VZCZCXRO3664
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #0733/01 0761948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171948Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8467
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5692
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2959
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6841
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4071
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1392
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1310
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3642
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4034
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8553
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000733 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2016 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: MAS ONLY PARTY READY FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: President Morales' Movement Toward Socialism 
(MAS) party is mobilizing its formidable machinery for the 
Constituent Assembly (CA) and is forming new alliances with 
various social and political groups.  The MAS is allegedly 
"buying" votes via the Venezuelan-backed program to issue 
identification documents to previously disenfranchised voters 
and is attempting to alter the CA enabling legislation to 
bolster its position and weaken that of the political 
opposition.  While the CA enabling law permits new political 
parties, citizens' groups and indigenous organizations to 
submit candidates, the April 3 deadline for meeting the 
National Electoral Court's registration requirements presents 
a logistical obstacle to widespread participation. 
Meanwhile, the opposition, apparently still reeling from its 
defeat in the December elections, is struggling to provide a 
meaningful counterweight to the MAS, with little hope for 
success.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  President Morales' Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) 
party, a well-organized (and well-financed) machine in its 
own right, is gearing up for the Constituent Assembly (CA) 
and is forming alliances with various social and political 
groups to extend its reach.  The MAS has already won 
endorsements from prominent social and indigenous 
organizations such as the Federation of Miners Cooperatives 
(FENCOMIN), the Movement without Fear (MSM), the Labor Union 
of Rural Bolivian Workers (CSUTCB), and the Regional Workers 
Union (COR) of La Paz.  The MAS is encouraging these and 
other small political parties/citizens groups to propose 
their own slate of candidates (and therefore appear 
"independent"),  the intended result being MAS control of 
both the majority and minority representatives for each 
electoral district. 
 
¶3. (C) With its Venezuelan-financed program to issue 
identification documents to previously disenfranchised 
voters, the MAS is reportedly "buying" support for its CA 
candidates.  Several Embassy interlocutors tell us that the 
carnets, provided free of charge, come with strings attached 
(in effect, the citizen must vote for the MAS).  One member 
of Congress believes that, based on the last census (reputed 
to underrepresent Bolivia's population) and the numbers of 
carnets the GOB plans to distribute, government 
identification cards will be "issued" to around 700,000 
persons who don't exist.  The MAS is also leading an effort 
to modify the CA's enabling legislation to eliminate 
government subsidies of political parties during the CA 
campaign.  The MAS plans to publicly decline such funds as an 
austerity measure, and to criticize its opponents for not 
following suit.  A deputy with the National Unity (UN) party 
told us that the MAS won't succeed in changing the law, but 
will drag the opposition through the mud in an attempt to 
gain votes.  The MAS is also attempting to postpone the 
deadline for voter registration for the CA to allow the 
citizens receiving carnets (who are presumably more likely to 
support the MAS) to participate in the election. 
 
¶4. (C) While the CA enabling legislation permits new 
political parties, citizens' groups and indigenous 
organizations to submit candidates, the April 3 deadline for 
meeting the National Electoral Court's registration 
requirements presents a logistical obstacle to widespread 
participation.  Many indigenous and women's groups are 
frantically searching for alliances with existing political 
parties or citizens groups, as they couldn't obtain the 
signatures required to form a new legal entity by April 3. 
Only two organizations, the Bolivian Social Democrats (BSD) 
and Potosi Mayor Rene Joaquino's Social Alliance (AS), began 
the registration process in a timely manner; one other group, 
the Patriotic Social Union Movement (Muspa), has completed 
the process. 
 
¶5. (C) In the absence of new political organizations, 
opposition to the MAS in the CA will likely be the same major 
parties that ran in the December election, many of which are 
 
LA PAZ 00000733  002 OF 002 
 
 
still reeling from their defeat.  The UN and Podemos are only 
beginning to look for CA candidates; they are struggling with 
how to provide a meaningful counterweight to the MAS.  The UN 
is attempting to work out an under-the-table deal with 
Podemos and the MNR to run only one opposition slate of 
candidates in each district.  Such a deal has been met with 
interest, but real political leadership is lacking to push it 
forward.   Both Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga and Samuel Doria Medina 
are keeping a low political profile.  Quiroga is challenged 
by the split of the National Democratic Action party (ADN), 
his former party, from the Podemos coalition.  Many doubt 
that Podemos or the UN will nominate a full slate of national 
candidates for the CA due to lack of organization and 
funding.  Several parties which did not participate in the 
December elections (like the newly-formed Social Alliance in 
Potosi or Sucre's Free Bolivia Movement (MBL) may be able to 
sway some voters in a few departments, but appear to have 
limited national capacity. 
 
¶6. (C)  Comment: Morales' stated goal is for the MAS to take 
the CA by an overwhelming majority, by electing as many as 70 
percent of the CA delegates.  Clearly, the MAS is the only 
party with a well-defined strategy for the CA and the funding 
to match.  If the opposition doesn't unite quickly and 
convince its financiers (like Doria Medina) to open up their 
coffers, they'll weaken their opportunity to have a sizable 
role in the CA, thus giving the MAS control to re-write 
Bolivia's constitution.  End comment. 
GREENLEE