This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000584 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON MARR PARM MOPS ELAB EINV IT ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS

SUBJECT: ITALY'S UNION COALITION PROGRAM: FAULT LINES ON 
THE LEFT 

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor David D. Pearce for reasons 
 1.4 (b) and (d). 

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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C)  Romano Prodi presented the center-left Union 
coalition's 281-page governing program on February 13.  As 
opposed to establishing a concrete program for the Union 
coalition should it win the April 9 national elections, the 
document has been viewed by critics from both the right and 
the left as an index of the Union's internal disputes.  The 
Eurocentric foreign policy section is relatively short, heavy 
on pacifist language, stresses multilateralism and 
""rebalancing"" transatlantic relations, recognizes the 
importance of the Middle East, calls for a withdrawal of 
Italian troops from Iraq in consultation with the Iraqi 
government, and anticipates a re-examination of the 
disposition of Italian military facilities.  Long on analysis 
of Italy's economic and social ills, it is weak on 
prescriptions for change.  Although the foreign policy 
portion is cause for concern, e.g., the near absence of 
reference to NATO, the document serves mainly to underscore 
the fault lines within the center left itself.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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UNITY IN DISCORD 
---------------- 


¶2. (SBU) Romano Prodi presented the center-left ""Union"" 
coalition's 281-page governing program on February 13.  The 
presentation ceremony featured Prodi standing on a stage 
together with the leaders of the varied political parties in 
Prodi's coalition.  The event was meant to highlight 
coalition unity and a forward-looking governing program, the 
result of months of careful negotiation.  Not surprisingly, 
the program is a laundry list of general proposals on social, 
environmental and labor issues. 


¶3. (C) As opposed to establishing a concrete program for the 
Union coalition should it win the April 9 national elections, 
the document has been viewed by critics from both the right 
and the left as an index of the Union's internal disputes. 
The day after its presentation, a major battle broke out over 
the absence of language on the controversial Lyon-Turin 
high-speed rail (TAV).  Communist Renewal and Green Party 
leaders said its absence means the project would be canceled 
while Prodi assured nervous moderates and business leaders 
the project would go forward.  Internal bickering has also 
occurred over whether the Union should continue PM 
Berlusconi's policy toward Israel (Daisy Party) or whether it 
should be reversed completely (Italian Communist Party).  One 
Daisy party official told Poloff not to worry about he termed 
""this trash document"" that they were forced to draft with 
communists and greens.  Poloff noted that they would have to 
govern with those same people. 
 

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FOREIGN POLICY 
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¶4. (SBU) The foreign policy section is relatively short, 
places Europe at the center of foreign policy, is heavy on 
pacifist language, stresses multilateralism, recognizes the 
importance of the Middle East, calls for a withdrawal of 
Italian troops from Iraq and for reassessing the disposition 
of the country's military facilities.  Iran is not 
specifically mentioned, though the program does refer to the 
problem of weapons proliferation.  A summary is provided 
below: 
 
--European integration: Europe and deepening European 
integration is the center-left's ""guiding principle.""  The 
Union repeatedly describes EU federalism as a strategic goal, 
states that Italy's national interests fold into those of 
Europe and that it will work for the resumption of the EU's 
institutional reform process.  It proposes a Europe-wide 
referendum in 2009 on the EU Constitution in conjunction with 
European Parliamentary elections.  It supports the accession 
of Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia and underscores the need to 
integrate western Balkan countries into Europe in order to 
encourage the resolution of lingering conflicts.  It favors 
accession negotiations for Turkey but points to the need for 
Turkey to comply fully with the Copenhagen criteria and to 
resolve issues of political and institutional reform, human 
rights, and the rights of minorities.  NATO receives no 
direct mention and notably not in its role as a locus for 
transatlantic political consultation. 
 
-- Common EU Foreign, Security, Defense Policies:  The 
program says a common EU foreign and security policy (CFSP) 
and a common EU defense policy (ESDP) are major priorities. 
The Union proposes implementing a CFSP immediately by 
creating an EU foreign minister, abolishing veto powers on 
foreign policy decisions within the EU Council, using 
enhanced cooperation as often as possible in decision-making 
processes and in conflict prevention and management, and 
creating an EU seat in international organizations, such as 
the IMF, WB, and UNSC.  Italy will implement this policy 
during its UNSC rotational presence in 2007 by coordinating 
EU policies within the Security Council.  The emphasis is on 
policy rather than development of military capabilities. 
There is no representation of ESDP, however, as competitive 
with or replacing the transatlantic Alliance in a military 
sense. 
 
--United Nations/International Criminal Court/IAEA: The 
Union's second guiding principle is what the platform 
characterizes as Italy,s ""vocation for peace"" and is pegged 
to article 11 of the Italian Constitution, which rejects war 
as a method to resolve international controversies.  The 
focus is on multilateralism and multipolarism, in particular 
regional organizations like the EU.  Making the UN stronger 
is a priority and Italy can/can relinquish part of its 
national sovereignty to the UN.  The use of force is allowed 
only in the greater context of collective security and for 
international police functions, in accordance with Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.  In full compliance with article 47 of 
its Charter, the UN should create a Military Staff Committee 
and a ready alert contingent.  Genocide is an attack against 
another country and requires self-defense, and the General 
Assembly should be given more powers toward this end. The 
role of the International Criminal Court should be enhanced. 
Efforts must be made for concrete progress toward the 
disarmament of nuclear powers, in order to then apply a ""more 
effective pressure"" on the new nuclear countries and on those 
that have nuclear ambitions.  The IAEA must be given more 
powers to obtain full NPT compliance. 
 
-- Rebalancing Transatlantic Relations: Italy must work to 
enhance the UN system, reform the UN, become again a lead 
country in Europe, and ""re-affirm and rebalance transatlantic 
relations in order to contribute to international security 
and assure peace and justice among nations."" 
 
-- Terrorism: Terrorism is unacceptable and ""unjustifiable."" 
The struggle against terrorism must be carried out using 
""political methods, the intelligence services, and by 
opposing terrorist organizations.""  It is necessary to 
develop a global strategy that should be articulated thus: 
cooperation among intelligence services, control of suspect 
financial flows and safe haven countries, development 
cooperation agreements with third countries. (Note: There is 
no reference to the use of military troops, and some 
coalition members distinguish between legitimate insurgency 
and terrorism.  End Note.) 
 
-- Iraq: The program states that ""the war in Iraq and the 
occupation were a serious mistake.""  It continues that it 
""weakened the UN and undermined multilateral world 
governance.""  On the future of Italian troops in Iraq, it 
states that, ""immediately after parliamentary elections in 
April, the Union will ask the Italian parliament to vote for 
the withdrawal of Italian troops.  Withdrawal would occur 
according to a schedule that is based on a timing that is 
technically needed for withdrawal and in consultation with 
the new Iraqi Government in order to guarantee security. 
Withdrawal will be accompanied by a ""strong political 
initiative to support.... transition toward democracy in Iraq 
and contribute to finding a path for Iraq to attain full 
democratic stability and which would give Iraqis full 
sovereignty over their country.""  (Note: The word used is 
""consultation"" and not ""agreement.""  The program does not 
address the need to consult or coordinate Italy's withdrawal 
with any of the other members of the coalition of the willing 
that are still in Iraq.  The US is never mentioned in the 
chapter on Iraq.  End note.) 
 
-- Mediterranean: The Union's priority is an active Italian 
and EU ""neighborhood policy"" with countries in the 
Mediterranean region.  ""Italy must work for a peaceful, 
stable and democratic Mediterranean"" through special 
relations with all and new development policies based on 
universal principles and intercultural dialogue.  The end 
goal is a common Euro- Mediterranean space.  Regional 
disarmament and denuclearization must be pursued. 
 
-- North-South and Solidarity:  The Union proposes to 
increase public funds for development assistance programs in 
the poorer countries.  ""Armed forces must never be used for 
humanitarian intervention or development assistance."" 
 
--New Defense Policies:  The Union's intent is to (1) work on 
European defense and on cooperation between the EU and the 
US; (2) reorganize a new and modern defense system; and (3) 
focus on human resources.  Enhanced/structured EU cooperation 
on defense has begun and should proceed rapidly.  In order to 
address the problems that derive from a unipolar world order, 
""we must aim for an autonomous European defense, albeit 
linked to the Atlantic Alliance, which is undergoing in-depth 
changes.""  The Union will propose the need to firmly anchor 
Italy,s strategic position in Europe, as a player in 
Europe's integration policies, as well as a loyal ally of the 
United States.  Italy's defense system must be made more 
""flexible and integrated at a European level with our 
allies."" 
 
--Military Basing: The program cites the changed strategic 
situation after the end of the Cold War and the need for 
repositioned and modernized, more efficient forces.  The 
program also anticipates a shift of military facilities and 
units toward southern Italy, both closer to threats emanating 
from the Mediterranean and to many soldiers' homes in the new 
all-volunteer military.  This relocation of some military 
presence to the south would be a result of a promised 
""redefinition of the military burden ('servitu' militare') 
borne by our territories, particularly in regard to nuclear 
bases.""  The program foresees a second National Conference to 
examine the issue of the military burden borne by different 
Italian regions.  (NOTE: This item primarily concerns Italian 
national military presence and, apart from La Maddelena, does 
not raise questions about U.S.military presence at Italian 
bases. The military burden discussed has long been a 
controversial issue in Sardinia, which bears a 
disproportionate burden in terms of military right-of-way, 
training areas, practice ranges, etc.  In November 2005, DS 
Secretary Piero Fassino publicly promised Sardinian Regional 
 
SIPDIS 
President Renato Soru that the center-left would advocate for 
shifting military burden to other regions and would call a 
national conference on the issue.  The only facility in Italy 
that might qualify in the public eye as a ""nuclear base"" is 
La Maddelena, now scheduled to be closed. 
 
------------------------------------ 
THE ECONOMY: WHY ITALY IS IN DECLINE 
------------------------------------ 

¶5. (SBU) In the section ""Why Italy is in decline,"" the Union 
details a series of well-known problems with the Italian 
economy. The analysis is precise and some of the solutions 
track results from the Ambassador's Partnership for Growth. 
The program is generally short on specific solutions to these 
well-known problems.  It generally offers generic solutions 
that observers believe will be difficult for a fractured 
coalition to implement. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Union proposes a renewed industrial policy to 
strengthen small companies and shift to more technically 
advanced sectors; a reform of public spending, primarily 
investments; the strengthening of industrial districts and 
their conversion into technology parks; and implementation of 
measures aimed at improving competition in all sectors of the 
economy. The Union plans to propose a new governance model 
for growth and competitiveness--a major reorganization and 
coordination between the government, line ministers and the 
regions.  In particular, the Union proposes the creation of a 
new ministry for the real economy that would be in charge of 
initiatives of economic competitiveness, support to 
companies, energy policy, competition, and 
internationalization. 

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SOCIAL AND LABOR ISSUES 
----------------------- 

¶7. (SBU) The Union program is highly critical of Berlusconi's 
social and labor policies, which it claims have created a 
precarious work environment.  As a solution, the Union 
proposes a laundry list of labor and pension reforms, 
family-friendly work policies, education schemes and 
immigration reforms.  Union groups have criticized the 
program as too long and inclusive to be a serious proposal. 


COMMENT 
¶8. (C) The Union's proposals for social and economic policy 
are too broad and vague to be meaningful, and many of the 
proposed labor reforms would increase the deficit and work 
against measures designed to increase the efficiency of the 
Italian economy.  The foreign policy chapters contain some 
areas of real concern, especially as regards a potentially 
hyper-Eurocentricity and the near absence of any reference to 
NATO.  While the issue of re-examining the disposition of 
military facilities makes no direct mention of NATO or the 
US, this will be an issue to watch in the event that the far 
left were to emerge with strong influence within a 
center-left coalition post-April 9.  The language on Italian 
troop deployments to Iraq is sufficiently vague to please 
both the moderates and extremists within the Union and 
contains no real surprises.  In brief, the document is a 
hodgepodge, and serves best as a guide to the fault lines 
within the center left itself.  END COMMENT. 
SPOGLI