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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAE #0381/01 1180835
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280835Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8112
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0068
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 5857
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1125
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4553
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1295
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0175
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0193
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0980
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0294
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0498

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: GSE CONFIRMS ROLE IN EASTERN FRONT TALKS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 00952 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On April 24, 2006 Ambassador DeLisi 
met with PFDJ Political Advisor Yemane Ghebreab to 
discuss recent news that Eritrea would host 
negotiations between the Eastern Front and the 
Government of National Unity (GNU).  Ghebreab 
explained that during his recent visit to Khartoum, 
the GSE was asked to take a leading role in the 
Eastern Front negotiations and nothing to date has 
changed.  Ghebreab acknowledged that there were many 
issues to resolve, including the role/identity of 
observers and whether the Libyans would be involved 
in the process.  However he remained hopeful that 
negotiations could start as soon as possible in May. 
For the GSE, this is a chance to show themselves as 
an important, and constructive, player on Sudan and 
on this issue at least, we believe that they will try 
to be exactly that.   End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In a meeting on April 24, PFDJ Political 
Advisor Yemane Ghebreab explained to Ambassador 
DeLisi that during his recent visit to Khartoum he 
was surprised by the different tone expressed by the 
Government of National Unity (GNU).  The GNU seemed 
willing to accept a broader Eritrean role on a number 
of issues and specifically requested EritreaQs 
assistance as a mediator with the Eastern Front. 
Ghebreab confirmed that the GNU had asked for Eritrea 
not only to play a leading role in the eastern Sudan 
negotiations but to play a larger role in the Darfur 
talks. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador DeLisi asked whether the Eritreans 
were ready to host negotiations and what outstanding 
issues remained.  Ghebreab replied that the GSE was 
willing and ready to host negotiations, but much work 
still needed to be done.  He was clear that the 
Eritreans had not yet done a great deal of planning 
but he was confident they would be ready when the 
time came.  Although he was unable to provide a date 
for negotiations, it seemed clear that they would not 
begin in early May as initially speculated.  He added 
that the GSE was not interested in a Qbig showQ, and 
instead would be hosting a low-key, no-frills event. 
 
¶4. (C) Ghebreab emphasized that the GSE would like 
these negotiations to be short and to the point. 
Although some of the issues in the east mirror those 
addressed in the CPA and in the Darfur talks, 
Ghebreab did not believe that the political dynamic 
in the east was nearly as complex.  As a result, he 
was hopeful that negotiations could be completed 
quickly and, with a tightly focused mediation, that 
they could avoid the problems that have beset the 
Abuja talks. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Ghebreab told the Ambassador that the GSE 
supported having observers attend the talks, but they 
did not want attendance on the scale seen in Abuja or 
Naivasha.  He argued that a small number of 
observers, as well as a small number of delegates 
from both sides, will be more constructive and he has 
stressed this point to both the GNU and Chairman of 
the Eastern Front Musa Muhammed Ahmed.  When asked 
about a role for Libya, Ghebreab noted that this too 
is still under consideration.  He did not rule out 
the possibility, observing that both the GNU and the 
Eastern Front had certain equities with the Libyans. 
However, he said that on both the question of 
observers and on the Libyan role, the GNU had left 
the decision to the Eritreans, and Ghebreab made it 
clear that the GSE saw this as their decision to 
make, although it was equally clear that they would 
do so carefully after consultation with both the GNU 
and the Eastern Front. 
 
¶6. (C) When asked about whether the GNU had raised 
any concerns about the GSEQs role in light of the 
April 11 attacks near Hamesh Koreib (see reftel), 
Ghebreab said that he had heard nothing that would 
suggest any GNU concerns about its request for 
Eritrean involvement in eastern Sudan.  In fact, he 
continued, the GNU had followed through on the 
commitment it had made to the Eritreans during the 
Khartoum talks to have the GSE play a greater role in 
Abuja.  He confirmed that PFDJ Sudan Watcher Abdallah 
Jabir had in fact been picked up in Asmara by a 
Sudanese Presidential plan on April 20 and flown to 
Khartoum and then on to Abuja with the GNU 
delegation. 
 
¶7. (C) Ghebreab acknowledged that the GSE remains in 
close contact with the Norwegian Government with 
which it has built a strong partnership on Sudan 
issues.  The Ambassador noted that we too have been 
working closely with Norway on these issues and that 
we applaud the GSEQs efforts to be a constructive 
actor.  In response to the AmbassadorQs query, 
Ghebreab said that the GSE had not asked Norway for 
any assistance with the negotiations - yet.  Noting 
that the GSE still had to work through various issues 
internally and with the parties, he indicated that 
any request right now would be premature.  He did, 
however, comment that, given the GSEQs intention to 
keep the negotiations low-profile and to avoid a 
circus-like atmosphere, financial support at least 
should not require major contributions.  Ambassador 
noted that he would be happy to convey to Washington 
any GSE thoughts on how the USG could assist with the 
process and Ghebreab promised to let us know the 
GSEQs thinking once it clarified a bit more. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment:  Ghebreab not only confirmed the 
GSEQs role as mediator for the eastern negotiations 
but he equally conveyed to us the sense that the GSE 
sees this as a major development for Eritrea and its 
role in the Sudan peace process.  The GSE would 
clearly love to deliver a success to demonstrate to 
its regional neighbors and the broader international 
community that Eritrea is a Qplayer.Q The GSE also 
understands that a rapprochement with Sudan has 
implications for regional position and by extension 
its relative strength in the border dispute with 
Ethiopia.  Finally, we believe that the GSE is also 
keenly aware that a constructive Eritrean role on 
Sudan could also have impact on EritreaQs relations 
with other international actors - a point Ghebreab 
tacitly conceded in his conversation with the 
Ambassador.  All in all, this is a high stakes 
undertaking for the GSE on a broader regional stage; 
although positive results are far from guaranteed, we 
believe that we will see a concerted GSE effort to 
make it happen.  End Comment. 
 
DELISI