VZCZCXRO2450
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO
DE RUEHKO #0756/01 0410952
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100952Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8543
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0530
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0863
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6715
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 4551
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 7619
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 5754

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000756 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO EAP/FO AND TREASURY DAS GLASER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016 
TAGS: PARM PREL PHUM JA KN
SUBJECT: JAPAN-DPRK TALKS: FURTHER DETAILS FROM N.E. ASIA 
DIRECTOR ITO 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 433 
 
     ¶B. TOKYO 644 
     ¶C. BEIJING 2089 
     ¶D. TOKYO 709 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR W. MICHAEL MESERVE.  REASON 
: 1.4 (b),(d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: MOFA Northeast Asia Director Ito reported 
"no progress" resulting from the February 4-8 Japan-DPRK 
talks despite the 20 hours they spent discussing the 
abduction issue, security concerns, and normalization of 
relations.  Ito identified the likely DPRK motivations for 
engaging in the talks, but concluded that Pyongyang remains 
unprepared to engage in real bilateral negotiations at this 
time.  He reported that during normalization talks the DPRK 
broke with past statements to insist that Japan's formula for 
providing ODA in exchange for closing all historic claims 
applied only to material losses, not cases of human 
suffering.  The North Koreans said they remain committed to 
implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement, but stated 
they would do so only after the United States ended its 
"sanctions," dropped its "hostile policy," and provided a 
LWR, Ito said.  He added that they claim no evidence exists 
to prove the DPRK is engaged in money laundering.  Ito also 
reported there was nothing new in the DPRK position on the 
abduction issue, aside from what he called their "absurd" 
demand that Japan turn over several journalists and NGO 
members who had allegedly assisted North Korean refugees in 
their escape from the DPRK.  He described the atmospherics of 
the talks as very poor, adding that both sides agreed to 
continue their bilateral negotiations at a later date, but 
that no agreement could be reached on the timing.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (C) MOFA Northeast Asia Director Naoki Ito described the 
February 4-8 Japan-DPRK bilateral talks as "effectively no 
progress on every front" in a meeting with POL Deputy 
Reynolds.  He had requested the meeting to provide the 
Embassy with further details on the talks.  Ito, a key member 
of the Japanese delegation, made it clear that he and his 
colleagues were deflated by the demeanor shown by the North 
Korean delegation.  In several meetings leading up to the 
talks the DPRK had indicated willingness to "make serious 
efforts" and "take concrete steps" to resolve its bilateral 
concerns with Japan.  As a result, that became the criteria 
we used to assess the outcome of the talks, Ito said.  By 
that measure, and despite the fact they had met for nearly 20 
hours of talks, Ito indicated that the lack of progress has 
left him convinced Pyongyang remains unprepared to engage in 
real bilateral negotiations at this time. 
 
¶3.  (C) During six hours of normalization talks on February 
6, the Japanese delegation had hoped to establish a "common 
understanding" that the DPRK would drop past monetary claims 
in exchange for the promise of significant amounts of future 
official development assistance (ODA).  Ito pointed out that 
the same formula had been used when Japan and the Republic of 
Korea normalized relations, and that Prime Minister Koizumi 
and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had agreed to pursue a 
similar approach in negotiating the Pyongyang Declaration. 
Contrary to all that, however, the DPRK delegation stated on 
February 6 that the formula would only be applied to 
"material losses," while insisting that "human suffering" 
(e.g. the comfort women issue) must be dealt with outside of 
the scope of that framework.  They did not appear to be all 
that interested in ODA, Ito concluded. 
 
¶4.  (C) In response to Japanese security concerns (nuclear 
and missile), the North re-stated that the DPRK "is committed 
to implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement," but 
added they would do so only after the United States lifted 
its "sanctions" on North Korea, ceased its "hostile policy," 
and "built up trust" through provision of a Light Water 
Reactor (LWR), Ito reported.  In response to the money 
laundering issue, the North stated there was "no evidence" of 
such activities, Ito said, adding that they acknowledged 
"some rules had been violated" but insisted they would deal 
with those infractions through their existing legal system. 
 
¶5.  (C) During 11 hours of abduction talks the DPRK side 
provided "no new information and offered no commitment to 
resume investigation of the remaining abduction cases," Ito 
reported.  Instead, they asked the Japanese to return the 
"remains" of abductee Megumi Yokota and called for an experts 
 
TOKYO 00000756  002 OF 002 
 
 
meeting to analyze the DNA evidence.  Ito said the Japanese 
government has offered such a meeting since December 2004, 
but admitted it has little enthusiasm for the idea because 
the North is likely to use that opportunity to increase 
doubts, rather than to resolve the issue. 
 
¶6.  (C) In the end, both sides agreed to continue their 
three-track bilateral talks, but couldn't agree on the timing 
of their next session, Ito said.  DPRK delegation head Song 
Il-ho was "very cautious" about not committing to any future 
dates, he added.  Song reportedly showed anger when he 
interrupted Ambassador for Normalization Haraguchi's 
statement at the concluding plenary session with the words: 
"I don't want to hear anymore of your speech." This prompted 
Haraguchi to stop talking and hand over a copy of his full 
remarks to Song, Ito said. 
 
¶7.  (C) Asked to analyze the behavior of the DPRK delegation, 
Director Ito offered the following observations: 
 
-- Pyongyang most likely agreed to the talks because it is 
concerned about the negative public perceptions of North 
Korea now prevalent in Japan.  Song Il-ho held an 
unprecedented one-hour pre-planned press conference to get 
out the DPRK message, rather than issuing his usual short 
statement on the steps of the North Korean embassy. 
 
-- Pyongyang may also be calculating that the Diet, which is 
currently in session, will be less likely to invoke punitive 
measures against North Korea so long as the DPRK shows a 
willingness to engage in talks with Japan. 
 
-- Finally, the North Koreans were interested in obtaining 
Japan's plan for normalization of relations so the leadership 
in Pyongyang can fully consider whether the economic 
advantages are worth the political cost of negotiating an 
agreement. 
 
¶8.  (C) While the Japanese used the talks to describe their 
plan for providing ODA to North Korea if normalization talks 
are concluded, Ito also reported that the Japanese delegation 
had clearly spelled out to the DPRK what economic sanctions 
and other punitive measures the Japanese government will 
consider implementing if North Korea fails to get serious 
about resolving the nuclear, missile and abduction issues. 
The most likely of these, according to Ito, will be passage 
by the Diet, later this session, of human rights legislation 
targeting North Korea (to be reported septel). 
SCHIEFFER