VZCZCXRO1147
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKUK #0055/01 0661912
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 071912Z MAR 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0515
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0551
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0579

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, ROL COORDINATOR, IRMO/IPCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/7/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KISL PHUM PINS PINR PREL IZ IR SY TU
SUBJECT: KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION MAINTAINS A MODERATE, INDEPENDENT 
STANCE 
 
KIRKUK 00000055  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting), Reo 
Kirkuk, Department of State . 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  The Kurdistan Islamic Party (KIU) hopes to be 
a viable option for Kurdish voters that are not satisfied with 
what they perceive to be the corrupt, self-serving policies of 
the KDP and PUK.  KIU officials reputedly reject violence in the 
name of Islam and argued that the Iraqi Government needed to 
work better with Islamic parties to control Islamic fanaticism. 
The KIU expected more KDP and PUK attacks in the future but 
hoped to remain a "peaceful opposition party".  Recently, the 
Kurdish Alliance formally requested that the KIU rejoin its 
bloc, but the KIU was unwilling to compromise their political 
independence without receiving concessions from the PUK and KDP. 
 The KIU receives a small budget from the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) but is unwilling to accept funds directly from 
the PUK or KDP.  The KIU has no special relations with the 
Kurdistan Islamic Group and rejected the recent fatwa to kill 
author Meriwan Halabja as extremism.  The KIU representatives 
indirectly responded to a question regarding their views on 
Sharia law by stating the KIU voted for the Constitution.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
(SBU) KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION - A VOICE of moderation 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  On 1 March 2006, IAPO's met with members of the 
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), including Kirkuk chief and 
Central Committee member Muhammad Karim, deputy chief of Kirkuk 
Abd al-Qadir Zagold, and Kirkuk Provincial Council member 
Ibrahim Khalil Rashid.  The KIU representatives said their party 
rejected all violence in the name of Islam and would never 
accept one Iraqi sect to impose its will on the others.  They 
pointed out that their party was the first Iraqi Islamic group 
to publicly denounce Ansar al-Sunna's Islamic ideology as too 
extreme - a move that greatly enhanced the KIU as a terrorist 
target.  The KIU representatives argued that the Iraqi 
Government needed to work with Islamic parties to control 
Islamic fanaticism.  They believe their party must continue to 
be a viable option for Kurdish voters that are not satisfied 
with the often corrupt, self-serving policies of the KDP and PUK. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Karim claimed the KIU was able to earn five seats on 
the national Council of Representatives because it did not 
represent a sect and had a creative governance plan for Iraq's 
future.  According to Karim, Allawi's group responded favorably 
to their governance plan and wanted to meet to discuss its 
contents, but nothing yet had materialized.  The KIU's plan in 
the short-term could be summarized as: first, prioritize 
security as a means to implement civil projects; second, treat 
all groups and parties equally; third, work to remove the term 
"occupier" from the Iraqi vernacular and coordinate with the 
Coalition to improve its treatment of Iraqis; and fourth, 
improve minority rights and mitigate the persecution of 
minorities by dominant Iraqi groups.  Karim argued that Iraq 
could not fight its enemies with force, only ideology. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The KIU representatives stated their support of civil 
rights and emphasized that its key platform was anti-corruption 
in northern Iraq.  The KIU prefers technocrats with "clean 
hands" to hold government positions.  In reference to the role 
Sharia law should play in governance, the KIU representatives 
indirectly answered that they had voted in favor of the current 
Constitution draft.  Karim added that his party supported the 
Constitution because it was moderate on civil and human rights. 
Karim said the KIU denied the fatwa issued by Kurdistan Islamic 
Group (KIG) official Abd al-Qadir Said to kill Meriwan Halabja, 
because he authored the controversial book, "Sex, Islamic Law, 
and Women."  The KIU position was clear in that it supported the 
KRG Ministry of Culture to deal with this "problem" according to 
the law.  The KIU representatives said their party had no 
special relations with the KIG other than the two parties were 
political counterparts in northern Iraq.  Karim then asked 
whether the Embassy would release a statement condemning 
Halabja's book out of respect to Iraqi Muslims.  He seemed 
puzzled as to why the USG would not release a definitive opinion 
on the controversy. 
 
 
(SBU)  THE PRICE OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Recently, the Kurdish Alliance formally requested that 
the KIU rejoin its bloc, but the KIU responded that it would 
 
KIRKUK 00000055  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
only unite if the Kurdish Alliance agreed to KIU demands that 
include funding for special projects and increased political 
representation in the Kurdish Regional Government. The Kurdish 
Alliance response has been to threaten KIU resources in the 
Kurdistan region.  Additionally, the KIU delegation has not been 
invited to many of the discussions regarding national government 
formation in Baghdad.  They complained that the U.S. Ambassador 
had not invited the KIU, while Mithal al-Alusi's party (with 
only one seat) had been involved in the negotiations. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The KIU had expected some repercussions from the KDP 
and PUK when it decided to split from the Kurdish Alliance but 
never anticipated attacks on their buildings or the targeting of 
their officials.  Karim said the KIU expected more attacks in 
the future but hoped to remain a peaceful opposition party in 
the Kurdish Regional Government. He was confident that the 
Kurdish Alliance was likely to dismiss the KIU from positions 
and opportunities in the KRG but claimed the KIU was willing to 
lose all it possessed to exercise its democratic rights. 
 
¶7.  (C)  The KIU receives a small budget from the KRG and relies 
on donations from its members.  The KIU reportedly refuses to 
accept money directly from the KDP or PUK, because it would 
compromise their independence.  KIU party members that earned 
salary from their political positions returned a large 
percentage of those earnings to the party.  For example, each of 
the five KIU members on the national Council of Representatives 
kept only $400 of his $10,000 monthly salary.  Rashid requested 
that the U.S. support the KIU because it was vulnerable to the 
KDP and PUK's dominance in northern Iraq.  When questioned about 
possible international funding sources the KIU members became 
visibly uncomfortable. 
 
Biographic Notes 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  The KIU in 2003 presented a post-war plan to the head 
of the Coalition Provisional Authority, who liked the plan and, 
as a result, gave KIU leader Salah al-Din Baha al-Din a seat on 
the 25 member Governing Council.  The three representatives at 
the current meeting had the appearance of western businessmen 
and seemed genuine in their statements to promote civil projects 
and curb corruption in the north. KIU Kirkuk chief and Central 
Committee member Muhammad Karim clearly was the top KIU official 
in the meeting; he sat between his two colleagues and did most 
of the talking.  The KIU representatives appeared sincere in 
their call for greater civil and human rights, and it is 
plausible that the KIU will gain more traction in northern Iraq 
if it holds fast to its image of anti-corruption and demands for 
greater accountability from the two dominant Kurdish parties. 
ORESTE