only comment with a foreign policy 
component, Szabados alleged that the pre-election visit to 
Hungary by Russian President Putin had registered positively 
in rural Hungary, where farmers see Russia as an export 
market for their produce. Both Gyurcsany and MSZP President 
Hiller had exploited the Russia angle effectively during the 
campaign, he thought, asking audiences in rural Hungary, "Who 
is the real patriot?  The party that gets Hungarian goods to 
Russian markets." 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Time will tell if Szabados's day-after predictions 
about round two and analysis of round one are accurate, but 
it is clear that the April 9 results represent a setback for 
FIDESZ; one that it will be difficult for the party to 
recover from in the less than two weeks remaining until round 
two. 
 
¶15. (U) Visit Embassy Budapest's classified website: 
www.state.sgov/gov/p/eur/budapest/index.cfm 
WALKER