This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PACFLEET FOR ADM ROUGHEAD 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2016 
TAGS: OVIP PGOV PREL MARR TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF PACFLT COMMANDER ADM 
ROUGHEAD 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (a and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Gary, your trip to Bangkok will take place as Prime 
Minister Thaksin faces his most serious political crisis 
since taking office.  Speculation about the future of his 
government will likely arise during all of your meetings.  We 
are asking all U.S. visitors meeting with Thai officials to 
urge respect for the democratic process and to stress the 
importance of showing restraint and using peaceful methods. 
Your visit remains a terrific opportunity to improve our 
links with the Royal Thai Navy.  Jonathan Greenert is here 
now and the Thai are excited about the possibility of more 
USN ship visits, possibly to include the USS Abraham Lincoln 
Battle Group in April.  Our military-to-military relationship 
is strong.  Nonetheless, our relationship with the Royal Thai 
Navy could be improved.  We hope during your stay that you 
will be able to promote several issues such as our desire for 
better cooperation with Thailand in maritime security as well 
as flag key benefits of U.S.-Thai cooperation such as the 
growing professionalism within Thai Naval Special Forces. 
 
THE POLITICAL SITUATION 
 
¶2.  (C)  In 2001, PM Thaksin Shinawatra became the first 
democratically elected civilian Prime Minister to win an 
outright majority in the Thai Parliament.  He has dominated 
the political scene in ways never seen before.  He has used 
Constitutional changes implemented in 1997 to take control of 
most of the major government institutions -- including ones 
initially designed to be independent.  Until recently, 
despite an authoritarian streak, he has deftly mixed populist 
measures such as virtually free health care with a 
pro-business economic policy in a fashion that allowed his 
Thai Rak Thai (Thais loving Thais) political party to run the 
country.  In February 2005, Thai Rak Thai won 375 of the 500 
seats in Parliament.  Thaksin comes from a prosperous 
Sino-Thai family in Thailand's second largest city, Chiang 
Mai, and placed first in his class at the National Police 
Academy.  He spent several years studying in the United 
States and considers himself a friend of the President. 
After a few years with the police, he left government service 
to run the family business (Shinawatra Corporation, or Shin 
Corp), which he turned into Thailand's largest telecom 
company, making himself a multi-billionaire. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Thai political system is presently working 
through its biggest crisis since 1992.  Tens of thousands 
have participated in peaceful rallies protesting government 
corruption and Thaksin's recent tax-free sale of Shin Corp to 
Singapore.  In an effort to work his way out of the current 
predicament, Thaksin dissolved parliament and called snap 
elections nominally set for April 2.  The opposition has 
announced it will boycott the elections, a move that could 
force an impasse taking Thai politics into uncharted 
Constitutional territory.  At this point, we believe there is 
a reasonably good chance that the Thai will work through this 
problem peacefully, and in a way that will generally be 
considered legitimate here.  Most of our contacts express 
confidence that troops will remain in the barracks. 
Nonetheless, given the Thai military's history of involvement 
in politics, we are monitoring the situation closely.  We are 
urging the police and military to use restraint against 
peaceful demonstrators and not to intervene illegally in the 
situation.  We wish to avoid being seen as taking sides. 
 
THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 
 
¶4. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over 
50 years of close cooperation.  Thai soldiers, sailors and 
airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese Conflicts 
and Thai peacekeepers served in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Thailand is the fourth largest participant in the U.S. 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. 
 Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to use 
Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional tsunami 
assistance program was key to making Operation Unified 
Assistance a success.  In your meetings with Thai officials, 
you will want to note the overall strength of the 
relationship -- highlighting our history and underscoring the 
importance of our tsunami cooperation, exercise program, 
increased tempo of USN ship visits, and cooperation in the 
War on Terrorism. 
 
THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
¶5. (C) While our overall relationship with the Thai military 
is good, our links with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) are not as 
strong as those with the Royal Thai Army or Air Force.  The 
RTN is smaller than the other services and tends to be less 
willing to be open with U.S. counterparts.  This has not been 
the case historically, and we need to work to reverse the 
trend.  Recently, the Chinese have improved their ties to the 
RTN as evidenced by the first PLA Navy ship visit to Phuket, 
a joint SAR exercise in the Andaman Sea, and sales to 
Thailand of Chinese equipment. Likewise, the RTN has been 
developing a closer relationship with the Indian Navy and has 
conducted some exercises with the Indians. 
 
¶6. (C) In addition to supporting our annual Cooperation 
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise with Thailand, 
JUSMAGTHAI has worked closely with RTN Special Warfare units 
to increase their capacity. USN SEALS have helped to provide 
their Thai counterparts with some impressive capabilities. 
For instance, Thai SEALS regularly conduct exercises aimed at 
protecting oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Thailand. 
This NSW relationship was graphically demonstrated during the 
tsunami response when USN and RTN SEALS rapidly deployed to 
 
SIPDIS 
Phuket to assist in the recovery efforts.  The Prime Minister 
was photographed in a recovery boat manned by the SEALS. 
Despite their improved professionalism, the Thai SEALS are 
not well-supported by senior RTN officials.  In your meetings 
with your counterparts, you may wish to discuss the 
importance of the SEALS and make mention of their 
capabilities. 
 
REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY 
 
¶7. (C) A key U.S. objective in the region is to improve 
Maritime Security.  We are working closely with PACOM to 
encourage Thailand and others to support the Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI).  In November, during the 
U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue, LTG Kemarat Kanchanawat, 
the Royal Thai Supreme Command (RTSC) Joint Operations 
Director, discussed a "Combined Maritime Patrol" architecture 
for the Strait of Malacca that would involve Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  In a January 24 meeting 
with the Ambassador, RTN CINC ADM Satirapan Keyanon indicated 
that the RTN was leery of this Combined Maritime Patrol 
architecture, suggesting that Kemarat was trying to commit 
the RTN budget to the proposal without proper authority. 
During your meetings with RTN officers, you may wish to probe 
for a clearer understanding of how the Thai Navy views its 
responsibilities to safeguard waters in the region.  On a 
related topic, RTN officials are skeptical of the Malaysian 
sponsored "Eyes in the Sky" program. Thailand does not plan 
to actively participate for at least a year due to not having 
enough aircraft to sustain long-term patrolling. 
 
UTAPAO UPGRADES 
 
¶8. (C) Utapao NAS has been designated by PACOM as the most 
important Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in the Asia 
Pacific Region.  While we avoid using the term "CSL" with the 
Thai due to their sensitivities about bases, Utapao remains 
vital to our interests in the region. Thai and U.S. officials 
in-country concur that Utapao is due for significant safety 
upgrades in order to continue to meet our needs.  Although 
Utapao is a RTN facility, PACAF is the executive agent 
exploring whether the United States can assist in providing 
safety upgrades there.  Thai military officials still await 
the results of a PACAF assessment of Utapao which took place 
in September.  Royal Thai Navy officials recently indicated 
to the Ambassador that they seek radar upgrades at Utapao in 
addition to fire safety and other improvements. 
 
THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION 
 
¶9. (C) Southeast Asia continues to feel the rising influence 
of China and India. While emphasizing the vital role of the 
U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S. 
engagement -- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger 
relations with the two regional powers.  The Thai view both 
countries as sources of unlimited consumer demand and hope to 
conclude Free Trade Agreements with both nations.  Given your 
close interest in those countries, it would be worthwhile for 
you to exchange views on the future roles of India and China. 
 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND 
 
¶10. (C) Until recently, Prime Minister Thaksin's biggest 
domestic challenge was the unsettled security situation in 
the far southern part of the country. Southern Thailand, in 
particular the southernmost Muslim majority provinces of 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, has experienced episodic 
violence since it was incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom 
in 1902.  However, since January 2004, we have witnessed a 
dramatic increase in the level of violence.  Press reports 
indicate that over 1,000 persons have been killed either by 
militants or by security forces during this period.  Local 
Muslim separatist militants have attacked symbols of Thai and 
Buddhist authority, civilians, and local citizens suspected 
of collaborating with the Government.  There continue to be 
daily incidents of violence.  In March 2005, Thaksin 
appointed a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed 
by highly respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun 
to look for alternative solutions to the long-running 
insurgency.  The NRC is expected to present its findings 
sometime this month. 
 
¶11. (C) The RTN does not play a role in addressing the 
situation in the South. Nonetheless, Thai officials may ask 
you for U.S. equipment and technology such as UAVs.  We 
suggest you be non-commital. There are widely circulated 
rumors among ethnic Malay Muslims that the U.S. has fomented 
the violence in the South in order to justify a U.S. security 
presence there.  This has made the RTG very sensitive about 
any visible U.S. assistance aimed at the South.  You should 
be aware of these concerns when discussing offers of possible 
U.S. assistance. 
 
HARRIERS 
 
¶12. (C) The RTN, like the other services, does not have a 
long-range vision of what Thailand's maritime security needs 
are, what threats Thailand might need to counter, or what 
equipment it should procure.  As a result, its inventory 
includes a wide variety of equipment of questionable utility. 
 One example is its VSTOL Carrier, the Chakri Naruebet. 
Thailand procured the carrier from Spain and, at the same 
time, bought eight used AV-8 Harriers. These aircraft are no 
longer airworthy.  For several years, we have been urging the 
Thai to use their carrier as a helicopter platform.  A number 
of RTN officers agree and have supported more training for 
helo ops from the Chakri Naruebet.  However, another faction 
within the RTN continues to ask us for more Harriers.  If you 
are asked for AV-8's, you may wish to underscore that we have 
no surplus Harriers due to their use elsewhere and urge the 
Thai to continue to develop their carrier as a helicopter 
platform. 
 
NAVAL HAWK (MH-60S) HELICOPTER 
 
¶13. (C) The RTN has expressed an interest in increasing the 
size of its helicopter force. One option is to purchase four 
of the new Sikorsky MH-60S Naval Hawk.  With its design 
emphasis on multi-mission capabilities, most particularly 
logistics, SAR and light attack, coupled with the fact that 
it is marinized for shipboard operations, make this aircraft 
ideal for the roles and missions of the RTN.  Although the 
RTN wants the MH-60S, it has been experiencing sticker shock 
and has had difficulty getting the funding required through 
the budgetary process.  You may wish to ask your 
interlocutors whether the RTN is willing to push for the 
funding required to purchase four aircraft as planned. 
 
WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT 
 
¶14. (U) Have a safe trip.  I look forward to catching up and 
giving you an update on the political situation. 
BOYCE