VZCZCXRO7905
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBJ #2776/01 0461021
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151021Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7853
INFO RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 4291
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1179
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 002776 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV UNSC UNGA CH BM
SUBJECT: BURMA CONSULTATIONS WITH PRC 
 
REF: A. BEIJING 16482 
     ¶B. BEIJING 17382 
     ¶C. RANGOON 179 
     ¶D. RANGOON 206 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Daniel Shields.  Reasons 1. 
4 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The PRC recognizes that the situation in Burma is 
bad, agrees that the regime's isolationist behavior is 
growing and welcomes further discussion with the United 
States, but Beijing does not believe that Burma threatens 
regional security at present.  After listening to a review of 
current U.S. Burma policy and the situation on the ground 
during a February 13 working lunch with a visiting DOS 
delegation, MFA Asian Affairs Deputy Director General Zhao 
Jianhua said that Beijing recognizes the problems but is 
concerned that a sudden move to democracy could lead to the 
disintegration of Burma, which would destabilize the region. 
The Burmese regime's main goal is to protect the military's 
interests in a future political structure.  Zhao speculated 
that perhaps a new approach of pressure combined with 
engagement on a variety of issues like narcotics, health 
issues and political prisoners might lead to positive change. 
 China does not support UNSC action at present but does 
support a continuing role for a USYG Special Envoy.  China 
will tell PM Soe Win during his February 14-18 visit that 
China wants Burma to remain stable, focus on economic 
progress and move the national reconciliation process 
forward.  End summary. 
 
U.S. Policy 
----------- 
 
¶2.  (C) A USG team led by EAP/MLS Deputy Director Robert 
Rapson met with MFA Asia Department Deputy Director General 
Zhao Jianhua over lunch on February 13 to discuss Burma. 
Rapson said U.S. discussions with regional partners are 
designed ratchet up pressure on Burma and push the regime to 
engage in a real process for meaningful political reform. 
The unpopular, unpredictable and increasingly repressive 
Burmese regime is not offering a viable political process to 
move Burma in a positive direction and continues to mismanage 
relations with minority groups.  The sudden and unannounced 
move of the capital to Pyinmana confirmed the regime's 
disregard for the international community while the 
deteriorating economic situation is leading to instability. 
The path forward for the regime is to engage in a meaningful, 
inclusive dialogue that leads to a political process that 
brings in all groups to democratize the country.  The United 
States has been encouraging other countries publicly or at 
least privately to carry similar messages emphasizing the 
need for credible and inclusive political reform. 
 
¶3.  (C) Reviewing recent developments on the ground in Burma, 
Embassy Rangoon Pol-Econ Chief Murphy said the "roadmap" is a 
sham, with hand-picked participants working on a pre-drafted 
constitution to come to a pre-determined conclusion that will 
keep the military junta in control of the country.  There is 
no movement towards reconciliation, the regime's self-imposed 
isolation is increasing, repression of pro-democracy and 
ethnic groups continues and there are increasing restrictions 
on UN and NGO activities, including humanitarian and 
development aid.   The economic situation is grim, with all 
socioeconomic indicators declining, inflation at 50 percent 
and the lack of any real economic choice for most of the 
population. 
 
PRC: No Interference but No Illusions 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Referring to Beijing's commitment to the U.S.-China 
Senior Dialogue and its related sub-dialogues and recognizing 
that Burma is important to both the United States and China, 
Zhao welcomed "informal and frank" discussion, urging that 
the discussion not be made public.  He said Beijing has a 
fundamental interest in a stable Burma.  The PRC would like 
to see progress toward national reconciliation and economic 
development because a Burma that falls into chaos is in the 
interests of neither China nor the United States.  Although 
the PRC policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other nations limits China's role in Burma, Zhao said Beijing 
is "quite concerned" with the situation in Burma and would 
like to see progress on national reconciliation and movement 
 
BEIJING 00002776  002 OF 005 
 
 
towards democracy via a stable political process.  Zhao said 
it is clear to China that the regime's transition process is 
not serious and that the real goal is to maintain a large 
military role in governing the country.  Discounting the 
Burmese excuse that the pro-democracy parties voluntarily 
decided not to participate in the National Convention, Zhao 
said China recognizes that the parties are being excluded. 
 
China Fears Chaos, Junta Keeps Country Stable 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Zhao said the PRC worries that if the junta left 
suddenly and Burma became democratic no one could be sure of 
the outcome, arguing that the military is the only force that 
can keep Burma stable.  He claimed that movement towards 
democracy in other parts of the world has often been chaotic 
and sometimes produced governments that were no better or 
even worse than their predecessors.  China wants progress on 
political reform and national reconciliation, but is also 
"extremely concerned" that pushing too hard could lead to 
chaos or even the disintegration of Burma.  Such an outcome 
would destabilize the entire region and upset the regional 
balance of power.  Noting that the number of Chinese 
companies investing Burma has been increasing in recent years 
and that China provides significant economic assistance, Zhao 
said Beijing also has economic interests at stake. 
 
Burmese Military Protecting Own Interests 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Zhao said the Burmese regime faces a dilemma because 
on the one hand it wants to keep the status quo but on the 
other hand it faces national and international pressure to 
move to democracy and engage in national reconciliation. 
What is not clear to the generals is how their interests and 
the interests of the Burmese military will be protected. 
Zhao offered that the international community needs to 
realize the political realities in Burma.  Although it is not 
necessarily in keeping with democratic principles, the 
international community and regional countries should think 
about how the military regime's interests will be protected, 
because only under these circumstances will the regime be 
willing to move forward on real change in Burma. 
 
One Stubborn Old Man Leading Burma 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Zhao said Burma is ruled by Senior General Than Shwe, 
a "stubborn old man" who is becoming even more stubborn and 
inflexible as he gets older.  Than Shwe makes all major and 
many minor decisions. Not even the head of the Burmese Army 
General Maung Aye or Prime Minister Soe Win can question his 
decisions.  Noting that the transition process has already 
begun, Zhao professed no insight into who will succeed Than 
Shwe, while stressing it is in the military's interest to 
have a smooth shift of power from Than Shwe to the next 
military leader.  Zhao said the junta is preparing for the 
transition now and wants to create a political structure to 
ensure the military's dominant role in Burma before Than Shwe 
departs the scene.  Zhao said former PM Khin Nyunt was a 
"less stubborn general" but that his pragmatic dialogue with 
ethnic groups, countries in the region and the international 
community, combined with power dynamics among the senior 
generals, led to his fall from power.  Zhao commented that 
outsiders should avoid making overly positive comments about 
Burmese generals they may favor because this leads to 
scrutiny of those individuals by Than Shwe and hurts their 
position among their peers. 
 
Pyinmana: Astrology, Monks and an Auspicious Name 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8.  (C) Zhao said China is in the dark regarding the move of 
the capital to Pyinmana, saying that some Burmese have said 
it is because of security concerns, with the regime feeling 
the central mountain area is more secure.  Zhao said Chinese 
sources in Burma report that Than Shwe decided to move the 
capital because of auspicious astrological signs, the advice 
of two senior Buddhist monks and a phonetic reading of the 
name "Pyinmana" to mean "to stay in power forever."  Zhao 
said the move, besides leaving the diplomatic community 
perplexed and the ASEAN community especially annoyed, has 
made many of Than Shwe's own officials very unhappy. 
 
PRC Criticizes Burma for Ignoring Its People's Welfare 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
BEIJING 00002776  003 OF 005 
 
 
¶9. (C) The Burmese regime is not paying attention to the 
welfare of its people, who are experiencing economic 
hardship, according to Zhao, who said China is sending a 
clear message that Burma needs to do more to promote economic 
development and create a positive environment for investment. 
 China encourages Burma to engage in economic reform that 
reflects the true economic situation and shows visiting 
Burmese officials the success of China's economic opening and 
reform.  Zhao pointed out that China cannot direct the regime 
to take specific reforms, as Burma, remembering its 
colonization by Britain and Japan, is sensitive to outside 
interference and the intentions of its big neighbor. 
Agreeing with Murphy's assessment of the economic situation 
in Burma, Zhao commented that the Burmese regime's boast of 
good economic growth in recent years is based on the 
artificial official exchange rate.  There is no mechanism for 
a real market economy, with most benefits flowing to military 
and government officials. 
 
Ethnic Groups and the Border 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Although the central government has signed 
ceasefires with 17 ethnic groups, Zhao said that the ethnic 
groups want autonomy and maintenance of the status quo, 
affording them a degree of autonomy while the central 
government wants to "take them out" and achieve military 
dominance over the whole country.  Since PM Khin Nyunt's 
ouster in 2004, the government has been taking a harder line 
with the ethnic groups, which have been maintaining contact 
with the central government while at the same time making 
preparations and coordinating amongst themselves to ensure 
their survival. 
 
¶11. (C) Commenting that Burma's central government controls 
only about 200 km of the 2000 km border between China and 
Burma, while five ethnic groups control the reminder, Zhao 
said Beijing is very concerned with border issues.  Forced to 
unilaterally manage the border, the Chinese government is 
urging the Burmese regime to reach agreements with the ethnic 
groups in order take control of the border.  Burma is 
concerned about the growth in the number of business deals 
and economic agreements entered into directly between the 
ethnic groups in Northern Burma and China's southern 
provinces.  Zhao said China and Burma have agreed to settle 
their differences through coordination and dialogue. 
 
Burma an ASEAN "Family" Issue 
----------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Zhao said China cannot engage with ASEAN on Burma, 
calling this an ASEAN "family issue" and pointing out that 
China is not part of the family.  However, China does discuss 
Burma bilaterally with ASEAN countries such as Laos, Cambodia 
and Malaysia.  Zhao said China was told that that the visit 
of Malaysian FM Syed Hamid Albar's ASEAN delegation was 
delayed because Burma was too busy moving the central 
government from Rangoon to Pyinmana.  Zhao commented that 
Burma should be relying on ASEAN and making ASEAN feel 
comfortable and supportive, but China is puzzled that Burma 
is not doing this and is instead showing disregard for ASEAN. 
 Rapson said the USG is supportive of visits by FM Hamid and 
by Indonesian President Yudhoyono, and hoped that both would 
convey firm messages to the regime. 
 
Fighting Narcotics 
------------------ 
 
¶13.  (C) Zhao said Burma's counternarcotics efforts are a 
bright spot, saying the PRC Ministry of Public Security has 
very good relations with the Burmese central government and 
has confiscated large sums of narcotics and arrested drug 
lords associated with Burma.  China has invested RMB500 
million (USD 62 million) in a 400,000 acre alternative crop 
program in northern Burma to give the indigenous farmers an 
alternative crop to poppies, with China guaranteeing a market 
for a portion of the crops.  Responding to CNC Tom Wersto's 
comments on the U.S. concern with the expansion of the scope 
and type of Burma-produced narcotics in the region, Zhao 
assessed that the Burmese government is serious about 
fighting narcotics but is constrained by the lack of central 
government control in areas controlled by ethnic groups, 
especially the well-armed and well-trained Wa.  Zhao noted 
that Burma thinks China can influence the Wa but in reality 
PRC influence with the Wa is very limited.  In some cases 
local Burmese government officials collaborate with the drug 
traffickers and powerful and well-equipped international 
 
BEIJING 00002776  004 OF 005 
 
 
underground drug trade networks provide support to Burmese 
drug lords, according to Zhao.  Nonetheless, Burma is making 
serious efforts and is cooperating with China and other 
countries.  Combating the narcotics trade is a promising area 
for additional coordination and cooperation between the 
Burmese central government and the international community, 
concluded Zhao. 
 
PRC Thoughts On Policy: Perhaps Pressure and Engagement? 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶14.  (C) The senior Burmese generals are very sensitive to 
outside pressure, which they are feeling from all fronts and 
all countries, leading to an intensification of their 
self-imposed isolation and stubbornness, according to Zhao. 
He said the international community must move away from 
isolating and pressuring Burma and towards a policy of 
dialogue and engagement that will produce a favorable 
regional and international environment if it wants real 
results.  Suggesting that neither isolation nor engagement 
has worked to date to bring about change in Burma, Zhao 
speculated that perhaps a new mixed approach that relies not 
solely on pressure but also engages the Burmese government 
and provides some assistance to Burma would lead to results. 
 
¶15.  (C) Zhao suggested that ASSK's plight should not 
dominate the international community's engagement with Burma 
and it would be better to include counternarcotics, 
trafficking in persons, public health and infectious disease 
issues in the agenda.  In response to this kind of 
engagement, perhaps the Burmese government would reconsider 
its positions and be less insular, although Zhao admitted 
that turning inward is the junta's tendency. 
 
Not n Favor of UNSC Action, But Welcomes New Specia Envoy 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) Zhao said China is not in favor of UNSC involvement 
on Burma because Burma does not pose a threat to regional 
security.  It is hard to say how Burma would react to a UNSC 
resolution, though in response to the UNSC briefing the 
regime became more stubborn and isolationist.  Responding to 
Rapson's point that the United States wants to see a new 
UNSYG Special Envoy granted access to Burma, Zhao said China 
is in favor of the assigning of a new Special Envoy.  China 
had a good relationship with former Special Envoy Razali, 
engaging in frank discussions with him and passing messages 
between him and the Burmese leadership. Zhao offered that 
Burma did not like Razali because he is Malaysian and was 
rumored to have had private business activities in Burma. 
 
U.S. Response 
------------- 
 
¶17.  (C) Rapson stressed that the regime's current policies 
will not lead to political reform, stability and economic 
development.  What is needed is a credible, meaningful, 
inclusive political process that brings in all domestic 
Burmese groups.  Releasing political prisoners like Aung San 
Suu Kyi, granting access for UN representatives and lifting 
restrictions on UN agencies and NGO's providing humanitarian 
assistance are steps Burma could take to show the 
international community that it is serious about moving 
forward. 
 
¶18.  (C) Rapson stressed that release of ASSK and other 
political prisoners would remain an important element of the 
U.S. message to Burma.  Bilateral and multilateral pressure 
on the regime is needed to present a strong and unified 
message of dissatisfaction with the situation in Burma. 
Rapson told Zhao that the United States will continue to work 
with key partners and countries in the region, like India, 
ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea, as well as the United Nations, 
including UNSC engagement to maintain and escalate the 
pressure on Burma.  Murphy pointed out that dialogue with the 
international community has had benefits for Rangoon in the 
past.  Zhao agreed and said the MFA had the PRC Embassy in 
Rangoon to analyze the rationale for Burma's isolationist 
policies.  Zhao lamented that the Embassy's official 
government interlocutors are not able to speak freely, only 
parroting written talking points and guidance from the senior 
generals. 
 
Burma Prime Minister Soe Win Visit to China 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (C) Zhao provided some details of Prime Minister Soe Win 
 
BEIJING 00002776  005 OF 005 
 
 
February 14-18 visit to China (ref. c and d).  During Soe 
Win's visit, which will include stops in the cities of 
Beijing, Xi'an, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, China will tell him 
that China wants Burma to remain stable, focus on economic 
progress and move the national reconciliation process 
forward.  Burma will raise its displeasure with the economic 
agreements and business deals being cut between Burmese 
ethnic groups on the border and China's southern provinces. 
China will urge PM Soe Win to reach agreement with the ethnic 
groups and to exert control over the border.  Zhao said the 
lack of central government control leads to numerous 
misunderstandings and raises the anxiety of the Burmese 
military government regarding China's activities and 
intentions, but expects this "long standing and not so 
serious" issue to be solved by bilateral, friendly and 
cooperative dialogue.  Burma's other concern is the illegal 
logging in Burma's northern forests by Chinese interests, 
cited by a Global Witness report.  Zhao said China is 
investigating this seriously and will discuss the conclusions 
of the investigation with Burma. Responding to a question, 
Zhao said avian influenza would be touched on in leadership 
meetings, but will mostly be left to the Ministry of Public 
Health and Ministry Agriculture to work with Burmese 
counterparts.  Rapson expressed appreciation for this 
overview of the PM,s visit and asked that the Embassy be 
given a readout afterwards. 
 
¶20.  (C) Participants: 
 
U.S. PARTICIPANTS 
----------------- 
- EAP/MLS Deputy Director Rob Rapson 
- Embassy Rangoon Pol-Econ Chief Patrick Murphy 
- INR Analyst Andrew Vincent 
- CNC Thomas Wersto 
- Political Minister Counselor 
- POL External Unit Chief 
- Poloff 
 
CHINESE PARTICIPANTS 
-------------------- 
- MFA Asian Affairs Deputy Director General Zhao Jianhua 
- MFA Division Director for Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
Chen Dehai 
- MFA Burma Desk Officer Liang Jianjun 
 
¶21.  (U) EAP/MLS Deputy Director Rapson cleared this message. 
Randt