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C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000370 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: MUCH ADO ABOUT EVERYTHING: ALVARADO CONTINUES TO 
VACILATE OVER MONTEALEGRE ALLIANCE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Presidential-hopeful Jose Antonio Alvarado 
wants to have his cake and eat it too, continuing to waffle 
between allying with Eduardo Montealegre and entering into 
Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC)-initiated primaries. 
Ambassador noted in his recent meeting with Alvarado and his 
advisers that time is running short, urging Alvarado to steer 
clear of a path that PLC leader/convicted prisoner Arnoldo 
Aleman controls.  Alvarado admits that the PLC primary 
proposal is likely a "set-up," but he intends to respond and 
seek clarification on a number of points.  Alvarado was 
partially receptive to our suggestion that he and possible 
running mate Eduardo Montealegre present a joint counter 
offer, commenting that they are making progress towards 
forging an alliance; however, he prefers that they each 
present similar counter proposals.  Clarifying that he is 
working on two parallel tracks -- one to form an alliance 
with Montealegre, and the other, to draw the PLC into a 
broader Liberal coalition -- Alvarado argues that these 
efforts are not contradictory.  He believes that only by 
exhausting all options can he -- and Montealegre -- reach out 
to Liberal voters in good conscience and expect their votes. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
Primaries - or Bust 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) In Ambassador's two-hour session on February 14 with 
presidential-hopeful Jose Antonio Alvarado and two advisers, 
Eduardo Urcuyo and Ariel Granera, Alvarado insisted that, 
while the PLC primary proposal (see below) is likely a 
"set-up," he will respond in writing and seek clarification 
on a number of points.  Alvarado asserted that he will either 
compete in free and fair primaries or he will not compete at 
all, claiming he will neither run on a PLC ticket, nor 
separately with Montealegre without them.  He remarked that 
the PLC had asked him to serve as Jose Rizo's running mate, 
an offer he declined because he will not accept Aleman's 
"dedazo." 
 
¶3.  (C) Alvarado was partially receptive to our suggestion 
that he and possible running mate Eduardo Montealegre present 
a joint counter proposal to hold primaries in May, suggesting 
instead that they each present similar counter offers.  He 
shared that he had dined the night before with Montealegre, 
observing that they are making progress towards reaching an 
alliance.  Clarifying that he is working on two parallel 
tracks -- one to form an alliance with Montealegre, and the 
other, to draw the PLC into a broader Liberal coalition -- 
Alvarado argued that these efforts are not contradictory. 
Only by exhausting all options can he -- and Montealegre -- 
reach out to Liberal voters in good conscience and expect 
their votes.  While Montealegre is leveraging his position 
vis a vis the PLC by competing in the March 5 Atlantic Coast 
elections, he is exhausting all options to bring aboard the 
PLC and to reduce Aleman's hold on the party, explained 
Alvarado. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) (Note:  Montealegre may be in for a disappointment. 
 According to preliminary results of IRI's poll on the 
Atlantic Coast political process, Montealegre will fare 
poorly in the March 5 election.  A combination of 
FSLN-generated fraud (backdating of DOBs on 1,000s of birth 
certificates plus the relocation and cedulation of 1,000s of 
other Sandinista supporters) and confusion are likely to give 
the FSLN a massive win in the North Atlantic Autonomous Zone 
(RAAN) and a more modest PLC majority in the South Atlantic 
Autonomous Zone (RAAS).  According to the poll, many voters 
who support Montealegre are confused and intend to check box 
1 on the ballot (PLC) because they still associate 
Montealegre with the PLC.) 
 
Background:  Primaries According to the PLC 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (U) By way of background, on Feb. 9, the PLC invited 
dissident Liberal candidates Alvarado and Montealegre to 
participate jointly with the PLC presidential pre-candidates 
in one round of primaries.  The basic points of the PLC 
proposal follow: 
 
- Montealegre and Alvarado may participate in one round of 
primaries with the other six PLC pre-candidates. 
 
- They may register party officials from their alliance 
parties by Feb. 28, a process which would presumably result 
 
in a field of 250,000 alliance party officials who would be 
eligible to vote in the primaries. 
 
- They must reply to the PLC proposal by Feb. 23. 
 
- The proposal does not mention using the primaries to select 
National Assembly or Parlacen deputies (and probably does not 
include them). 
 
¶6.  (U) Several points in the PLC proposal require further 
clarification, including: 
 
--Change of the PLC statutes to allow selection by primaries 
VS convention. 
 
--The exact composition of the voting list, which would need 
to include all of Montealegre's and Alvarado's alliance 
officials; 
 
--Which deputy positions, if any, would also be decided by 
the primaries; 
 
--How the other deputy positions would be selected; 
 
--The need to modify all alliance party statutes to recognize 
the winner(s) of the primaries; 
 
-- Whether other democratic pre-candidates would be eligible 
to compete (e.g. Francisco Fiallos of APRE); and, 
 
--The selection method of the vice presidential candidate. 
 
The Situation According to Montealegre 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) Local IRI Director Gilberto Valdez reported on 
February 13 that Montealegre may announce at a February 16 
press conference his decision not to participate in the 
primaries as proposed by the PLC.  Rather, Montealegre 
intends to seek an agreement with Alvarado, ideally before 
his Thursday press conference.  According to Montealegre, 
Conservative Party (PC) leader Mario Rapacciolli has agreed 
to modify the PC's deal with Montealegre's ALN and relinquish 
the vice presidential position to Alvarado if the two 
candidates reach an agreement.  (Note: Rapacciolli has not 
yet discussed this decision with other PC leaders.)  Valdez 
also confirmed that Aleman allowed the PLC to offer 
Montealegre and Alvarado to participate in one-step primaries 
to derail promising negotiations between the two.  He added 
that some Alvarado advisers are still working to persuade 
Alvarado to abandon talks with Montealegre and join the PLC 
primaries. 
 
APRE's Perspective 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) Alianza por la Republica (APRE) President/Assembly 
Deputy Miguel Lopez Baldizon offered a third perspective on 
the PLC proposal, asserting to polcouns on February 14 that 
the PLC offer should have been institutional, to APRE, not 
Alvarado, who he termed an APRE "free-lancer."  Lopez also 
agreed that APRE and Montealegre's ALN should submit a joint 
counter offer to the PLC; he intends to broach the subject 
with Montealegre.  APRE will also seek OAS technical advice 
in its February 15 meeting with the visiting OAS team 
regarding the primary process, explained Lopez. (Note: 
According to Valdez, the PLC deliberately invited Alvarado, 
not APRE, in an attempt to separate Alvarado from the APRE.) 
 
¶9.  (C) On the subject of presidential candidates and the 
ongoing impasse among different Liberal factions, Lopez 
argued that President Bolanos holds the key to the solution; 
he must make up his mind and instruct his "troops."  He 
downplayed the recent falling out he had with Bolanos, 
alleging it had been engineered by Bolanos' senior political 
adviser Frank Arana, and had since been resolved. 
 
It's PLC's Institutional Edge, Stupid 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) Alvarado and his advisers agreed with Ambassador 
that the PLC has lost much of its political machinery and 
considerable popular support.  However, Granera insisted that 
the PLC continues to enjoy an institutional advantage over 
Alvarado and Montealegre because along with the FSLN, the PLC 
controls the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), the courts, and 
the Fiscalia -- the entities involved in the electoral 
 
process and "controlling" the outcome.  Urcuyo commented that 
when the PLC controlled the majority of Nicaragua's 
municipalities, the PLC, as the FSLN is doing nowadays, would 
backdate birth dates to allow 14 and 15-year olds to vote. 
"We did this for the sake of democracy," explained a 
straight-faced Urcuyo.  (Comment: In other words, an ALN-PC 
campaign independent of the PLC could be disadvantaged by 
fraud committed by both the FSLN and the PLC.) 
 
Avoiding a Four-Way Race at All Costs 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - 
 
¶11.  (C) Granera was adamant that a four-way race best serves 
Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega's interests, arguing that if 
the ultimate objective is to defeat Ortega, the this option 
must be avoided at all costs.  Any of these Liberal 
candidates -- Alvarado, Montealegre, Jose Rizo, Francisco 
Aguirre Sacasa, or Ramiro Sacasa -- are honorable and would 
be a better option than Ortega, he reasoned.  (Comment: 
Conservative Ariel Granera, who in his spare time serves as a 
senior-level MFA official, is likely one of the advisers 
recommending that Alvarado explore "options" with the PLC and 
avoid an alliance with Montealegre, at least for now. 
Urcuyo, on the other hand, admitted that Aleman's game plan 
may be to allow an Ortega victory in exchange for his 
freedom.  If this is the case, and a number of other 
interlocutors have shared the same assessment with us, 
Montealegre's allying with the PLC would be tantamount to 
political suicide.  End Comment.) 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) The PLC's about-face came shortly after Montealegre 
and Alvarado appeared to be moving closer to forging a 
combined "Third Way" alliance and when polls and other 
indicators suggest a PLC defeat in the March 5 Atlantic Coast 
elections.  The new proposal may reflect both the initiative 
of some PLC'ers who sincerely desire a sound and legitimate 
unification of Liberal forces and yet another ploy by Aleman 
to recapture the lost strength of the PLC while maintaining 
his control of the party.  Without the inclusion of deputy 
positions in the primary process, Aleman will again be able 
to select sycophants personally loyal to him and perpetuate 
his control of the party.  Even if Montealegre were to win 
the presidency with the support of the PLC, he would be 
hamstrung -- "a la Bolanos" -- by a legislative bloc 
controlled by the caudillo. 
 
¶13.  (C) Comment continued.  Alvarado, who wants to have his 
cake and eat it too, continues to flirt with the PLC, while 
Montealegre maintains his position not to associate with the 
PLC so long as Aleman controls it.  Alvarado's argument that 
to win a Liberal alliance must include the PLC, because the 
PLC has institutional presence that can affect the outcome of 
the March and November elections, is only partially valid. 
Clearly, Daniel Ortega, who controls Aleman's destiny through 
the courts, has the upper hand in the Ortega-Aleman pact. 
The Sandinista majority in the CSE has led to virtually total 
Sandinista control of the CSE's operations. 
 
TRIVELLI 
1 
TRIVELLI