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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM555, SECURITY GUARDS IN JUBA ASSAULT THIRD-COUNTRY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM555 2006-03-02 14:06 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0555 0611406
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021406Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1716
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0551
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000555 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA AND AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EAID PREL PINR SU
SUBJECT: SECURITY GUARDS IN JUBA ASSAULT THIRD-COUNTRY 
NATIONAL SUPERVISOR 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  On Monday, February 27, 2006, members of 
the Local Guard Force (LGF) contracted by the USG to 
secure the U.S. Consulate compound in Juba (Southern 
Sudan) attacked one of the contractor's third country 
national (TCN) employees.  The security guards demanded 
to be provided letters of recommendation, certificates of 
training and immediate payment of their salaries.  This 
assault took place on the contractor's compound located 
in Juba and did not involve any USG personnel or 
facilities. End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
Training Turns to Violence 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  In response to the guard's demands, the TCN employee, 
a Kenyan, told the group there was no money in the office 
and they were due to be paid the next day.  The guards 
then attacked the TCN, dragging him a short distance 
along the ground while kicking him in the chest and 
stomach.  An additional group of 15 guards in the 
compound began to gather rocks and sticks. 
 
3.  The contractor's local general manager (a U.S. 
citizen) arrived and urged calm, requesting that the 
rogue guards release the TCN.  The guards responded with 
threats and insults, and would not allow the general 
manager to approach the TCN.  The guards did not attack 
the general manager, possibly fearing he was armed. 
During the conversation, the TCN escaped and took refuge 
at a nearby secure location. 
 
------------ 
Juba Justice 
------------ 
 
4.  The police responded to the contractor's office in 
riot gear and arrested five of the guards involved in 
this incident.  The remaining culprits fled the scene and 
remain at large.  The five resisted arrest and the police 
had to physically restrain them.  At the police station, 
the arrested subjects threatened the TCN in front of 
several witnesses (including the police), saying they 
were going to kill him as soon as they were released from 
prison.  The police are looking for 10 other guards who 
were involved in this incident. 
 
5.  The police and the prosecutor advised the guard 
contractor's general manager they intend to prosecute the 
guards involved in this incident to the fullest extent of 
the law.  While the arrested security guards will have 
the opportunity to post bail, the police believe it is 
unlikely they can afford it.  The perpetrators are facing 
up to 18 months in prison. 
 
6.  The TCN was taken to the hospital to receive 
treatment for his injuries, which included lacerations on 
his hands and arms.  The TCN departed Juba for Kenya the 
following day, fearing furthe attacks by those involved 
or their families.  Some of the guards involved in this 
incident are members of locally well-connected and 
prominent families and tribes.  Despite this, the 
security guard contractor said he intends to pursue this 
case through the full legal process. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  Southern Sudan is recovering from a lengthy civil 
war, has large numbers of displaced persons, suffers from 
an acute lack of development, offers limited economic 
opportunities for most local citizens, and has little 
civil society in place.  These are the ingredients for 
discontent and animosity.  Many locals may be resentful 
of outsiders-- including Kenyans, Ugandans and returning 
southerners-- who come to Juba and assume many of the 
management and leadership positions with the various 
international entities operating in the area. 
 
8.  It is disturbing that a group of employees believed 
they could attack their employer with impunity, and 
merits the urgent attention of the Government of Southern 
Sudan (GoSS).  This case will be a good test of how 
quickly and fairly the GoSS justice system can operate. 
RSO Khartoum will continue to monitor this case. 
 
STEINFELD