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FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0783
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8439
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1744
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1260
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0335
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0742
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1207
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5802

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000623 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV WI MO AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO "AMBASSADOR" COMMENTS ON NEGOTIATING 
WITH MOROCCO 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Polisario "Ambassador" to Algeria Mohammed Beissat 
discussed his views on possible negotiations with Morocco 
over King Mohammed VI's autonomy plan in a prolonged April 1 
conversation with DCM and Pol/Econ Chief.  Reviewing the 
history of Polisario-Moroccan direct negotiations since 1979, 
Beissat expressed his skepticism about Moroccan intentions, 
but he did not rule out a new round of talks "provided the 
framework was appropriate."  DCM urged that the Polisario not 
pass up the opportunity to negotiate, and pressed Beissat on 
the possibility of a referendum on autonomy.  Beissat said 
somewhat ambiguously he thought a referendum might be 
acceptable if the Sahrawis in Tindouf were included in the 
vote.  It was not clear if he was referring to an 
"autonomy-only" referendum.  On a more negative note, he 
dismissed King Mohammed as a "weak" leader who was unlikely 
to be able to make peace. In response to DCM's comment that 
the international community was not likely to pressure 
Morocco, Beissat said he thought the real pressure on Morocco 
would come from the young generation of Sahrawis inside the 
Western Sahara, who, he asserted, had rejected Moroccan 
attempts to impose a Moroccan identity on them.  Time was not 
on Morocco's side, he argued.  End summary. 
 
DISAPPOINTING HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOROCCO 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a lengthy conversation April 1, Polisario 
"Ambassador" to Algeria Mohammed Beissat, accompanied by 
visiting Polisario Interests Section chief in Australia Kamel 
Al-Fadil, discussed with DCM and Pol/Econ Chief the 
possibility of Polisario engaging in a new round of direct 
negotiations with Morocco over King Mohammed VI's autonomy 
plan.  DCM urged that Polisario not miss the opportunity to 
negotiate once the Moroccan side was ready.  Beissat did not 
dismiss the possibility of negotiations, but said their 
decision would depend on finding the appropriate "framework" 
under UN auspices. 
 
¶3.  (C) Sketching in some detail the history of 
Polisario-Moroccan direct talks, Beissat said they went back 
to three- way talks including Mauritania held under AU 
auspices in 1979.  (Note:  We do not vouch for the historical 
accuracy of Beissat's presentation, which was clearly that of 
an informed but highly partisan interlocutor.)  When Morocco 
walked out of those talks, Mauritania  dropped its claim to 
the southern portion of the Western Sahara and withdrew from 
the conflict.  A senior Polisario delegation next held direct 
negotiations with King Hassan II in 1988, which made some 
progress toward a ceasefire and generated the momentum that 
allowed Morocco and Algeria to resume diplomatic relations. 
Hassan had offered autonomy in 1988, suggesting all he needed 
was to maintain Morocco's flag, stamps, and currency, but 
Polisario had insisted on a referendum that would include 
independence as a possible outcome, a position subsequently 
accepted by Hassan and which formed the basis for the 
ceasefire and the establishment of MINURSO. 
 
¶4.  (C) Beissat described a 1996 session with then Crown 
Prince Mohammed and Minister of Interior Basri as very 
disappointing, since Mohammed had refused to listen to a 
Polisario presentation on independence, reportedly saying 
that was not within his instructions from his father.  The 
appointment of James Baker as the UNSYG's personal 
representative, the Houston talks, and Hassan's death had 
followed.  Beissat reiterated Polisario frustration over 
Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan, noting that Baker had 
intentionally adjusted the voter list and duration of the 
transitional period in order to address Moroccan concerns, 
and yet Morocco had still walked away from the concept of a 
referendum, which had been the basis of the entire diplomatic 
process since the 1991 ceasefire.  This experience made the 
Polisario very skeptical of the utility of negotiating with 
Morocco since even if an agreement were reached, the 
Moroccans could simply change their minds and the 
international community would not impose any penalty on them. 
Beissat praised Baker as a statesman of the first order, and 
said the Polisario doubted any other UN representative could 
be found who would have Baker's stature. 
 
NO POLISARIO OBJECTION TO TERMINATING MINURSO 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) DCM noted that both Morocco and Algeria had expressed 
serious concern about the possibility that MINURSO's mission 
could be terminated by the Security Council.  Beissat said 
Polisario saw little point to extending MINURSO since it 
manifestly could not carry out its intended purpose of 
preparing the ground for a referendum.  Beissat agreed, 
however, that removing MINURSO would make the resumption of 
hostilities more likely, and he also agreed that MINURSO at 
times played a helpful role as an observer.  He complained 
that MINURSO was powerless to protect the Sahrawi civilian 
population under Moroccan occupation, noting that Moroccan 
security forces prevented Sahrawis from visiting MINURSO 
headquarters in Laayoune and that the Moroccans tortured 
Sahrawis at a prison located only a few blocks from MINURSO 
headquarters.  Beissat expressed understanding for Ambassador 
Bolton's questioning the utility of the UN continuing to fund 
a peacekeeping operation that could not carry out its 
mandate. 
 
NOT RULING OUT AUTONOMY, BUT... 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Returning to the discussion of negotiations, DCM said 
he would speak frankly.  There was little to no chance that 
the international community would pressure Morocco, and 
rather than wait for something to change, the Polisario 
should prepare to engage Morocco directly and without 
preconditions on the basis of a Moroccan offer of autonomy. 
Beissat said he thought nothing good would come of King 
Mohammed's consultations with the Moroccan political parties, 
since the outcome would be to narrow rather than widen the 
scope of autonomy.  In addition, the King appeared not to 
intend to include the Sahrawis in Tindouf in a referendum. 
Some Moroccan parties had even suggested that all Moroccan 
citizens must have the right to vote in a referendum.  This 
showed Morocco's lack of seriousness, he said. 
 
¶7.  (C) DCM asked how Polisario would respond to a referendum 
on autonomy that included Tindouf residents.  Beissat said 
the Polisario's bottom line was there had to be 
self-determination.  If the Sahrawis voted for autonomy in a 
referendum, the Polisario would accept the outcome, even 
though he personally would never go back to Western Sahara 
under Moroccan sovereignty.  (Comment:  It is unclear whether 
Beissat was speaking about a referendum in which autonomy was 
one option or a confirmatory referendum on autonomy.)  That 
said, Beissat was skeptical King Mohammed was strong enough 
to negotiate a settlement. Recalling the Polisario's meeting 
with King Hassan in 1988, Beissat said they had told Hassan 
that he was a strong man, and Hassan had said it took a 
strong man to make peace as well as to make war.  Beissat 
said the real problem with King Mohammed was that he was weak. 
 
TIME NOT ON MOROCCO'S SIDE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Beissat, perhaps trying to appeal to American 
interlocutors, said he was struck by television images of 
Jalal Talabani serving as Iraq's President while Saddam was 
on trial.  International events were moving very fast, and 
what seemed impossible today could become very real tomorrow. 
Analyzing Morocco's internal situation, Beissat claimed 
occupying the Western Sahara cost Morocco about $4 million a 
day.  Morocco's Islamist movement was getting stronger, 
especially the banned Justice and Charity party, which did 
not accept the legitimacy of the monarchy and was not 
interested in Moroccan control of Western Sahara.  Beissat 
suggested that time was not necessarily on Morocco's side. 
Internal pressures were building, especially from the young 
Sahrawi population in the Western Sahara.  Despite thirty 
years of Moroccan efforts and pressure to Moroccanize the 
Sahrawis, the high school students were the ones in the 
streets protesting Moroccan occupation.  Their parents may 
have accepted Moroccan control, but the young people did not. 
 
ERDMAN