This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD BM CM IN
SUBJECT: MANDALAY: DIPLOMATIC VIEWS 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 287 
 
     ¶B. 05 RANGOON 1279 
 
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  During an Embassy "Outreach Week in 
Mandalay" (ref A), the Charge called on the Indian and 
Chinese Consuls General to exchange views on local political 
and economic developments.  Despite the close relationship 
that China and India enjoy with the Burmese regime, both 
Consuls need permission from local authorities for virtually 
any activity.  Neither had met any opposition NLD leaders in 
Mandalay prior to our visit.  In contrast to concerns about 
Chinese or Indian expansion frequently offered elsewhere, the 
Consuls General did not express any worry about the influence 
of each other's country in northern Burma.  Instead, they 
view the region as a sleepy backwater, despite growing trade, 
drug issues, and ethnic disputes along their national 
borders.  End Summary. 
 
CHINA: EVERYTHING SEEMS FINE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Charge, joined by P/E chief, called on Chinese 
Consul General Duan Zhiquan in Mandalay on February 27. 
Duan, a South Asia expert stationed in Mandalay for the past 
year, downplayed Chinese investment and commercial activity 
in the region, where about 100,000 overseas Chinese reside. 
He claimed that other than a joint venture tractor factory, 
most investment was in "small scale" trading, but added that 
a four-year project to construct a nearby hydroelectric dam 
would employ over 100 Chinese technicians and engineers. 
 
¶3. (C) Duan observed the GOB's recent efforts to centralize 
the trade of precious gems sharply cut the presence of 
Chinese gem merchants in Mandalay, a hub for gem mining 
operations in Upper Burma (ref B).  "Now, very few gems cross 
the border directly from Mandalay into China," he said, 
"Everything must go through Rangoon."  Chinese tourists, Duan 
added, find it cheaper to travel to Thailand and Singapore 
than to visit neighboring Burma, where "there is nothing to 
buy and only the scenery to admire." 
 
¶4. (C) Duan offered his view that the law and order situation 
in Burma "seems to be just fine" and that local Burmese "lead 
a simple life, but they have plenty to eat."  He complained 
that electricity supply in Mandalay is poor, so "there is no 
night life."  He criticized the effectiveness of U.S. 
sanctions and questioned motives behind raising the Burma 
question at the UN Security Council.  "There is no 
international security threat and no terrorism here," he said. 
 
¶5. (C) The Charge responded that Burma's export of narcotics, 
diseases, and refugees posed a serious threat to regional 
security, including that of China.  She also noted that it 
was unsustainable for 50 people to decide the future of 55 
million in Burma and for the military to keep the lion's 
share of the country's resources.  Duan conceded that life is 
becoming more difficult for average Burmese and said that the 
regime's relocation of the capital to Pyinmana created new 
land rights problems and increased uncertainty about the 
future.  He added that the PRC intended to set up a liaison 
office in Pyinmana to handle "state visits and other 
business." 
 
¶6. (C) Duan attended the Charge's reception at a local hotel 
later that evening, at which he met several NLD members and 
NGO workers for the first time.  He was keenly interested to 
learn whether the Charge had requested GOB authorization to 
hold the reception, and initially appeared reluctant to 
attend.  He noted that he needed regime permission "to do 
just about anything" in Mandalay, including most travel 
within his consular district.  The Charge responded that we 
did not in general request authorization, but that we invited 
GOB officials to receptions and other Embassy-sponsored 
events.  Duan was one of the last guests to leave our 
reception and he welcomed with a big smile news that we 
planned to return frequently. 
 
INDIA: ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Charge also met on February 27 with Indian Consul 
General Anita Nayar.  The Indian CG, who has been at her 
assignment for a little over a year, described Mandalay as 
"very quiet."  In response to an inquiry about the imminent 
visit to Burma of the Indian President, Nayer replied "there 
is nothing for me to do; his visit to Mandalay is only for a 
few hours and I assume the Burmese authorities will be 
handling all of the logistics." 
 
¶8. (C) Nayer complained that it was impossible to do anything 
in Mandalay without permission.  "We can do what we want," 
she said, "but we must first get authorization from the 
regional military commander, who is very cautious."  She said 
that her Embassy in Rangoon handles requests to the GOB, 
adding that she rarely makes any direct inquiries to Mandalay 
authorities.  Waiting for the combined Indian and Burmese 
bureaucracies in Rangoon to respond to simple requests, 
however, can take months.  She complained, for example, that 
she still had not received approval to erect an information 
board outside of the Indian consulate. 
 
¶9. (C) Nayer suggested that increased U.S. activities in 
Mandalay should focus on a library and technical and English 
language instruction.  She acknowledged that India had 
announced at the East Asia Summit its intention to increase 
language instruction and training in ASEAN countries, but had 
no plans to pursue such programs in Mandalay. 
 
¶10. (C) Nayar estimated about 20,000 Indian families lived in 
Mandalay and a total of about 100,000 Indians lived in her 
consular district (which consists of Mandalay and Sagaing 
Divisions and Chin State, but does not include Kachin State 
in northernmost Burma).  She acknowledged that local ethnic 
Indians, many of whom are unable to obtain Burmese 
citizenship, face serious difficulties in gaining access to 
state education, buying property, and maintaining legal 
residency status.  Nayar said, however, that she receives 
"only a few" requests for her intervention with the GOB on 
behalf of these stateless Indian-Burmese. 
 
¶11. (C) Nayer described Indian investment in northern Burma 
as "minimal."  She said there were several "very dated" 
Indian government investments in joint ventures, including a 
local bicycle factory and a sewing machine factory.  "No one 
wants to put their money here," she said, adding that most 
Indian commercial activity was at the border and focused on 
trade of pharmaceuticals, textiles, and beans and pulses. 
 
¶12. (C) Addressing general perceptions that India's presence 
in Burma was designed to counter Chinese influence, Nayer 
offered her personal view, based on her years of experience 
working on China, that "we don't really have much to worry 
about here when it comes to China."  She added that she 
nonetheless understood New Delhi concerns about China and 
described the Indian "Look East" policy in Burma as a shift 
"from an ideological approach to a practical one."  She 
agreed with the Charge that India would be much happier to 
have a democratic Burma, rather than an unstable neighbor. 
 
¶13. (C) Nayer also attended our evening reception, where she 
asked the Charge to introduce her to the five divisional NLD 
leaders in attendance.  She had never met the party leaders 
and said she was "absolutely delighted" to have the 
opportunity to get to know the democratic opposition and made 
arrangements to discuss local issues with them. 
 
COMMENT: OUT OF TOUCH AND UNDER THUMB 
------------------------------------- 
¶14. (C) China and India have among the closest relations with 
the Burmese regime.  Even their Mandalay diplomats, however, 
need to obtain permission from local authorities for 
virtually any activity.  Friendship with the GOB, it seems, 
offers no better treatment than what the regime accords its 
adversaries. 
 
¶15. (C) We also took note of the scant concern the Indian and 
Chinese diplomats had for Sino-Indian rivalries in Burma, in 
contrast to more alarmist views offered by their respective 
Embassies in Rangoon and in other capitals in the region. 
Although Chinese and Indian populations are prominent in 
Mandalay, neither Consul General seemed able to respond to 
their needs or extend their own influence in the region.  To 
the contrary, each Consul viewed their district as a stagnant 
backwater.  They prefer to leave in the hands of their 
Embassies the increasing flow of trade goods, refugees, 
drugs, and ethnic disputes along both countries' borders. 
End Comment. 
VILLAROSA