This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001128 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN AND EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZK EAID ENRG EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: CENTRAL ASIA: LOOKING FOR WAYS TO ADD SUBSTANCE TO 
RELATIONS WITH THE EU 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 383 
     ¶B. BRUSSELS 731 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are both trying to 
add "more substance" to their respective relationships with 
the EU by broaching the idea of extending the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to their countries.  Kyrgyzstan 
plans to propose a draft Action Plan, similar to those the EU 
negotiates under ENP.  Uzbek diplomats portrayed the 
imposition of EU sanctions as having little or no impact on 
Uzbek policy; however, the GOU is trying to show that it is 
listening to the concerns of the EU.  The EU Council 
Secretariat does not expect any significant improvement in 
 
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EU/Uzbek relations before 2007 because President Karimov 
"desperately" needs the solid support of Russian and Chinese 
friendship through the 2007 election cycle.  In the 
Secretariat's view, once Karimov is "reelected" next year, he 
 
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may begin to reach out to the west for rapprochement and 
distance himself from Russia and China.  Apals said that 
Germany is trying to work out a mechanism with Uzbekistan for 
an "international independent investigation" into Andijon 
possibly under UN auspices; since no one has defined the 
terms of such an inquiry means, there could a number of 
various solutions that could accommodate the Uzbeks.  End 
Summary. 
 
EU/Central Asia: An Overview 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Poloff met with Brussels-based Central Asian diplomats 
recently to discuss the present status of their respective 
countries' relations with the EU and to discuss how they see 
relations with the EU trending over the course of the next 
few years. (Comment: Officials from the Embassy of 
Turkmenistan in Brussels declined poloff's request for a 
meeting. End comment.)  Because Central Asian nations are not 
part of the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 
cooperation with the region does not have the same status as 
with the South Caucasus, which were added to the ENP in 2004. 
 To wit, Central Asian nations have varying levels of 
engagement with the EU at this stage depending on their 
strategic significance: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the 
most engaged; Tajikistan moderately engaged; and Uzbekistan 
is struggling to maintain a positive image after the 
imposition of EU sanctions following Andijon.  Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan are both trying to add "more substance" to their 
respective relationships with the EU by broaching the idea of 
extending the ENP to their countries.  Tajikistan receives 
significant assistance from the European Commission but is 
increasingly trying to persuade European companies to invest 
in the country.   Uzbekistan has an uphill climb to repair 
its relationship with the EU; its officials maintain that 
they are not completely isolated from the EU and are open to 
dialogue. Turkmenistan does not appear to desire deeper 
engagement with the EU and is satisfied confining the 
relationship to an energy dialogue. 
 
Uzbekistan 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) Nodir Ganiyev and Ulugbek Agzamov, political/security 
officers at the Uzbekistan Mission to 
the EU, said that Uzbekistan wants to have a better dialogue 
with the EU but the circumstances for re-opening cooperation 
are difficult.  Bilateral mechanisms for official dialogue 
between the EU and Uzbekistan were suspended in October and 
the scheduled meeting of the Cooperation Council in February 
was postponed indefinitely, pending Uzbekistan's acceptance 
of in international inquiry on Andijon.  Recognizing that the 
relationship is strained, Ganiyev maintained that Uzbekistan 
is not completely 'frozen-out' of discussions with EU 
officials.  He said that Ambassador Vladimir Norov has 
regular conversations with EU Special Representative (EUSR) 
for Central Asia Jan Kubis and that the Ambassador still has 
meetings with Commission and Council officials.  The 
Ambassador, and the GOU, are trying to show that they are 
listening to the concerns of the EU. 
 
¶4. (C) Poloff asked what the practical effect of EU sanctions 
has been on Uzbek thinking.  They portrayed sanctions as 
having little or no impact on Uzbek policy and actions. 
Agzamov said that Uzbekistan does not buy military 
equipment/arms from Europe anyway so the sanctions have had 
no effect on Uzbek arms procurement; he also said that Uzbek 
officials in Tashkent do not travel to Europe frequently 
either so the travel restrictions have not had a dramatic 
effect.  Despite Agzamov's assertions that sanctions have not 
altered Uzbek policy, Ganiyev nevertheless said that the GOU 
would still work to try to have them lifted at the end of the 
year when they come up for review by the EU.  They said the 
EU should take into account that the Ministers of Interior 
and Defense are in new positions which shows that they are 
undertaking their own necessary steps to redress what 
happened. 
 
¶5. (C) Ganiyev forcefully conveyed that the Andijon events 
were inspired by Islamic extremists and that these people 
were not peacefully protesting, as was the common portrayal 
in the EU.  He claimed that after Andijon, when the EU was 
calling for an international investigation, the EU never 
invited Ambassador Norov to explain the GOU's side of the 
story and that this was insulting.  They proceeded to show 
poloff a GOU-produced documentary video (in English) which 
they said showed the true nature of the events at Andijon. 
They said they invited EU representatives to observe the 
"open and fair" Andijon 
trials but that the officials refused.  They said the number 
one issue for the GOU is maintaining stability and combating 
extremist elements from Afghanistan. 
 
¶6. (C) Moving on to energy, Ganiyev said that Gazprom 
investments in Uzbekistan would hopefully create the 
opportunity for the GOU to be involved in energy transport 
discussions with the EU "on a mutually beneficial basis." 
The GOU is in favor of projects that connect Caucasus energy 
with Europe and they hope to be involved in such projects. 
However, they stressed they do not want the dialogue on 
energy to become "politicized." 
 
 
Kazakhstan 
---------- 
 
¶7. (C) Arman Abikenov, Counselor at the Kazakhastan Mission 
to the EU, cited a number of recent and forthcoming 
high-level meetings between EU and Kazakh officials as 
evidence that the EU/Kazakh relationship is strong and 
getting stronger: EU Special Representative (EUSR) for 
Central Asia Jan Kubis will travel to Astana twice in April; 
EU Commissioners Piebalgs and Ferrero-Waldner have received 
invitations to travel to Astana and have indicated that they 
will go, although dates have not been set.  He stated that 
relations with the European Parliament are particularly 
strong and a number of "pro-Kazakh" Parliamentary Deputies 
have come to Astana to deepen relations. 
 
¶8. (C) He said the core political issues for Kazakhstan with 
the EU are: a) Application for OSCE 
Chairman-in-Office; b) Attaining Market Economy Status from 
the EU; c) WTO accession.  He stressed that the EU is, and 
will continue to be, a foreign policy priority for the Kazakh 
government; he noted that President Nazarbayev listed 
relations with the EU fourth in his list of foreign policy 
priorities in his recent state of the union speech.  Abikenov 
said the GOK realizes that cooperation with the EU in trade 
and economics is of highest importance but that WTO accession 
would take precedence. 
 
¶9. (C) Abikenov said that Kazakhstan is interested in 
starting a dialogue on possibly extending the EU's European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to Kazakhstan; he said that 
Kazakhstan will start to press this at a higher level.  This 
falls into the context of what kind of relationship the EU 
wants to have with Kazakhstan after 2008 when the current 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) expires. 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
---------- 
 
¶10. (C) Aibek Tilebaliev, Minister Counselor at the Embassy 
of the Kyrgyzstan, said that his government wants to add 
"more substance" to the EU/Kyrgyz relationship.  As a result, 
the EU has been receptive to Kyrgyz proposals for an Action 
Plan; Bishkek is preparing a draft for proposal at a meeting 
of the Cooperation Council in April but Tilebaliev lamented 
that it has been a very slow process - "it is hard to get 
people in Bishkek to focus on this."  He said that the EU has 
conveyed clearly in meetings of the 
Cooperation Council that it wants constitutional reforms to 
continue. 
¶11. (C) In a discussion on Kyrgyzstan's domestic political 
situation, Tilebaliev lamented that, unfortunately, the 
Kyrgyz people are still waiting for jobs and improvements one 
year after the "Tulip Revolution."  He speculated that new 
elections could occur after the constitutional referendum 
which is due to take place later this year.  He said that 
politicians in Bishkek are divided over what kind of future 
government (presidential or parliamentary) they want. 
Frankly speaking, he said, people are still trying to figure 
what exactly these new systems would mean; referendums, he 
commented, "are usually in favor of the government." 
Tilebaliev predicted that the new Parliamentary speaker would 
bring needed stabilization to the Kyrgyz political scene; 
this would enable the Kyrgyz parliament to accomplish more. 
Sidestepping the question of the status of the relationship 
between PM Kulov and President Bakiyev, Tilebaliev said that 
they enjoy a "working relationship" but did not elaborate. 
 
¶12. (C) Discussing regional cooperation, Tilebaliev said that 
Presidents Bakiyev and Karimov met recently in St. Petersburg 
and that the relationship has improved after the tension 
following Andijon.  The 
Presidents have agreed to re-open some of the border 
crossings that were shut after Andijon and even agreed to 
open up some new ones.  While highlighting this positive 
development, Tilebaliev 
said that difficulties still remain such as mine-placement 
along the border.  The GOK wants to have better border 
demarcation and security with Tajikistan; the present border 
is a problem because Tajik squatters are entering southern 
Kyrgyzstan and taking over land illegally.  The government is 
discussing with Tajikistan how to address this issue. 
Tilebaliev said that relations with China and Russia are 
good. Russia is increasing its troop/military hardware 
presence in Kyrgyzstan, and there is no friction between 
Bishkek and Beijing over treatment of Uighurs, which he 
acknowledged had been a problem in the past. 
 
Tajikistan 
---------- 
 
¶13. (C) Behzod Mingboev, political officer at the Tajikistan 
Embassy in Brussels, said that Tajik/EU relations are good 
but noted that cooperation is mostly confined to assistance 
through the Commission; it is important, he said, for the GOT 
to improve its image in the EU.  EU programs are helping with 
border troop training facilities to support counter-narcotics 
efforts.  Mingboev emphasized that what the GOT 
really wants is more investment and it is trying to persuade 
EU-based companies to invest in key sectors, such as 
hydroelectric power.  However, Mingboev said that Tajikistan 
is interested in capital from anywhere -- whether it is 
Russia, China, India, or the EU -- the Tajik economy needs 
investment. (Comment: Per ref B, the Commission stated that 
Tajikistan is the biggest recipient of assistance in the CIS 
and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 
End comment.) 
 
The View from the EU Council 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) In a separate meeting with poloff on March 22, Gints 
Apals, EU Council official with responsibility for Central 
Asia, said that while the geographical limits to the ENP have 
never been defined, there are few enthusiasts among Member 
States for extending ENP to countries in Central Asia, such 
as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  (Comment: In an interesting 
aside on Kazakhstan, Apals said he heard 
from "Japanese sources" that Russian special services were 
behind the recent high-level opposition killing in Kazakhstan 
as a way to destabilize Nazarbayev.  End Comment.)  First, 
Apals said, the ENP has not proven that it is an effective 
mechanism yet; the ENP needs to make more advancements for 
Member States to even consider such a proposal.  Second, a 
country like Kazakhstan could conceivably claim a "European 
identity" because part of its territory lies in Europe but 
Kyrgyzstan cannot make such a 
claim; for Kazakhstan, "it would take a long time" for any 
movement on an Action Plan and Kyrgyzstan would be even more 
complicated, Apals said. Perhaps these issues will be raised 
at the Cooperation Council meeting in Astana on April 5, 
Apals said, and Member States will merely be obliged to "take 
note" of Kyrgyzstan's and Kazakhstan's initiatives on Action 
Plans. 
 
¶15. (C) Discussing Uzbekistan, Apals said that one should not 
expect any significant improvement in EU/Uzbek relations 
before 2007 because President Karimov "desperately" needs the 
solid support of Russian and Chinese friendship through the 
2007 election cycle.  Once Karimov is "reelected" next year, 
Apals believes, Karimov may begin to reach out to the west 
and EU for rapprochement and distance himself a little from 
Russia and China.  Uzbekistan Ambassador to the EU Vladimir 
Norov is pressing hard for renewed dialogue with the EU, 
Apals said, and he has heard rumors that Norov is one of the 
officials that Karimov has given permission to reach out to 
western interlocutors.  However, EUSR Kubis recently tried to 
make a visit to Tashkent but was told by officials there not 
to come, Apals said - not exactly a rebuke but not a sign of 
warming relations either; EUSR Kubis enjoys good personal 
relations with President Karimov, Apals said, so this request 
had to have been made by Karimov himself.  Apals said that 
Germany is trying to work out a mechanism with Uzbekistan for 
an "international independent investigation" into Andijon 
possibly under UN auspices; since no one has clearly defined 
what "international independent investigation" means, Apals 
said, Germany thinks there could be a number of various 
solutions that could accommodate the Uzbeks. 
 
¶16. (C) On Tajikistan, Apals said that although the country 
is the largest recipient of EU aid in the CIS, he believes 
that better EU relations is not a first-tier priority for 
Tajikistan.  President Rahmonov merely sees the EU as a 
political counterweight to his neighbors Russia, China, and 
Iran; the EU is seen as having more of an "honest broker" 
role amongst these powerful actors.  Tajikistan is likely to 
continue to be the largest recipient of EU aid, Apals said, 
because "Kazakhstan does not need it, Turkmenistan is not 
asking for it, there is no traction for more aid among EU 
Member States for Kyrgyzstan, and political conditions do not 
make more aid possible for Uzbekistan." 
 
¶17. (C) On Turkmenistan, Apals said that "60% of the 
EU/Turkmen relationship is devoted to energy dialogue." 
During EUSR Kubis' recent trip to Ashgabat, Apals got the 
impression that there is heavy pressure on President Niyazov 
from Moscow on the energy front.  However, Niyazov did 
express interest in two options for bringing Turkmen gas to 
Europe, Apals said: 1) A pipeline through Kazakhstan 
controlled by an international consortium; 2) a Trans-Caspian 
Pipeline controlled by an international consortium. 
Gray 
.