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PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #0199/01 0550753
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240753Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6996
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0064
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0113
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0174
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0667
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0180
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0030

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000199 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2016 
TAGS: PREL EUN YI MW SR BK BO IR IZ KPAL CG
SUBJECT: CZECHS ON FEB 27 GAERC 
 
REF: A. STATE 25937 
 
     ¶B. PRAGUE 0068 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Martin Hohe for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. At the February 27 GAERC, the top priorities 
will be the Balkans, the Middle East, and Belarus. The Czechs 
stress the importance of observing international standards in 
Kosovo, and of managing the impact in Belgrade of any 
permanent solution for Kosovo. The Czechs strongly support 
U.S. positions on Iran and Hamas, and support a EU trade 
mission to Iraq. On Belarus, the Czechs support sanctions 
against the regime elite. They also regard opposition leader 
Milinkevich to be a skilled interlocutor. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Poloffs met February 21 with Petr Kaiser, Director 
of the Czech MFA's Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Department, to deliver reftel A talking points and to discuss 
February 27 GAERC. The discussion focused on the Balkans, the 
Middle East, Belarus, and Congo. 
 
----------- 
The Balkans 
----------- 
 
¶3. (C) On the Balkans generally, Kaiser said the Western 
Balkans will be first priority at the Gymnich meeting of EU 
Foreign Ministers in Salzburg March 10-11. 
 
¶4. (C) On Kosovo, the Czechs stress the importance of 
observing international standards, noting that minority 
rights must be protected for the Roma as well as the Serbs. 
The Czechs agree with the approach of UN Special Envoy 
Ahtisaari, namely that Kosovo must address basic problems, 
such as human rights issues (including protection of minority 
rights, church sites, etc.), before tackling the more 
difficult issue of independence. Kaiser reaffirmed that the 
EU is still calling for complete cooperation with ICTY. 
 
¶5. (C) The Czechs continue to be concerned about the impact 
in Belgrade of any resolution concerning the future of 
Kosovo. Any outcome is likely to be seen as a defeat, with 
associated internal political difficulties. 
 
¶6. (C) On EU incentives, the Czechs believe that only the 
prospect of eventual EU membership is likely to encourage 
meaningful participation on both sides. 
 
¶7. (C) On Montenegro, the challenge is how to ensure 
participation of the opposition in the referendum. Currently, 
the parties are not talking to each other directly, relying 
instead on shuttle diplomacy. According to Kaiser, a major 
problem to overcome is the opposition's belief that a 50%   1 
result will be unfair. The opposition, therefore, wants the 
referendum to be decided by a super majority. He noted that 
Belgrade has not been cooperative on the issue. 
 
--------------- 
The Middle East 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (C) On Iran, the Czechs completely support the U.S. 
position. Kaiser said that recent events only confirm the 
Czech's long-term view that the Iranian government cannot be 
trusted, and is a destabilizing influence in the region. 
 
¶9. (C) On Iraq, the Czechs support the proposal to send an EU 
trade mission to Iraq. Kaiser predicts the proposal will be 
approved because EU member states have a strong desire to do 
something that will support the Iraqi people and help 
stabilize the political situation there. 
 
¶10. (C) On Palestine, Czechs views remain unchanged: Hamas is 
still on the list of terrorist organizations, and therefore, 
the EU should not engage with Hamas politically unless it 
denounces violence. Kaiser noted that some EU member states 
disagree. They believe the EU must deal with Palestine 
because of interests there, such as the EU presence at the 
Rafah border crossing. 
 
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Belarus 
------- 
 
 
PRAGUE 00000199  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶11. (C) Kaiser said support for Belarus in the EU is 
currently very high. There is a growing understanding and 
agreement that the EU must do something to help the 
Belarusians. 
 
¶12. (C) The Poles and Latvians hosted meetings on Belarus on 
the margins of the last GAERC. At one of these meetings, 
Belarusian opposition leader Alexander Milinkevich spoke with 
27 foreign ministers or their proxies. He was able to clearly 
state the situation in Belarus. According to Kaiser, 
Milinkevich exhibited good political instincts and the 
Foreign Ministers appeared very impressed. 
 
¶13. (C) Milinkevich at that meeting acknowledged impending 
defeat in the coming election (a view shared by EU member 
states), and is no longer calling for people to go to the 
streets. Milinkevich claims he is not calling for a color 
revolution. His aim is to introduce the opposition parties to 
the voters, and to rebuild civil society. Kaiser observed 
that the civil society movement in Belarus has much in common 
with the Poland's Solidarity movement in the 1980s. (Note: 
The goal of rebuilding civil society is consistent with Czech 
efforts to provide capacity-building training to Belarusian 
civil society, ref B). Milinkevich had said his political 
campaign has basic needs: photocopiers, for example. He also 
expressed appreciation for the ERB radio project, and 
confirmed the strong need to counter the regime's propaganda. 
Notwithstanding the inaccurate information they receive, 
Milinkevich said the public's appreciation of the West is 
very high. 
 
¶14. (C) The Czechs support harsher measures against members 
of the Belarusian political elite. 
 
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Congo 
----- 
 
¶15. (C) Although the Congo is not a foreign policy priority 
for the Czech Republic, the Czechs maintain an Embassy there. 
Kaiser said EU member states are discussing how to respond if 
elections become violent. 
CABANISS