VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0862/01 0750842
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160842Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6648
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0277
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7175
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0364
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1116
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000862 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC JA KN KS
SUBJECT: ROK-JAPAN MAR 7 STRATEGIC DIALOGUE IN TOKYO: LONG 
MEETINGS WITH NO PROGRESS 
 
 
Classified By: POL M/C JOSEPH Y. YUN.  REASONS 1.4 (B, D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) In March 13-14 meetings with poloff, MOFAT and 
Japanese Embassy contacts said South Korean VFM Yu 
Myung-hwan's exhaustive meetings with Japanese VFM Yachi 
during the March 7 ROK-Japan strategic dialogue in Tokyo 
failed to result in progress on a number of bilateral and 
regional issues.  Yachi called on the ROK to pay greater heed 
to the human rights situation in the DPRK and to exercise 
caution in its economic cooperation with North Korea.  He 
expressed concern that Beijing and Seoul had increasingly 
politicized history issues despite Japan's peaceful post-war 
history, regretting that Japan had not received a fair 
assessment of its peaceful intentions 60 years since World 
War II.  Yu responded that inter-Korean engagement was a 
critical component to resolving the nuclear issue and that 
the ROK's economic assistance was a humanitarian gesture 
aimed at addressing famine in North Korea.  Japan needed to 
re-examine its understanding of history more seriously if it 
were committed to improving bilateral relations with the ROK. 
 Continued visits to the Yasukuni shrine by PM Koizumi's 
successor could seriously hinder progress in bilateral 
relations, Yu cautioned. 
 
¶2.  (C) Both sides agreed to cooperate on expanding bilateral 
cultural exchanges, working toward early resumption of the 
Six Party Talks, addressing the situation in Iraq and Iran, 
and examining the future of the East Asia Summit.  They also 
agreed to work toward a foreign ministers meeting at the May 
Asia Cooperative Dialogue in Qatar.  On FM Ban Ki-moon's 
candidacy as UN Secretary General, Yachi directly linked 
Japan's support to the ROK's support for Japan's desire for a 
seat at the UN Security Council, calling for further 
bilateral consultation on the issue.  In a separate March 15 
meeting with the Ambassador, Yu said Yachi believed Japanese 
PM Koizumi would make one more visit to the Yasukuni shrine 
before stepping down in September.  Yu opined that Japan 
would not oppose FM Ban's UNSYG candidacy for fear of 
damaging bilateral relations, although his Japanese 
interlocutors were non-cmmittal.  END SUMMARY. 
. 
GRUELING ONE-DAY SCHEDULE, LENGTHY ENGAGEMENT... 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3.  (U) On March 13, Deputy Director Kim Yong-kil of 
Northeast Asia Division I, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MOFAT), gave poloff a read-out of VFM Yu Myung-hwan's 
March 6-8 visit to Tokyo.  Japanese Embassy political officer 
Shugo Tanaka discussed the meeting separately with poloff on 
March 15.  According to Kim, VFM Yu arrived the evening of 
March 6 and had meetings "from sunrise to sunset" on March 7. 
 In the morning, he met briefly with Former Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yasuo Fukuda of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
 
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Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Abe, and former Prime Minister 
Yoshiro Mori.  After a brief courtesy call on Foreign 
Minister Taro Aso, he and Japanese VFM Shotaro Yachi held 
seven hours of ROK-Japan strategic dialogue (the second since 
October 2005). 
. 
...BUT NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON STICKY ISSUES 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4.  (C) Kim stated the two sides discussed the DPRK nuclear 
program, inter-Korea relations, North Korea human rights, and 
history issues, but were unable to narrow differences on 
long-standing bilateral issues or on dealing with the DPRK. 
Kim lamented that, consequently, they did not have sufficient 
time to discuss China's growing economic and political 
influence in the region, a subject that would have to await 
the next round of strategic dialogue. 
. 
YACHI: ROK SHOULD BE PRUDENT IN APPROACH TO N-S ENGAGEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) On North Korea, said Kim, Yachi conveyed Japan's 
concern that the ROK received little in return for its level 
of economic cooperation with Pyongyang.  Absent visible and 
effective reforms in North Korea, the Kaesong Industrial 
 
Complex (KIC) and other forms of economic engagement only 
served to prop up the Kim Jong-il regime.  This, together 
with China's assistance to the DPRK, rendered any measure to 
apply pressure on Pyongyang ineffective.  From Japan's point 
of view, the DPRK would approach the Six Party Talks more 
seriously if it no longer received assistance from the PRC 
and the ROK.  Economic assistance was best reserved for 
discussion in the framework of the Six Party Talks. 
. 
N-S COOPERATION IMPORTANT FOR RESOLVING NUCLEAR ISSUE 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Yu responded that the ROK believed consistent 
progress in inter-Korea relations was a crucial factor in 
successfully resolving the DPRK nuclear issue.  Improved 
Seoul-Pyongyang ties ultimately reduced military tension on 
both sides and would allow the DPRK to be more cooperative at 
the Six Party Talks.  The importance of the Six Party Talks 
notwithstanding, easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula was 
a more pressing issue for Seoul.  While visible and immediate 
reforms in the DPRK were desirable, the ROK believed 
continued engagement with the North would eventually steer 
the DPRK toward becoming a responsible state.  The ROK also 
based its policy of providing economic assistance to North 
Korea partly out of humanitarian concerns, as alleviating 
food shortages was a practical step in improving the lives 
and welfare of the North Korean people.  Moreover, South 
Korea did not believe pressure against North Korea would be 
effective in changing Pyongyang's behavior. 
 
¶7.  (C) According to Tanaka from the Japanese Embassy, Yu 
added that North Korean citizens were increasingly aware of 
the ROK's relative affluence over the DPRK, as well as South 
Korean food assistance.  Over time, continued contact with 
visiting South Koreans and exposure to inter-Korean economic 
projects like the KIC would inevitably lead to changes in 
North Korean society.  As such, visible reminders of South 
Korea's economic superiority, such as infrastructure projects 
and factories bearing South Korean identification, could act 
as a catalyst for the DPRK's eventual transformation.  Noting 
that the ROK accounted for 60 percent of all humanitarian 
assistance to North Korea and 20 percent of the DPRK's 
foreign trade, Yu asserted that Seoul had clearly linked any 
increase in economic cooperation to progress in the Six Party 
Talks.  It was, however, noteworthy that China accounted for 
40 percent of North Korea's foreign trade -- twice as much as 
the ROK. 
. 
ROK NOT IGNORING DPRK HUMAN RIGHTS, HAS A UNIQUE ROLE 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Tanaka reported that VFM Yachi cautioned the ROK not 
to fall behind the international community in efforts to 
improve human rights conditions in the DPRK.  Japan hoped 
that the ROK -- which, like Japan, had difficulties 
persuading the DPRK to resolve long-standing abductee issues 
-- would be more proactive on North Korea human rights.  VFM 
Yu stated that Seoul fully understood Tokyo's position on the 
issue, stressing that the international community greatly 
misunderstood the ROK's position on North Korea human rights. 
 The ROK did not view the human rights issue as a diplomatic 
issue, but as an internal matter.  Seoul therefore supported 
the international community's diplomatic efforts to urge the 
DPRK to improve its human rights conditions, but viewed its 
own role as a provider of necessities to relieve the 
suffering of the people of North Korea.  By providing food 
assistance and accepting North Korean refugees, the ROK 
played its own part in the greater effort to address the 
human rights situation without endangering progress in 
inter-Korean reconciliation. 
. 
SIX PARTY TALKS 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) MOFAT's Kim said both vice ministers agreed to 
cooperate closely to work toward resumption of the stalled 
Six Party Talks and implementation of the September 19 joint 
statement of principles.  Yachi expressed Japan's desire to 
host a U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination meeting in the 
near future.  He welcomed the ROK's decision to accept five 
elements out of the U.S. eight-point proposal for South 
 
Korea's participation in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) and urged Seoul to consider participating in 
interdiction exercises in the region.  Yu said ROK 
policymakers thought Japan's three-track approach to 
implementing the September 19 joint statement was a good 
idea.  The ROK hoped the Six Party Talks would resume before 
Hu Jintao's visit to Washington in late April.  It was 
unrealistic, however, to rely exclusively on China's efforts 
to restart the talks.  The ROK therefore had urged the DPRK 
at every opportunity to return to the Six Party Talks. 
. 
HISTORY ISSUES SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE NEXT PM, SAYS YU 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Yachi regretted that President Roh Moo-hyun's speech 
commemorating the March 1 independence movement against 
Japanese occupation had criticized Japan's supposed desires 
for conquest and hegemony.  It was unfortunate that Japan had 
not received a fair assessment of its efforts toward global 
peace 60 years since the end of World War II.  Yachi also 
expressed concern that Beijing and Seoul appeared to be 
taking a united front on the history issues.  Increasing 
politicization by China and the ROK on history issues was 
unhelpful.  While Japan took in the sentiments of the Korean 
people "with heavy heart," it was important for Japan and 
Korea to develop a future-oriented relationship. 
 
¶11.  (C) Yu responded that Japan's political leadership 
needed to re-examine its understanding of history if it was 
committed to improving bilateral relations with the ROK.  He 
added that continued visits to the Yasukuni shrine by PM 
Koizumi's successor could seriously hinder progress in 
bilateral relations, stressing that history issues ought to 
be resolved before Japan had a new Prime Minister. 
. 
POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN QATAR 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶12.  (C) Yachi proposed, in the spirit of enhancing bilateral 
ties, to double the number of ROK-Japan joint cultural events 
from 1,800 to 3,600 in 2006.  Both sides agreed to resume 
another round of the ROK-Japan security dialogue with foreign 
and defense ministry officials in mid-April.  They also 
agreed to cooperate on providing assistance to Koreans 
forcibly relocated to the Sakhalin Islands at the turn of the 
century and launching the second phase of the joint history 
committee in April.  In addition, both governments would try 
to arrange a foreign ministers meeting on the sidelines of 
the May Asia Cooperative Dialogue in Qatar. 
. 
IRAQ/IRAN 
--------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Tanaka, from the Japanese Embassy, said VFM Yachi 
explained that Tokyo was contemplating an early withdrawal of 
its troops from Iraq.  Although Japan had not yet made a 
final decision, the timing of withdrawal by Australia and the 
U.K. was key.  Yu, expressing surprise at Japan's idea for 
early withdrawal, said the ROK was considering recalling some 
troops from the more secure parts of Iraq.  It planned to 
provide USD 220 million in assistance to the Iraqis. 
 
¶14.  (C) On Iran, both sides expressed concern at Tehran's 
increasingly problematic behavior with its nuclear program. 
Japan urged Iran through various channels to heed the 
international community's warnings and to follow established 
IAEA norms.  Yu said Tehran had asked for the ROK's 
cooperation at the IAEA, even threatening to place a trade 
embargo on South Korean imports.  Seoul would not, however, 
cave into Tehran's demands. 
. 
EAS, FM BAN'S UN SECGEN CANDIDACY, UNSC LINKAGE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶15.  (C) According to MOFAT's Kim, Yachi briefed Yu on the 
recent normalization talks between Japan and North Korea.  Yu 
gave a read-out of the recent inter-Korean general 
officer-level military talks and former President Kim 
Dae-jung's planned visit to North Korea.  On the East Asia 
Summit, both sides agreed it remained unclear what purpose 
the body would serve and that it was important for the EAS to 
 
develop its identity further. They also agreed new member 
states should be democracies and that encouraging 
participation by countries like India and Australia was 
particularly important.  Yachi stated that Japan opposed 
participation by Russia and opined that the United States 
appeared disinterested in the EAS.  Yu said the ROK was open 
to new participants, but saw no need for an early resumption 
of EAS.  On Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon's candidacy as UN 
Secretary General, Yachi said Japan viewed Ban as a 
 
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highly-qualified candidate and believed the next SecGen 
should be someone from an Asian country.  Given Japan's 
interest in gaining a seat at the UN Security Council, he 
hoped Tokyo and Seoul would continue discussions. 
. 
GOJ UNLIKELY TO OPPOSE BAN'S CANDIDACY, YU TELLS AMB 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶16.  (C) In a separate March 15 meeting with the Ambassador, 
VFM Yu (acting for FM Ban) said he had a frank, open exchange 
with Yachi.  Yachi informed Yu that in all likelihood PM 
Koizumi would make one more visit to Yasukuni shrine before 
he steps down in September.  Yachi asked that the ROKG "not 
to react too emotionally."  Yachi assessed that if former 
cabinet chief Fukuda or Finance Minister Tanegaki succeeded 
Koizumi, chances were good that there would not be prime 
ministerial visits to Yasukuni.  However, if Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Abe or FM Aso were to become prime minister, such 
 
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visits could occur.  Yachi was trying his best to improve 
relations with South Korea.  He suggested a visit by FM Aso 
to Seoul, which Yu discouraged fearing that there would not 
be a meeting with President Roh and that this would be 
portrayed as a snub.  Perhaps, Yu said, FM Ban could visit 
Tokyo.  Yu also noted that his Japanese interlocutors, 
including senior LDP legislators, seemed very positive about 
FM Ban, but were non-committal on whether they would support 
Ban in the UNSYG race.  Still, Yu assessed that Japan would 
not openly opposed Ban because such a move would be very 
damaging for relations. 
VERSHBOW