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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000757 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: GOA REJECTS SYG'S REPORT ON WESTERN SAHARA, 
REQUESTS "NEUTRAL" RESOLUTION 
 
REF: A. USUN 767 
     ¶B. USUN 794 
     ¶C. RABAT 729 
     ¶D. RABAT 734 
     ¶E. ALGIERS 623 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
 SUMMARY AND COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶1.  (C) MFA Counselor and former UN Ambassador Abdallah Baali 
convoked Ambassador April 25 to explain Algeria's rejection 
of the recommendations in the UNSYG's report on the Western 
Sahara, which Baali claimed "ignored the achievements of the 
past" by abandoning the Baker Plan and the principle of 
self-determination.  Algeria, he stated, will not be a party 
to direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario 
based on a Moroccan autonomy proposal, since Morocco would 
not offer genuine autonomy and the approach did not include 
an element of self-determination.  Ambassador noted he had no 
instructions on the SYG report, but reiterated U.S. support 
for a mutually acceptable political solution within a UN 
framework, for direct talks between Morocco and the 
Polisario, and for the development of an expansive autonomy 
proposal by Morocco.  Ambassador stressed the need for 
creative thinking about how to proceed given the fact that 
Morocco would always reject independence while the Polisario 
would always reject integration.  Autonomy therefore offered 
the only possibility of common ground.  Direct 
Polisario-Morocco negotiations without preconditions could 
create space to find common ground.  Otherwise we risked 
condemning the refugees to another thirty years in the camps. 
 Baali argued that time did not favor Morocco, and that 
pressure from Sahrawi street demonstrations inside Western 
Sahara could over time force Morocco to return to the idea of 
a referendum.  Baali asked that the U.S. support a "neutral" 
UNSC resolution on MINURSO renewal that at most "took note 
of" but did not "welcome" the SYG's report. 
 
¶2.  (C) Given the sharpness of both Algeria and the 
Polisario's reaction to the SYG's report, we recommend 
careful consideration be given to the idea of a neutral 
resolution and technical rollover.  Looking ahead, though, we 
should continue to promote direct Moroccan-Polisario talks 
without preconditions, with Algeria and Mauritania 
participating as "interested neighbors," while looking for 
creative ways to integrate an exercise in self-determination 
into the autonomy framework.  We should also seek to lay the 
groundwork for a more private dialogue on creative ways to 
reconcile autonomy with self-determination.  We do not 
believe, as Embassy Rabat has suggested, that double-teaming 
with France at this juncture would be productive. 
French-Algerian relations are at a particularly raw point 
because of heated rhetoric over France's colonial rule and, 
even in the best of times, Polisario and Algeria see France 
as one-sidedly in favor of Morocco.  Accordingly, a 
U.S.-hosted framework as proposed by Ambassador Bolton 
strikes us as a more productive way to proceed, or at least 
to keep the pressure on for new thinking.  Unlike Lebanon, 
associating ourselves with France on this issue will not, in 
our view, help advance our goals.  End summary and comment. 
 
GOA REACTS NEGATIVELY TO UNSYG'S REPORT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) MFA Counselor (and former UN Ambassador) Abdallah 
Baali convoked Ambassador to MFA April 25.  DCM accompanied 
Ambassador.  Baali explained the GOA had received an advance 
text of Annan's report.  Bouteflika had written a letter to 
Annan requesting that Algeria's position be explained in the 
report, but that did not occur, perhaps, Baali speculated, 
because Bouteflika's letter would have undermined the 
report's recommendation that there be negotiations to include 
Algeria.  Algeria will not be a party to negotiations on 
Morocco's autonomy proposal, Baali stressed.  In response to 
Ambassador's comment that Algeria is certainly a concerned 
neighbor if not a party, Baali agreed Algeria should have a 
say as a neighboring state but would not play a role as a 
party to the dispute.  The negotiations must be between 
Morocco and the Polisario.  Pressed by Ambassador, Baali 
acknowledged that Algeria and Mauritania had been involved in 
the negotiations leading to the Houston Accords.  Baali, who 
participated in the Algerian delegation to Houston, said 
their role had been limited to discussions of the cantonment 
of military forces and the return of refugees. 
 
BAKER STILL THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Baali asserted that the Baker Plan was still on the 
table.  It provided for all options:  autonomy, independence, 
and integration.  Algeria saw no need for a new plan.  If 
there were to be Moroccan-Polisario negotiations, they should 
be aimed at the implementation of Baker.  Ambassador asked if 
it was correct that Algeria would not support negotiations 
without preconditions?  Baali said yes, Algeria supported 
Baker, while recognizing there would be a need for 
negotiations on the implementation of Baker.  Foreign 
Minister Bedjaoui was in New York April 24 to "make clear to 
Annan that forgetting the achievements already made was not 
the right approach."  The concept of negotiations without 
preconditions was unacceptable to Algeria. 
 
¶5.  (C) Reviewing the negotiations leading to the Houston 
accords, Baali said the Algerian and Mauritanian delegations 
had been present, but in separate rooms from the Moroccan and 
Polisario negotiators.  Algeria and Mauritania had only been 
directly involved in discussions on cantonment of Polisario 
forces on their territory and the return of refugees, while 
the parties also discussed the voter list and referendum 
electoral campaign.  Baker had, however, provided regular 
briefings to the Algerian delegation, and the Algerian 
delegation remained in close touch with the Polisario 
delegation throughout.  Ambassador asked why this could not 
be the format for negotiations now, with Algeria maintaining 
its position of not being a party but rather a concerned 
neighbor?  Baali replied that Houston was meant to find a way 
to implement the UN settlement plan.  Now, however, Annan was 
calling for negotiations without preconditions, a totally 
different format and "logic."  Algeria did not see the need 
to start over from scratch, especially since autonomy was one 
of the options included in Baker.  All the elements were 
present in Baker, the problem was that Morocco had lost 
confidence that it could win a referendum after five years of 
autonomy, even if the Moroccan settlers voted. 
 
AMBASSADOR STRESSES NEED TO FIND COMMON GROUND 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  (C) Ambassador said that while he did not have 
instructions on the SYG's report per se, the U.S. view was 
that we sought a political solution in the UN framework. 
There should be a direct dialogue between Morocco and 
Polisario to create a political space in which a compromise 
could be achieved.  A solution must be mutually acceptable, 
since neither the U.S. nor the international community would 
impose a settlement.  Since Morocco rejects independence and 
the Polisario rejects integration, it made sense to focus on 
autonomy as the only possible area of common ground.  We did 
not want to condemn the Sahrawi refugees to another 30 years 
in the camps.  We had therefore urged Morocco to come up with 
a meaningful autonomy proposal with real self-government. 
Ambassador noted that while he understood that Algeria was 
unhappy with Annan's report, it did call for 
self-determination to be part of the settlement. 
 
¶7.  (C) Baali said the problem with Morocco's approach to 
autonomy was that it actually led back to the integration 
track.  It should be up to the Sahrawis to decide what they 
wanted, as had been the case with all other cases of 
decolonization.  Noting he was speaking personally, 
Ambassador commented there was a need to find a way to 
implement the principle of self-determination creatively in a 
way that would be acceptable to both parties.  It was clear 
we were at an impasse; there was a need for creative thinking 
that could reconcile the legitimate concerns of both sides. 
Algerians had voted in a referendum on independence in which 
there was only one option.  Since Algeria as well as we knew 
that autonomy was the only possible basis for finding common 
ground, why couldn't a similar approach be explored that 
would bring a solution within a self-determination framework? 
 Ambassador added that the idea of mutually agreeing to 
extend the 5-year autonomy period (until everyone was certain 
a referendum would produce the desired result) -- an idea 
that MFA SYG Lamamra and Baali himself had mentioned to him 
in recent conversations -- was the type of creative idea that 
should be privately explored.  Baali responded that it should 
be up to the Sahrawis to choose.  Algeria's independence 
referendum was not a good parallel because all the elements 
of independence had already been worked out with France, he 
argued.  The bottom line was that Algeria could not accept 
the SYG's proposed format. 
 
TIME FACTOR NOT IN MOROCCO'S FAVOR 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Baali said there was also a time factor.  Algeria saw 
no need to rush into negotiations that would leave it up to 
the parties to find a solution without reference to past 
agreements.  Ambassador pointed out that the parties would 
not be on their own, the international community would help 
them.  Baali responded that there was a new situation on the 
ground in the Western Sahara with the demonstrations held 
since last fall.  For many years the population of the 
Western Sahara had been quiet, so both Morocco and Algeria 
had been surprised by the new level of Sahrawi national 
identity.  This was creating a new situation in which changes 
on the ground could speed up the process of holding a 
referendum as Morocco and the international community felt 
the impact of the new Sahrawi nationalism.  Ambassador 
commented that it appeared that Algeria's objection was not 
to autonomy per se, but to a referendum with autonomy as the 
only option.  Baali said there was a need for a referendum 
that offered options to the Sahrawis, not a plan imposed by 
Morocco. 
 
SEEKING A "NEUTRAL" RESOLUTION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) Baali said Algeria urged the U.S. not to support a 
MINURSO extension resolution that referred positively to the 
SYG's negotiations recommendation.  Instead, Algeria wanted a 
simple, technical resolution that at most would take note of 
the SYG's report without endorsing it.  Then we could see how 
to proceed.  Baali said he was sorry he could not be more 
positive.  The Algerian Ambassador to the UN had sent a 
letter to Annan expressing Algeria's reservations.  The 
language in this letter had been carefully drafted.  Noting 
that he now had to demarche the French Ambassador, Baali 
remarked that at the time of UNSCR 1495, the U.S. had wanted 
the text as strongly worded as possible, while France had 
managed to water it down.  The French role was a key reason 
why there was a stalemate. 
ERDMAN