VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #3362/01 0901231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311231Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3353
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016 
TAGS: PREL UNSC RS
SUBJECT: P-5 HOLD UN CONSULTATIONS MARCH 2 IN MOSCOW 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. 
  For Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Russia hosted a meeting of P-5 IO Directors 
March 2 in Moscow to discuss UN Security Council and 
management reforms, the proposed Human Rights Council, the 
Peacebuilding Commission, and other issues related to 
implementation of the World Summit Outcome Document, as well 
as appointment of a new Secretary General and revitalization 
of the UNSC Military Staff Committee.  The group also 
reviewed UN Security Council action in the Middle East, Iran, 
Iraq, Kosovo, Syria/Lebanon, Cyprus, and Africa.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Kristen Silverberg represented the 
United States.  Russian MFA International Organizations 
Department Director Aleksandr Konuzin represented the Russian 
side and served as host.  Stephen Pattison, Director for 
International Security in the Foreign Office, represented the 
UK.  The French representative was Sylvie Bermann, Director 
of the French MFA's Department of United Nations and 
International Organizations.  China was represented by newly 
appointed MFA International Organizations and Conferences 
Department Director Wu Hailun.  After consultations with 
Konuzin, the group met briefly with Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Aleksandr Yakovenko. 
. 
REGULARIZING P-5 MEETINGS 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Russia's Konuzin began by noting the importance of a 
P-5 meeting to assess progress following the 2005 World 
Summit.  He suggested regularizing such consultations at the 
policy level, with one meeting per year in New York during 
the UNGA and another in February to assess UNGA outcomes. 
A/S Silverberg welcomed the idea and offered to host the next 
session in New York during this year's UNGA.  France's 
Bermann also agreed and proposed holding the subsequent 
session in Paris next February. 
. 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Konuzin said Russia was prepared to be flexible 
concerning the draft Human Rights Council text, but harbored 
a number of concerns.  Russia did not support a mandatory 
five-year review of the Council, but felt that after five 
years the UN could decide whether a review was required. 
Russia opposed a two-term limit on membership as contrary to 
the UN's universality principle, and was prepared to put this 
point to a vote if it were included in the text.  Konuzin 
said Russia opposed country-specific resolutions, and was 
also uncomfortable with the provision for suspension of 
members, since the basis for it was unclear.  Russia was 
flexible on the number of sessions the Council should hold; 
the idea of having three sessions within a ten-week period 
was acceptable.  Special sessions were also acceptable, in 
Russia's view, but should require more than a one-third vote. 
 While changing the format of the UN's human rights body was 
important, Konuzin argued, it must be accompanied by changes 
in the substance of the body's work. 
 
¶5. (C) China believed that human rights reform was needed to 
end politicization of the issue in the UN context, Wu said. 
The new draft resolution on the Council should be further 
improved, Wu argued, although China would accept that 
resolution if it enjoyed consensus.  It was particularly 
important for the P-5 itself to reach consensus as soon as 
possible.  China would accept holding a Human Rights 
Commission session this year, and was flexible on its format. 
 France's Bermann said the current proposal regarding the 
Human Rights Council was a compromise and needed further 
improvement.  It was essential to be able to suspend Council 
members if they did not respect human rights.  She urged 
avoiding a vote on the HRC at all costs for the moment, as it 
was more important to broaden support around one position. 
UNGA President Eliasson's formulation on membership was not 
acceptable, and the issue still needed to be properly 
addressed. 
 
¶6. (C) A/S Silverberg noted that Secretary Rice had called 
SYG Annan to underscore that the U.S. did not support the 
current proposal regarding the Human Rights Council.  The 
U.S. would not compromise further on the important principle 
that members of the HRC share a good-faith commitment to 
human rights.  The U.S. supported changes to the text to 
exclude countries under UNSC sanctions from HRC membership, 
and establish a two-thirds vote requirement for election to 
membership.  The U.S. was open-minded whether to engage in 
member state negotiations or delay consideration of the 
proposal, A/S Silverberg said, but was prepared to call for a 
vote and vote no. 
. 
SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Konuzin said Russia believed any decision on Council 
reform should be based on the maximum possible agreement 
among member states, which he interpreted to mean "much more 
than two-thirds."  In any case, he said, now was not a good 
time to vote on a Council reform resolution since it would 
only be divisive.  Noting that Japan had not joined the other 
G-4 countries in sponsoring this year's UNGA resolution on 
Council expansion, Konuzin asked whetherQhis was a strategic 
or tactical maneuver by the Japanese.  He said Russia had 
"suspicions," but was not asked to elaborate.  Konuzin said 
he was unclear on the specific elements of Japan,s proposal, 
but asserted that Russia could not agree to the kind of 
elections foreseen by the Japanese because it would create an 
"uncontrollable situation" and the process would become 
"ridiculous." 
 
¶8. (C) Bermann said reform of the Security Council was 
essential to fully reform the UN.  The HRC and management 
reform should come first but the P-5 should continue to work 
on the issue.  France thought the G-4 plan was "fair and 
equitable," but the Japanese plan would be very difficult to 
implement.  A/S Silverberg stated the U.S. favored modest 
Security Council expansion, and believed Japan had the 
qualifications to be a valuable member of that body.  She 
noted the U.S. had concerns with Japan,s "Option C," and 
remained opposed to the G-4 plan.  Wu argued further 
consultation was needed on Security Council reform, but it 
was essential to avoid holding "forced" votes that would 
damage solidarity among UN members.  The P-5 should encourage 
"democratic dialogue and consultation" and not take action 
that surprised other members. 
. 
MANAGEMENT REFORM 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Konuzin stressed the importance of management reform 
but noted that it should not be allowed to change the nature 
of the UN as an organization of member states.  Russia was 
flexible with regard to giving the SYG more authority, and 
"reasonably flexible" on budgetary and staffing issues, but 
believed new mechanisms should be laid out to foster 
efficiency and accountability, and should not take away the 
oversight authority of the Member States.  Russia opposed 
voting on budget packages, believing each programmatic 
element of the budget should be considered separately. 
Russia favors mandate review, but understands G77 
sensitivities in the matter and believed it was important to 
work with those countries.  Konuzin said Russia did not favor 
linking progress on reform with consideration of the current 
UN budget.  Russia needed more information on the financial 
implications of changes to the contracting system but 
stressed that in any case, the issue needed additional 
consideration in the Fifth Committee.  The Russians were 
reluctant to establish a strong Deputy SYG, since that would 
not be in line with the UN Charter.  The system under which a 
SYG is elected and is allowed to fill all his functions 
should be preserved, Konuzin argued. 
 
¶10. (C) Wu said China believed Secretariat reform should 
preserve the nature of the UN as a body of governments. 
Internal management of the Secretariat needed to be 
strengthened.  Wu argued that it was essential for the P-5 
countries to remain in close touch on management reform to 
avoid surprising one another. 
 
¶11. (C) A/S Silverberg agreed with Konuzin's point that 
decisions on mandates must be made by member states.  Concern 
about specific mandate proposals might be eased when their 
details were laid out, A/S Silverberg said.  The U.S. was not 
supporting this effort primarily as a cost saving exercise, 
but believed change was vital so that funds would be devoted 
to priority areas. 
 
¶12. (C) Pattison argued that management reform was too 
important to leave to the Fifth Committee.  He said the issue 
did not involve an attempt by the P-5 to gain more power but 
was a real effort to make the UN work better.  Pattison saw 
the SYG paper on system coherence as important, particularly 
because of the inefficiencies caused by competition among UN 
agencies.  Bermann believed it essential to persuade G-77 
countries that management reform was in their interests. 
. 
REVITALIZATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Konuzin argued that the Security Council was a victim 
of its own success, which led elected members to bring issues 
to the Council that did not belong there, under the guise 
that they were related to conflicts ("(blank) and conflict"). 
 He felt "proud" that the P-5 have resisted this trend. 
Konuzin then added he understood the U.S. reasons for calling 
Council meetings on PKO management issues, but the Council 
"should be cautious about this kind of thing."  Konuzin put 
forth an "idea" that "instead of being on the defensive," the 
P-5 should make proposals for GA revitalization by looking at 
the Security Council agenda for issues that could be given to 
the GA, and by encouraging the GA President to hold more 
discussions on political issues.  A/S Silverberg responded 
that the U.S. believed PKO-related matters such as sexual 
exploitation and procurement scandals were well within the 
Council,s mandate.  For the U.S., adequate Council oversight 
was key to responding to domestic issues concerning the 
justification of PKO expenditures. 
 
¶14. (C) Wu stressed that clear divisions existed between the 
roles and responsibilities of the Security Council and the 
General Assembly, and these should be respected to avoid 
duplication.  The Security Council's authority must be 
maintained, but the roles of other countries must also be 
taken into account.  Above all, Wu argued, the interests of 
developing countries must be kept in mind. 
. 
PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Bermann said the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) 
represents the result of lessons learned about coordination 
on institution building.  The PBC needs to be well-funded and 
have links to the IFIs.  The Council needed to ensure that 
the PBC begins its work with a success that would establish 
its bona fides.  This means not taking on too much at once, 
perhaps only one or two countries.  Haiti might be too 
difficult but Burundi might provide better chances for 
success.  Wu said the P-5 should be flexible regarding the 
rules of election to the PBC, and should give due 
consideration to the views of Asian countries. 
 
¶16. (C) A/S Silverberg noted that it was important to have 
moderate expectations about the Commission.  The PBC needs to 
show early success by taking on manageable countries such as 
Burundi or perhaps Liberia.  Pattison offered Sierra Leone as 
another possibility for initial PBC action.  Konuzin noted 
that Guinea-Bissau had been raised as a possible focus for 
the PBC, but agreed Burundi might be more appropriate, 
although its government was showing signs of reluctance. 
. 
OTHER OUTCOME DOCUMENT ISSUES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) Russia's Konuzin expressed satisfaction that the 
World Summit Outcome Document would help strengthen the UN. 
The Document had emerged as the common denominator of 
discussions in New York, and though it did not fully reflect 
the views of any single member state, it was acceptable to 
almost all of them.  Wu said the Outcome Document was of 
prime importance but should be implemented step-by-step 
beginning with easy issues.  Work on counterterrorism at the 
UN must take into account the concerns of developing 
countries.  China favors a high-level counterterrorism 
conference and enhanced consultations on the draft 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT). 
The UN should agree "as soon as possible" on a definition of 
terrorism in the CCIT.  UK's Pattison said it was time to 
redevelop the "habit" of P-5 consultation.  He agreed with 
the Chinese point on defining terrorism.  Pattison said the 
UK considered the Duty to Protect a very important element of 
the Summit outcome, as it was becoming increasingly central 
to the Security Council,s work.  More broadly, Pattison 
continued, the Outcome Document reflected the evolving nature 
of conflicts and a corresponding extension of the Security 
Council,s agenda.  Whereas once the Council had focused on 
relations between states, it now focused on intrastate 
conflicts, Pattison argued, which made non-traditional issues 
such as women's concerns relevant to the Council,s work. 
. 
SYG APPOINTMENT 
--------------- 
 
¶18. (C) China's Wu presented four points: the new SYG should 
be capable; the UN should follow the accepted principle of 
regional rotation, under which it was Asia,s turn -- the P-5 
should agree that Asian candidates would "have priority"; 
September/October was a good time frame for making a 
selection; and P-5 unity was important since the P-5 have 
"special responsibilities" in the selection process. 
Acknowledging current disagreements among the P-5, he said 
P-5 members should at minimum try to find an Asian who would 
be acceptable.  Konuzin agreed on the need to respect the 
tradition of regional rotation.  When SYG Annan had been 
chosen, the African and Asian blocs had agreed that Asia 
would provide the next SYG.  Those two blocs contained some 
100 countries, and while not all might agree to an Asian SYG 
now, the majority no doubt did.  In Konuzin's view, this 
served as an additional argument for choosing an Asian SYG. 
A/S Silverberg reiterated that the U.S. does not accept the 
rotation principle.  She asked about unity within the Asian 
bloc on the issue.  Wu replied that all Asian countries 
favored an Asian SYG, and that the ASEAN countries agreed 
that an ASEAN candidate should be selected. 
 
¶19. (C) Pattison raised the possibility of establishing 
criteria for choosing the next SYG, which would give a sense 
the selection process was being conducted with maximum 
transparency.  Criteria might include experience in running a 
large organization, a prominent international profile, and 
experience in international affairs.  Bermann echoed 
Pattison's view on the desirability of demonstrating 
transparency in the selection process, and suggested looking 
at procedures used by the WTO or other comparable models. 
 
¶20. (C) A/S Silverberg noted that although she agreed with 
Pattison,s criteria, intangible factors inevitably came into 
play, and any criteria would be at a level of generality that 
would make them unlikely to be useful.  She also stressed 
that setting criteria could have unintended future 
consequences.  Konuzin shared A/S Silverberg's concerns about 
specific criteria.  If the P-5 agreed to criteria, other 
groups might put forth their own, less desirable criteria, he 
continued.  The key was to avoid deadlocks, and the P-5 
should work to reach internal agreement. 
 
¶21. (C) On the question of timing for SYG selection, Konuzin 
dismissed concern that reaching consensus too early would 
make SYG Annan a lame duck.  Wu argued for a 
September-October time frame to choose the new SYG.  Konuzin 
responded that this would only ensure that the next UNGA 
session would be preoccupied with the succession issue and 
would make no progress in other areas.  Konuzin urged maximum 
flexibility on timing, but said that as soon as general 
agreement emerged about a successor to Annan, a vote should 
be taken quickly to avoid additional candidacies. 
. 
MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) REVITALIZATION 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) A/S Silverberg laid out U.S. arguments for 
revitalizing the MSC:  The Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) presents UN members with too few options 
and frequently fails to adequately justify its requests.  For 
this reason, outside military advice would be beneficial. 
A/S Silverberg added that Congress, and no doubt other 
legislatures, often question funding for UN peacekeeping 
operations, and a revitalized MSC would help address those 
concerns.  She urged close P-5 consultation and said the U.S. 
would welcome participation of member states outside the P-5. 
 Bermann said France agreed with the U.S. concerns but not 
with institutionalizing the MSC.  She questioned the need to 
create another layer of decision-making and questioned the 
value of input from member states outside the P-5, even if 
they had military expertise.  Pattison said that while DPKO 
sometimes produced useful advice, it could be improved, 
however the MSC was not necessarily the answer.  Konuzin 
expressed enthusiasm for the U.S. initiative and welcomed 
that it had been initially raised in the P-5 context. 
Agreeing with Pattison that the DPKO sometimes offered useful 
advice, Konuzin said that in other cases, such as on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, DPKO's advice had been flawed. 
More cooperation with troop contributing countries would be 
beneficial, Konuzin argued.  Wu said the MSC reflects the 
P-5's special responsibility, and China could accept P-5 
consensus on a revitalized MSC. 
. 
MIDDLE EAST/CYPRUS 
------------------ 
 
¶23. (C) Referring to the then-upcoming Hamas delegation visit 
to Moscow, Konuzin assured his P-5 counterparts that 
Russia,s message would be fully consistent with Quartet 
principles.  A/S Silverberg noted the U.S. does not meet with 
Hamas, and urges others to avoid meeting with them as well, 
then underscored that it was essential not to move the 
Quartet goal posts and to retain Quartet unity.  France's 
Bermann and UK's Pattison echoed that view, with Bermann 
stressing that a collapse of the Palestinian Authority would 
pose a risk to Israel.  Responding to a question from Konuzin 
about Sheba Farms, Pattison said the issue should only be 
brought to the Council if there is a strong prospect for its 
resolution there. 
 
¶24. (C) Turning to Lebanon/Syria, Pattison argued that the UN 
needed to keep up pressure to get cooperation from Syria, 
including on resolution 1559 obligations concerning the 
investigation of former Lebanese PM Hariri's assassination. 
Syria must be held to all requirements per Resolution 1636. 
Brammertz,s report in mid-March will "force the issue," and 
the UN must also be prepared to respond to the report by UN 
Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen in April.  A/S Silverberg 
underscored the need to hold Syria to all its obligations, as 
this was essential to the Security Council's credibility. 
Bermann agreed on the need to keep pressure on Syria, "but 
let,s see the reports."  She noted that Larsen must be able 
to return to the region before completing his report. 
 
¶25. (C) Konuzin questioned the need for additional pressure 
on Syria, and said member states should not interfere in the 
Brammertz investigation.  Russia believes action on 
Resolution 1559 must be carried out in the context of the 
political dialogue in Lebanon.  That dialogue was not going 
well, Konuzin argued, but should be encouraged nonetheless. 
Wu, noting progress made by the SYG, argued that the 
investigation must respect the views of the parties and 
others, including the Arab League.  China supported a 
diplomatic solution; the focus of 1559 should remain on the 
investigation. 
 
¶26. (C) Pattison raised the issue of Cyprus, asserting that 
no progress had been made since the Annan Report.  Inaction 
would only worsen the problem, he said, arguing for a "new 
look" from the P-5 and the Security Council.  However, he 
added, no further steps should be taken until after the Greek 
Cypriot elections in May and UN Under Secretary-General for 
Political Affairs Gambari's visit in June.  The P-5 should 
focus on making the Gambari visit successful, Pattison said. 
Konuzin agreed on the importance of finding a solution, but 
urged caution to avoid repeating previous mistakes and said 
that no time frames should be imposed.  Wu urged a resumption 
of the SYG's good offices on the issue. 
. 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶27. (C) Bermann underlined that P-5 unity on Kosovo was 
critical, and urged "realism": an even-handed approach and a 
recognition that Kosovo would not return to Serbia.  Konuzin 
agreed on the importance of P-5 unity, but lamented that some 
P-5 members are sending messages not consistent with the 
London agreement.  Konuzin embarked on a lengthy discourse 
stressing that according to the Guiding Principles of the 
Contact Group, there is no predetermined outcome for Kosovo. 
However, he said, "some partners" insist independence is the 
only option, and see the task of the Contact Group only as 
making Belgrade accept this option.  Russia rejected this 
view, he said. 
 
¶28. (C) Konuzin said the Kosovar Albanians had not delivered 
on standards.  He noted that of 220,000 ethnic Serbs who had 
left Kosovo, only 12,500 had returned.  "This is ethnic 
cleansing," he declared.  Konuzin admitted that ethnic crimes 
had gone down in Kosovo, however this was because few Serbs 
remained and those that did were physically separated from 
the Albanian Kosovars.  Konuzin insisted there must be more 
progress on standards before resolving Kosovo,s final 
status. 
 
¶29. (C) Konuzin rejected the view that Kosovo could offer no 
precedent for other conflicts.  Rather, he underlined that 
Kosovo "is a precedent already."  As an example, he said 
Abkhaz leaders have been explicit that they regard Kosovo as 
precedent.  A/S Silverberg countered that the U.S. sees 
Kosovo as unique, due to the violent disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and the long-standing UN mandate over the 
territory.  Pattison and Bermann supported the U.S. view. 
 
¶30.  (C) Pattison added that status talks needed to start 
this year precisely to get the Kosovar Albanians moving on 
standards.  This did not represent "status first, standards 
later," but "standards in the context of status."  He argued 
that only when Kosovar Albanians see the prospect of 
resolution on status will they address standards.   Konuzin 
reiterated the Russian view in favor of standards before 
status.  He urged again that the P-5 "stick to the Guiding 
Principles and not prejudge status." 
. 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶31. (C) Konuzin said the time had come for a new Security 
Council Iraq resolution to redefine the UN role there.  He 
said the P-5 could agree on enhancing the role of the UN in 
Iraq.  A/S Silverberg agreed the UN needs to have an expanded 
role in Iraq, but cautioned that it is too early to move 
forward on a new resolution.  The P-5 should wait to consult 
with the new Iraqi government before proceeding with a new 
resolution. 
 
¶32. (C) Konuzin raised the status of UNMOVIC.  He said that 
while post-war inspections had found no WMD in Iraq, danger 
remains in the form of WMD potential.  The Iraqi government 
does not control former WMD facilities and "we don't know 
where the Iraqi scientists are."  Konuzin said Russia is 
"anxious" about possible terrorist access to former chemical 
weapons depots.  Some sites formerly under UNMOVIC control 
have been "penetrated," he said.  Konuzin urged that results 
of inspections carried out by the Iraq Survey Group under 
Charles Duelfer be shared with UNMOVIC.  He noted UNMOVIC 
needs to determine whether it has completed its mandate, and 
added that the Iraqis could draw on UNMOVIC,s experience to 
set up their own monitoring mechanisms. 
 
¶33. (C) A/S Silverberg pointed out that UNMOVIC holds over 
USD 100 million in Iraqi assets.  The Iraqi government has 
said that it needs these funds for reconstruction.  She 
appealed to the P-5 to expand financial assistance to the 
Iraqi government through follow-on to Madrid pledges and debt 
relief.  Pattison said Konuzin was correct to raise the 
question of UNMOVIC,s status and the UN role in Iraq. 
Following the August 2003 bombing of its headquarters in 
Iraq, the UN was understandably cautions.  Iraq is now at a 
different stage.  The UN's role can and should increase once 
the Security Council "gives the UN a clear role," he said. 
 
¶34. (C) A/S Silverberg noted that one constraint on the UN in 
Iraq is the lack of secure airlift capacity for UN personnel. 
 Konuzin noted that UN Special Representative for Iraq Qazi 
had mentioned this.  Konuzin said Russia was prepared to 
assist financially to provide the UN with airlift in Iraq. 
A/S Silverberg noted that the matter of finding aircraft with 
adequate defensive protection for the UN had been a subject 
of consultation between SYG Annan and President Bush.  Wu 
said China was open to a new Iraq political resolution in the 
Security Council, and said the time had come to "finish" 
UNMOVIC. 
. 
AFRICA 
------ 
 
¶35. (C) Bermann noted good news and bad news on Africa.  On 
the positive side were Liberia and Burundi, where situations 
were improving.  The situation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) was also getting better and the outlook for June 
elections there has improved.  She noted France and others in 
the EU are preparing to lend security support at election 
time.  On the negative side of the ledger was the situation 
in Cote d'Ivoire, where UN peacekeepers need reinforcements. 
Sanctions were the right course of action in Cote d,Ivoire, 
she said, because it was necessary to support the Prime 
Minister.  Now the issue was to reinforce UNOCI.  France 
fully supported the U.S. initiative on Ethiopia/Eritrea 
including UNMEE downsizing. 
 
¶36. (C) A/S Silverberg cautioned against pulling out of 
Liberia too soon.  She said any increase of UN peacekeepers 
in Cote d'Ivoire should come from the UNMEE draw down and not 
from Liberia.  She noted the situation in Darfur was getting 
worse.  It was necessary to press the AU to allow its forces 
to serve under UN auspices.  Pattison agreed but noted it was 
also necessary to strengthen AU forces to enable them to do 
this.  Konuzin agreed with this point.  Wu stressed the need 
to consult the Government of Sudan on peacekeeping forces. 
Pattison responded that consultation is necessary but 
governments with influence in Khartoum also need to tell the 
GOS its behavior in Darfur is unacceptable. Non-interference 
must not be used as a cover for genocide, he said. 
 
¶37. (C) A/S Silverberg also urged P-5 members to encourage 
economic reforms in Africa by rewarding governments that 
create positive trade and investment climates, as the U.S. 
was doing through the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 
Trade and private investment are keys to development, she 
said.  The UN needs to refocus its programs to encourage 
these positive changes. 
 
¶38. (C) Pattison mentioned a key problem in the DRC is that 
the DRC regular army is not being paid.  This is especially 
true for former rebels in Eastern DRC who have been 
incorporated into the army.  On Ethiopia/Eritrea, he said the 
situation could blow up at any moment.  The UN has to be 
careful about any removal of UN forces from the security 
zone; "we must maintain some monitoring presence at least," 
he said.  Konuzin added that he was "perplexed" about the 
Ethiopia/Eritrea situation since it was clearly a personal 
issue between the two countries, presidents.  As with Cote 
d'Ivoire, he had no idea how to improve the situation.  Wu 
noted China had just given USD 400,000 to AMIS.  The Council 
should listen to the AU and the Government of Sudan on 
rehatting.  Threats of additional sanctions would only do 
harm.  Wu said China could not support extending the arms 
embargo to the rest of the country. 
. 
IRAN 
---- 
¶39. (C) The UK's Pattison said El Baradei's March report to 
the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) would make clear that Iran 
has not resolved any of its issues with the IAEA and remains 
intent on developing nuclear weapons capability.  The 
Security Council needed to move quickly to show Iran that the 
Council was unified.  Pattison proposed the P-5 meet in New 
York right after the March 6 IAEA Board meeting to discuss 
the way forward and prepare for UNSC involvement.  He 
stressed moving quickly is the key to limit Iran,s 
opportunity to respond. 
 
¶40. (C) Wu noted that "we have the same purpose:  not to 
allow Iran to have nuclear weapons."  However, China favored 
resolving the issue in the IAEA, not the Security Council. 
Wu said the IAEA report to the Security Council does not 
require any UNSC action.  He said China supports giving 
Russia's proposal to conduct enrichment for Iranian reactors 
in Russia time to work.  China favors patience and restraint 
and is concerned about "escalation of confrontation." 
 
¶41. (C) Konuzin endorsed the Chinese approach. Russia wanted 
a WMD-free Iran, and the answer was an Iranian moratorium on 
enrichment by returning to the pre-January 3 status quo. 
However, Konuzin said Russia is "inclined to keep this matter 
in the IAEA."  He added that he did not think the strategy of 
Security Council action was thought through.  It was not at 
all clear how referral to the Security Council would resolve 
the problem, since the Iranians will lash back at UNSC 
condemnation and only harden their position and defy the 
UNSC.  "What is the next step?  Do we have a strategy?  Or do 
we just want to take steps and react to what the Iranians 
do?" he asked.  Konuzin said Russia, for now, will insist on 
"continuing on the basis of a diplomatic approach instead of 
a threatening approach" and thus does not favor bringing the 
matter to the UNSC for action. 
 
¶42. (C) Pattison stressed that "time is not on our side." 
The EU-3 has been engaged in a diplomatic approach but it has 
not worked.  However, he agreed that Konuzin had raised a 
fair question in asking about the consequences of going to 
the Council.  The UK's view is that going to the Council will 
"register with the Iranians" if there is P-5 unity.  If the 
Iranians see division, they will exploit it.  P-5 unity at 
the Council offers the best hope of getting the Iranians to 
back down.  A/S Silverberg and France's Bermann supported 
this view.  A/S Silverberg pointed to the January 30 
Political Directors agreement to take up this issue in the 
UNSC after March 6. 
. 
VENEZUELA'S SECURITY COUNCIL CANDIDACY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶43. (C) A/S Silverberg urged the P-5 not to support 
Venezuela's candidacy for a Security Council seat.  She noted 
that the Security Council must maintain its effectiveness and 
professionalism, which Venezuela,s presence would undermine. 
 France's Berman concurred.  Russia and China were 
non-committal. 
. 
SWISS PROPOSAL ON SECURITY COUNCIL PROCEDURES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶44. (C) Konuzin solicited opinion on the Swiss proposal on 
Security Council procedures, which seeks to encourage the 
Council to make regular reports to the General Assembly as a 
way of enhancing transparency.  Konuzin expressed strong 
opposition, saying this infringed on Council prerogatives and 
was thus contrary to the UN Charter.  Pattison said the UK 
also did not want the Swiss proposal to be adopted and did 
not like the General Assembly "telling the Council how to do 
its business."  However, he said the UK favors sensible 
reforms to "keep ahead of the criticism."  A/S Silverberg and 
Bermann agreed.  Wu said the Council "should improve itself" 
but any measures should not limit the prerogatives of the 
P-5.  China was open-minded on improving Council 
transparency, but "any changes must be made by the Council 
itself." 
. 
DFM YAKOVENKO 
------------- 
 
¶45.  (C) Following the talks, the group met briefly with DFM 
Yakovenko, who welcomed the opportunity the consultations had 
provided.  He endorsed the idea of regular biannual P-5 
meetings that would rotate among the members.  The U.S. and 
UK underlined to Yakovenko the importance of maintaining P-5 
unity during discussions of Iran in the Security Council. 
Yakovenko took this argument on board while noting that 
negotiations with Iran were ongoing.  He also defended 
Russia's invitation to the Hamas delegation, stressing 
Moscow's adherence to Quartet principles in its discussions 
with Hamas.  China noted that Iran would be among the "hot 
topics" the Council would discuss this year and supported the 
need for P-5 consensus.  France raised Syria, urging that 
Damascus be encouraged to cooperate with the Brammertz 
investigation. 
 
¶46.  (U)  Assistant Secretary Silverberg has cleared this 
message. 
RUSSELL