VZCZCXRO6560
OO RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR
DE RUEHAN #0364/01 1081405
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181405Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2598
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0633
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0030
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0028
RUEHPL/AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS 0177

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
PARIS FOR D'ELIA 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
KAMPALA FOR MHSIANG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM CN
SUBJECT:  Comoros Holds Primaries in Anjouan 
 
REF:  ANTAN 263 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Awaiting official announcement by the 
Constitutional Court, the National Electoral Commission of 
the Union of the Comoros published interim results from the 
April 16 Presidential primary putting candidates Sambi, 
Ibrahim Halidi, and Djaanfari through to the second round. 
Though nicknamed "Ayatollah" because he studied in Iran and 
Saudi Arabia decades ago, frontrunner Sambi neither claims 
to be nor appears in his actions to be an Islamic extremist. 
The South Africans, under the banner of the African Union 
(AU), did an admirable job keeping the peace as 
international and national observers were welcomed by 
enthusiastic Comoran voters.  Neither the National nor 
Island Electoral Commission scored high marks for 
preparation or management.  As long as the Court in Moroni 
announces the expected winners, Comoros should rather calmly 
turn to the national campaign for the May 14 election.  A 
more visible AU leadership role, or unexpected wisdom from 
Azali, will probably be needed if the second round is to go 
so well.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U)  The Union of the Comoros has been wracked with 
instability since it achieved independence from France in 
¶1975.  President Azali took power in a coup in 1999 and then 
was voted into power in elections in 2002.  If successful, 
this election will mark the first peaceful democratic 
transfer of power since Comoran independence.  The three- 
island nation has also suffered secessionist struggles that 
led to the current political compromise whereby each island 
assumes the presidency in turn.  President Azali, coming 
from Grand Comore, must therefore cede to a candidate from 
Anjouan.  The purpose of the April 16 primary on Anjuoan was 
therefore to select the three island candidates who will 
compete in the national presidential election to be held May 
¶14. 
 
Sambi, Halidi, Djaanfari Projected to Win 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U)  As of midday April 18, populist Ahmed Sambi, former 
French military officer Mohamed Djaanfari, and President 
Azali's party candidate Ibrahim Halidi were projected to 
have placed first, second and third in the Anjouan 
primaries, passing to the national presidential election May 
¶14.  The National Electoral Commission, after two days of 
silence, announced unofficial results April 18, giving Sambi 
26 percent and Djaanfari and Halidi each 14 percent.  The 
High Constitutional Court in Moroni has the legal authority 
to declare the official winners and is expected to do so 
before the 72-hour deadline runs out April 19. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  The only significant candidate not to pass the 
primaries was Mohamed Caabi, current Union Vice President, 
who reportedly had 10 percent of the vote.  Eight other 
minor candidates, unknowns or has-beens, each earned five 
percent or less.  A handful of Caabi supporters and family 
caused a disturbance at the hotel housing Union officials 
and international observers, chanting that "Azali stole the 
election."  The protests were small and were kept under 
control by South African-led African Union troops. 
Observers noted that most Comorans associated Caabi with the 
current ineffectual Azali regime, and across the island 
whoever voters supported, part of their vote seemed to be 
against Caabi.  Further, rumors were that Anjouan Island 
President Bacar had it in for Caabi, and reportedly deployed 
two or three of the other candidates to try to undermine the 
Union Vice President. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  A haggard and nervous Caabi came to the hotel in 
an attempt to calm and disperse the crowd April 17.  He 
attempted weakly to deliver a letter of protest to AU 
officials, then left the scene.  To guarantee safe passage, 
the South Africans flew Union government representatives by 
helicopter from the hotel to the airport for their departure 
from Anjouan.  By April 18, international observers had 
returned to Moroni and the ballots transferred to the 
Constitutional Court; thus Anjouan was mostly quiet awaiting 
official results. 
 
"We delivered the election" 
--------------------------- 
 
 
ANTANANARI 00000364  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6. (SBU)  South African Ambassador Mabeta, admitting a few 
irregularities, proudly said April 17, "we delivered the 
election."  South African-led AU troops (AMISEC), with a few 
Mauritian, Malagasy, and Egyptian forces, were professional 
and effective in providing a presence of deterrence.  While 
not present at most polling stations, the AMISEC handled 
crowd control at a few big voting sites, conducted roving 
patrols, and stood ready to respond if needed.  Above all, 
the AMISEC presence, requested by the Union Government and 
welcomed by the Comorans, made it possible for all Anjouan 
gendarmerie and security forces to stay in their barracks. 
There was no sign of domestic Anjouan or Union Comoran 
uniforms during the primaries April 16. 
 
International and National Observers 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (U)  Several independent Comoran observers were joined by 
20 international observers led by La Francophonie (OIF) and 
including the Arab League, African Union, French and U.S. 
Embassies.  In addition, each candidate was eligible to have 
his own delegate at each voting site - only six or seven had 
the support to actually assign someone to most locations. 
Embassy Antananarivo PolEcon Chief and Embassy Port Louis 
PolOff separately visited a total of over 80 polling 
stations, about two-thirds of the 220 sites in Anjouan's 
five regions.  Turnout appeared to be high, though an 
official count will be needed to confirm what percentage of 
112,000 registered voters cast a ballot for one of the 12 
candidates.  Voting lines were full of Comoran women waiting 
to cast their vote, many in rural areas descending on the 
polls in the afternoons after tending to their work in the 
fields all morning.  Observers did not report signs of 
intimidation or interference. 
 
National and Island Electoral Commission Incompetence 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Relatively peaceful and seemingly fair primaries 
occurred in spite of incompetence and lack of accountability 
at both the National (CNEC) and Island (CIEC) Electoral 
Commissions; who were jointly responsible for organization. 
Voting materials were delivered late to almost every polling 
station, resulting in hours of delay across the island. 
Worse, the evening of April 15, the CIEC, with the approval 
of the CNEC, accepted a last-minute claim by several 
candidates to change dozens of voting bureau presidents. 
Responding to the allegation that many were biased, the CIEC 
set about finding replacements well into the night, then 
trying to communicate the changes across the vast void of 
the mountainous isle.  As a result many polling stations 
failed to open before 2 p.m. April 16, especially in the 
southern Nioumakele region. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  The Electoral Commissions almost had an 
opportunity to compound their error when Azali's candidate, 
Halidi, asked for the election to be canceled late April 16. 
His argument was that the irregularity of changing the 
polling station presidents (which he had endorsed the day 
before!) had disadvantaged his supporters in the Nioumakele 
region.  Halidi dropped his complaint April 17 when results 
came in, including from Nioumakele stations that remained 
open past midnight, indicating he had made the top three. 
Uncertainty prevailed from the day of the poll through 
midday April 18, when the CNEC finally made an interim 
announcement. 
 
Least Worst Case Scenario 
------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU)  While imperfect, the Anjouan presidential primary 
could scarcely have gone better from the perspective of hope 
for democracy in Comoros.  Sambi, a successful businessman, 
devout Muslim, and inspiring populist speaker, was clearly 
the candidate for change and the candidate of the poor.  His 
slogan of "Pour servir, pas se servir" (To serve, not serve 
oneself) resonated with frustrated Comorans, as did his 
campaign promise to put a roof over every head.  Sambi is 
the one candidate who would have had genuine street protests 
on his behalf if he had lost.  (Note:  Though nicknamed 
"Ayatollah" because he studied in Iran and Saudi Arabia 
decades ago, Sambi neither claims to be nor appears in his 
actions to be an Islamic extremist.  For his running-mate he 
 
ANTANANARI 00000364  003 OF 003 
 
 
named Idi Nadhoim, an economist who spent five years with 
the United Nations in Addis Ababa, a successful businessman, 
and well-known secularist moderate.  Both Sambi and Idi 
speak perfect English and have stated publicly and privately 
their wish to work closely with the United States if 
elected.  End Note.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Halidi, while President Azali's party's 
candidate, was less associated with the current government 
than Caabi, and thus avoided the "referendum" vote against 
him.  Caabi's failed attempt the morning of April 17 to call 
people to the streets using the Mosque bells appeared to 
confirm he lacked popular support.  Halidi benefited from 
Azali's war chest and a limited personal following. 
Djaanfari was universally described as a relative unknown; 
his French military background will not help in the next 
round in a country that has already experienced "French 
influence." 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  The disturbances caused by Caabi "supporters" 
were minor and contained by the South African troops -- 
although they could have been defused if an Election 
Commission or AU official had the nerve to make a public 
statement of some kind.  Still, overall, the military and 
civilian international presence was welcomed as positive by 
the vast majority of Comorans. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  Beyond "getting it over with," the 
Anjouan primary offers several lessons for the second round. 
The National Electoral Commission cannot be counted on in a 
crisis, thus Azali himself or international observers will 
have to calm tensions when they arise.  The South Africans 
proved themselves capable of providing security, and even 
helped the hapless Electoral Commissions with logistics. 
South African Ambassador Mabeta seemed eager keep a low 
profile and have his country's troops be seen but not 
needed.  For South Africa, the AMISEC mission is all 
downside:  if it goes well it was supposed to, if it fails 
it was all their fault. 
 
¶14. (SBU)  Apart from the South Africans, the AU played a 
technical role, but offered no real leadership.  When 
tensions flared at the hotel and Caabi supporters asked to 
see an "international observer," AU observers hid in their 
rooms while journalists took pictures.  Simply accepting a 
written request to examine irregularities from Caabi may 
have had a calming effect, instead AMISEC had to order the 
crowds back across the parking lot.  On May 14, it will be 
necessary for AU Special Representative Madeira, or some 
other authority, to step to the podium with information and 
a voice of reason.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶15. (U)  Embassy Antananarivo would like to express 
appreciation to Embassy Port Louis for their assistance and 
cooperation in this election monitoring effort. 
 
SIBLEY