This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001176 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, H 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TH BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS POL MIL US FTA
SUBJECT: SENATOR FEINGOLD'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER 
THAKSIN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY: On February 20, Senator Russell Feingold 
(D-WI) accompanied by Ambassador Boyce called on Prime 
Minister Thaksin.  Thaksin said the relationship with the 
U.S., as exemplified by our close cooperation following the 
December 2004 tsunami, was excellent.  The discussion focused 
on violence in southern Thailand; the disappearance of human 
rights lawyer Somchai Neelaphajit and other human rights 
concerns; F-16s, Hmong refugees from Laos; and Thaksin's 
domestic political challenges.  Senator Feingold expressed 
serious concern over the situation in Burma. END SUMMARY 
 
SOUTHERN THAILAND - THAKSIN PLAYS COP 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  During a February 20 meeting with Prime Minister 
Thaksin at Government House, Senator Feingold expressed 
concern over the ongoing violence affecting far southern 
Thailand and asked for the Prime Minister's assessment of the 
situation as well as his plans to work with the National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC).   Thaksin emphasized that 
there was no evidence of intentional terrorist involvement in 
the South and that Malay separatism was a primary factor 
behind the violence.  There was a committed group of armed 
militants who used separatist propaganda about the unique 
history of the region to manipulate youths to fight for an 
independent homeland. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Thaksin claimed the government and the NRC were now 
"heading in the same direction," after the NRC's initial 
failure to understand the complexity of the situation.  The 
NRC believed the violence was rooted in the deep feeling of 
"injustice" felt by southern Muslims who felt that they had 
been mistreated historically by the Thai state.  Both he and 
the NRC understood that they needed to address the concerns 
of ethnic Malay Thais.  "We need to look into their hearts." 
 
 
¶4.  (C)  When asked about reports of heavy-handed tactics in 
the South, Thaksin defended Thai security practices.  He 
described the Krue Se incident of April 2004 as an instance 
of security forces being involved in "hot pursuit" of 
militants.  The Tak Bai incident of October 2005 was the 
result of a lack of proper military transportation.  The 
deaths at Tak Bai resulted from suffocation, and not from the 
actions of security forces.  He blamed the militants for 
deliberately manipulating the Tak Bai incident in order to 
provoke a dramatic confrontation with security forces. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Thaksin said economic underdevelopment was a 
factor in the violence because of resentment among ethnic 
Malays of the better economic conditions on the Malaysian 
side of the border.  The Islamic education system contributed 
to the poor economic conditions in the region because Islamic 
schools did not equip their graduates with job skills. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Thaksin boasted several times that he had personally 
interrogated some of the captured militants.  Most had been 
manipulated by separatist ideas or paid to commit violence. 
There was absolutely no evidence of connections between the 
captured militants and JI or Al-Qaeda.  Thaksin claimed that 
under questioning the captured militants readily confessed 
their involvement in the insurgency and that harsh 
interrogation techniques were not required to obtain 
information from them. 
 
SOMCHAI - "A HEART ATTACK DURING QUESTIONING" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Senator Feingold asked about the investigation into 
the disappearance of human rights lawyer Somchai Neelaphajit. 
 Thaksin said the inquiry into the disappearance would finish 
in mid-March and that additional arrest warrants of police 
officers would be issued by the Department of Special 
Investigation (DSI).  The findings so far implicated some 
mid-level police officers in the disappearance.  The police 
allegedly brought Somchai to the Criminal Suppression 
Division for questioning.  While under interrogation Somchai 
had a heart attack and died.  After the heart attack police 
panicked and took Somchai's remains outside of Bangkok where 
the body was incinerated.  The police did not know Somchai 
had a heart condition.  Thaksin claimed that Somchai had not 
been interrogated harshly, however, the police were unaware 
he had a heart condition and Somchai was without his heart 
medication.  Thaksin emphasized that these actions were from 
"working level officers." 
 
EJK 
--- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Senator Feingold asked for an explanation of reports 
that Thai security forces had been involved in other 
extra-judicial killings, especially during the 2003 "war on 
drugs."  Thaksin denied these reports, saying that Thai 
forces respected the rule of law.  The number of killings 
during the "war on drugs" had been exaggerated and most 
involved drug kingpins "cutting-off" underlings in order to 
silence them.  Thaksin complained that media reports, 
especially the Thai English language press, were unfairly 
critical and unreliable.  "The papers are readable, but not 
quotable." 
 
BURMA AND ASSK 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Senator Feingold asked about current Thai policies 
towards Burma and strongly urged additional Thai efforts to 
press for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK).  Thaksin 
said that ASEAN leaders had used tough language with the 
Burmese during the December 2005 ASEAN summit, a first for 
ASEAN.  He complained that the Burmese had failed to tell 
even ASEAN members about their plans to move their capital. 
Thaksin offered Bangkok as a possible venue for the Burmese 
regime to engage with the international community.  Senator 
Feingold emphasized the importance of Thai engagement with 
the Burmese to secure the release of ASSK.  Thaksin said the 
SPDC would not hold ASSK "forever" but would wait until after 
the national reconciliation process was finished.  After 
being pressed, Thaksin he said he would try to talk to Than 
Shwe personally about ASSK. 
 
HMONG REFUGEES 
-------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  Senator Feingold thanked the Prime Minister for 
Thailand's cooperation on Hmong refugees, especially the 
recent case involving 27 Hmong children.  Thaksin said that 
the Lao were difficult to work with and acted defensively. 
The case of the 27 children was a good example of this.  He 
complained that illegal immigration from Laos was an ongoing 
problem for Thailand. 
 
REGIONAL SECURITY, CHINA 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.   (C)  Thaksin said that Thailand was concerned about 
piracy in the Strait of Malacca and would support collective 
security efforts, although it remained primarily an issue for 
the littoral states.  He noted that pirates from Aceh were of 
particular concern.  Regarding China, Thaksin said bilateral 
relations were very close, particularly under his 
administration. 
 
FTA 
--- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Thaksin said he wanted a "fair" FTA with the 
U.S., suggesting it would require sacrifices from both sides 
in order to enjoy the overall benefits an FTA would bring. 
He quipped, "you Americans like won-ton soup, but you don't 
like one-ton pickups."  The negotiations with the U.S. are 
very complicated, especially the areas regarding 
pharmaceuticals and financial services.  The Bank of Thailand 
was particularly worried about some of the FTA's financial 
services provisions. 
 
F-16s 
----- 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Senator Feingold made a strong push for the Thais 
to purchase/upgrade U.S. F-16s rather than Swedish or Russian 
aircraft.  Thaksin said he had asked the Royal Thai Air Force 
(RTAF) Commander Chalit for a final recommendation, which he 
expected within a week.  Thailand was seriously looking at 
Russian planes was because the Russians were offering a 
barter deal and because the sale would open up new markets to 
Thai agricultural exports.  Thaksin said there were two 
components to the aircraft deal -- mid-life upgrades for 
existing F-16s and procurement of some new aircraft to 
replace the RTAF's aging F-5s.  The RTAF would purchase 
mid-life upgrades for a number of F-16s, but Thailand would 
not buy new U.S. aircraft unless a better deal was offered. 
Thaksin believed the purchase of Russian aircraft should not 
affect cooperation with the U.S.  Ambassador Boyce reminded 
Thaksin that a purchase of Russian aircraft could in fact 
affect technology transfers and raise questions over 
interoperability with U.S. forces.  Thaksin said access to 
technology was very important for Thailand and urged the U.S. 
to offer better terms. 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. 
---------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Thaksin highlighted the overall positive image of 
the U.S. in Thailand, noting that many Thais -- including 
both he and the Foreign Minister -- were the products of the 
U.S. educational system.  Most Thais did not have strong 
opinions about the U.S. war on terror; however, there was a 
general negative feeling about the U.S. invasion of Iraq, 
especially among Thai Muslims. 
 
POLITICAL CHALLENGES IN THAILAND 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Senator Feingold asked the Prime Minister about 
recent challenges from opposition figures to his government. 
Thaksin downplayed opposition efforts to oust him, calling 
recent protests "part of the normal democratic process." 
Thai political elites got bored quickly because of the 
history of short lived governments in the past.  His rural 
base remained strong, and even in Bangkok he still enjoyed 
more support than the opposition.  An extraordinary session 
of parliament would be convened on March 6, followed by a 
debate from March 8-10, in order to refute opposition charges. 
 
¶16.  (U) Senator Feingold's office cleared this message. 
BOYCE