VZCZCXRO3047
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0528/01 0601017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011017Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1681
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PINS PINR SU
SUBJECT:  SOUTHERN SUDAN:  MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL 
SECURITY ADVISOR ABU JOHN 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  On February 28, CG Juba met with GoSS 
Presidential Security Advisor Samuel Abu John to discuss 
SPLA reform, military force structure, and CPA 
implementation modalities.  Abu John said that the GOSS 
realizes the importance of paying the SPLA, but is still 
trying to get good rolls.  He also said that the LRA needed 
to be stopped as soon as possible, but that current efforts 
by the Ugandans are inadequate and that the SPLA would most 
likely have to seriously engage soon.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
In Search of a Leaner, More Professional Force 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (U) Remembering his meeting with the CG in Yei a year 
ago, Abu John remarked that things had improved: the GoSS 
was taking shape, and he personally had overcome the 
persistent malaria that had wracked him last year.  He said 
that in his new capacity he was responsible for advising on 
security matters related to the SPLA, and not the police and 
other security forces that fell under the competency of 
Minister of Police Daniel Awed. 
 
¶3.  (U) The top priority, according to Abu John was to 
professionalize the SPLA and upgrade its capabilities.  He 
noted that this process was ongoing as the military 
regrouped many of its forces in Yei and to a lesser degree 
Nimule.  To CG's query on force structure and optimum 
strength of the SPLA, Abu John replied that this was a work 
in progress.  The plan was to do a complete inventory of 
forces - total numbers were still not known - and then see 
which were most physically and mentally fit for retention in 
the army.  The excess would then be considered for other 
security services: police, national parks, prisons, and the 
fire brigade.  Until this exercise can be completed, Abu 
John concluded, it will be impossible to provide precise 
numbers. 
 
---------- 
CPA Issues 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Abu John complained that the North had played an 
obstructionist role in CPA implementation.  Specifically, 
the GoSS had identified its contribution to the JIUs and 
made them available for joint training with JIU counterparts 
from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), but the Khartoum 
government had still not identified its forces.  Even more 
seriously, he charged, the GNU had not begun withdrawing 
northern forces from the south as stipulated in the CPA 
timetable.   CG observed that both sides are bound by these 
timetables, and that both sides had experienced difficulties 
in meeting deadlines.  CG suggested that the Assessment and 
Evaluation Commission was a CPA-stipulated mechanism for 
airing such issues and seeking to broker satisfactory 
solutions. 
 
---------------------------- 
Non-payment of SPLA Salaries 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) CG observed that the failure to pay SPLA salaries 
had become a staple of Juba gossip - what was at issue here? 
Abu John admitted that the root of the problem was the same 
one underpinning force structure issues - no one had an 
accurate figure for how many troops were under arms.  It was 
therefore impossible to begin general payment, since every 
person in the South would attempt to claim he/she had fought 
with the SPLA.  GoSS leadership understood that the soldiers 
were unhappy and thought that they were being cheated of 
their due.  There was sufficient money to pay several months 
of salary, and yesterday the first payments had been made in 
Yei.  The SPLA command hoped to assign each soldier a number 
to help streamline the process in the future.  CG noted that 
logistic and personnel reforms should be part of the 
professionalization process. 
 
--------------- 
The LRA Problem 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Abu John admitted that the LRA was a problem that 
was not going away.  There had been at attack a few days 
earlier just 30 miles outside of Juba, and attacks on trucks 
on the Yei road had made merchants skittish and risked 
creation of a bottleneck that would reverse the downward 
trend in Juba market prices that had resulted from opening 
transportation links to the south.  He blamed the North for 
continuing to provide support to the LRA through aerial 
resupply -- he said he had reliable witnesses who could 
corroborate this.  He said that he believed UNMIS forces in 
 
KHARTOUM 00000528  002 OF 002 
 
 
Yambio were aware of this as well, if they would be willing 
to admit to it. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) He added that there were still many unknowns about 
the LRA.  Despite the numbers tossed about, no one really 
knew how many fighters were here.  He expressed doubt about 
claims that recruitment had become mostly internal - "Tong 
Tong" fighters, in the local parlance - because most 
victims/witnesses of LRA attack said that they communicated 
in a mixture of Acholi, English and Kiswahili, situating 
their origin in Uganda.  Nonetheless, he realized that they 
had some local support from guides and others who could be 
recruited for pay.  Abu John said that the LRA appeared to 
have pulled most of its forces back in an arc running along 
the borders of Uganda, DRC and CAR.  There were reports of 
LRA forces active in DRC, and he had heard that LRA were 
present in the Central African town of OBO. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) According to Abu John, the UPDF pursuit of the LRA 
rebels was laughable.  The UPDF rolled down the road in 
tanks while the LRA remained in the bush.  CG asked if the 
GoSS had settled on a policy of dealing with the problem. 
Abu John replied that if the GoSS offer of mediation were 
not accepted, he saw no choice but to go after them with 
force.  If the LRA moved on foot, the SPLA would have to 
track them on foot.  South Sudan could not afford to let the 
status quo prevail. 
 
------------ 
Other Issues 
------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) On USG sanctions, Abu John believed the south was 
being unfairly affected, especially in reopening the railway 
to Wau.  He said that he had heard that the Border 
demarcation commission had constituted and met in Khartoum a 
day earlier.  He said that he hoped that the commission 
could come to agreement and stop the North from trying to 
push the border south, since both petroleum reserves and the 
withdrawal of northern forces to their own areas depended 
upon an accurate border demarcation.  CG asked in parting if 
Abu John felt that his comment last year - " the donors are 
assessing us to death" - still held true.  CG cited some 
specific USG funded programs for mine removal, health and 
infrastructure.  Abu John acknowledged progress but stressed 
that much remained to be done, and that expectations in the 
South were high. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Abu John understands what need to be done, but 
realizes that none of the choices will be politically cost- 
free. 
 
¶11.  (U) Full bio data provided septel, March 2005 trip to 
Yei. 
 
HUME