This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000415 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR DS/IP, DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/OPO/FPD, DS/ICI/RFJ, 
DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA/EX, D, P, DS, 
CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2016 
TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 
 
REF: A. 05 STATE 35169 
     ¶B. 05 SANAA 557 
     ¶C. SANAA 266 
     ¶D. SANAA 306 
     ¶E. SANAA 349 
 
Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/19/06, 
to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped 
Al-Qaida members.  EAC discussed the immediate security and 
personal safety concerns of the embassy and it's employees. 
EAC also discussed residential local guards and the Rewards 
for Justice (RFJ) program.  Members in attendance were DCM, 
RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO, POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD. 
 
¶1. (S/NF) EAC was briefed by all relevant agencies and 
sections on the situation, 17 days after the reported escape 
of the Al-Qaida prisoners.  Members were advised that none of 
the escapees had been captured as yet and their whereabouts 
were still unknown.  NOTE: (Post has subsequently been 
advised that two of the escapees have turned themselves in). 
Relevant office and section heads advised that the ROYG has 
been cooperative in sharing what information there is, but 
that there was nothing new to report at this time. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) EAC members agreed that the security and travel 
restrictions put in place in RefTel's were still warranted in 
light of the lack of information concerning the whereabouts 
of the escapees.  Personal security and travel restrictions 
agreed to by the EAC are as follows: 
 
¶A. Embassy personnel are strongly urged to maintain a low 
profile in Sana'a until the capture of the escapees or 
information of their whereabouts are learned.  Unnecessary 
travel to the Bab al-Yemen, local neighborhoods, shopping and 
social venues and areas on the outskirts of Sana'a should be 
curtailed.  Post personnel are reminded to avoid numerous 
trips to grocery stores and other venues frequented by 
Westerners.  All personnel were reminded to vary their routes 
and times to and from work. 
 
¶B. Limit all non-essential travel within or to Yemen. 
Official travel outside of Sana'a will be considered on a 
case-by-case basis.  Travel to Yemen by official Americans 
will also be considered on a case-by-case basis.  The RSO and 
section heads will review all travel and TDY requests and 
make recommendations to the DCM. 
 
¶C. All American employees will be allowed flex time and 
access to armored shuttles. 
 
¶D. Local Guard Force, Residential Guards and ROYG residential 
security forces will be alerted and will maintain a 
heightened security posture. 
 
¶E. RSO will notify ROYG security forces to increase vigilance 
at the three approved hotels used by official American 
personnel. 
 
¶F. All embassy personnel were reminded by the RSO to maintain 
vigilance and immediately report any incident that seems 
suspicious or unusual to the RSO office or Post 1. 
 
¶G. EAC agreed that the most recent Warden Message adequately 
reflected the situation and no change was necessary at 
present. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) EAC members discussed timelines and potential 
tripwires and all agreed that the one month mark would be the 
point at which discussion on future security restrictions and 
an enhanced embassy response might be warranted.  All EAC 
members agreed that, absent significant numbers of the 
escapees captured or information concerning their 
whereabouts, post would have to make changes in the operation 
of the mission and the security of it's personnel.  EAC 
members felt that the longer the terrorists were at large, 
the more likely they were to start planning operations 
against the embassy and its personnel. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) EAC agreed to continue monitoring the situation and 
to liaise with their ROYG counterparts on the situation. 
Members agreed to reconvene if any information was received 
that increased the threat to the embassy or it's personnel. 
Post will immediately report developments as they occur. 
 
¶5. (SBU) RSO advised that the issue of reduced residential 
local guard coverage discussed in 2005, RefTel's A and B, is 
again under review by DS/IP/OPO/FPD.  The issue of 24/7 
residential local guard coverage first broached by 
DSS/IP/OPO/FPD in 2005 concerned post's residential guard 
staffing being over standards for our threat ratings.  Post 
has maintained the position that our unique situation, even 
before the recent escape of 23 Al-Qaida prisoners, requires 
an exception to the guidelines and post must keep 24/7 
residential guards.  The EAC unanimously agreed that guard 
coverage should not be reduced and voiced strong objections 
to the matter even being considered during these turbulent 
times.  RSO advised he was in the process of writing a post 
response on the issue, EAC demanded RSO include their strong 
feelings on the subject. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) RSO advised EAC that DS/ICI/RFJ, Rewards for 
Justice program, made contact with the RSO office and advised 
that rewards for two of the escapees, Al-Banna and Al-Badawi, 
were still available.  EAC agreed that advertising in the 
local newspapers, press releases, advertising campaign and 
posters may be effective in attaining information on the two 
subjects, but decided to check with the ROYG on the 
feasibility of such a campaign in Yemen.  RSO advised the EAC 
of the possibility of including some of the other escapees in 
the RFJ program, if they met the criteria.  EAC agreed that 
avenue was worth exploring. 
Krajeski