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DE RUEHAC #0218/01 0592005
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 282005Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3842
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0146
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ3/SCJ33/SCJ34/SOCSO LNO//
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS TO USAID LAC/AA 
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD BARBARA MOORE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR ASEC MARR SNAR CVIS KCRM
KICC, PA 
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY'S INTERIOR MINISTER ON ELECTION, 
SECURITY, POLICE, CABRAL 
 
REF: A. ASUNCION 210 AND PRECEDING 
     ¶B. ASUNCION 208 
     ¶C. ASUNCION 200 
     ¶D. 05 STATE 223607 AND PRECEDING 
     ¶E. 05 ASUNCION 630 
     ¶F. 05 ASUNCION 593 
     ¶G. 05 ASUNCION 269 
 
Classified By: PolOff Mark A. Stamilio, reasons 1.4(b),(c),(d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (C) Summary: On 2/27 Interior Minister Rogelio Benitez 
told Ambassador President Duarte's recent election victory 
was an historic opportunity to cleanse the Colorado Party 
(ANR) and pursue Duarte's reform agenda.  He highlighted 
differences between perceptions of insecurity and the 
reality.  He discussed his efforts to clean up the corrupt 
and ineffective Paraguayan National Police (PNP) and create a 
new metropolitan police force as a "fresh start" alternative. 
 He sidestepped the Ambassador's direct question about the 
possible promotion of corrupt police official Aristides 
Cabral.  He characterized a group of Patria Libre Party (PPL) 
militants as "remnants" but acknowledged the difficulty of 
finding and eliminating them.  The Ambassador and Benitez 
discussed a number of areas where the USG might provide the 
GOP additional security cooperation and assistance.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On 2/27 the Ambassador called on Interior Minister 
Rogelio Benitez.  (Note: The Ambassador and Benitez met the 
preceding weekend during the Ambassador's trip to 
Encarnacion, which is Benitez's hometown.  Benitez met the 
Ambassador in Encarnacion at President Duarte's request, and 
hosted the Ambassador at his residence for an informal 
meeting the evening of 2/24.  The 2/27 office call was their 
first formal meeting, and lasted roughly two hours.  End 
Note.) 
 
---------------------------- 
An Historic Election Victory 
---------------------------- 
¶3. (U) Benitez described President Duarte's recent primary 
election victory (refs B and C) as historic.  He acknowledged 
that decades of uninterrupted power had corrupted many within 
the Colorado Party, but asserted that Duarte represented a 
break from tradition.  He blamed much of the corruption on 
the need for "electorally important" Colorados who could win 
national elections to broker deals with "politically 
important" Colorados who controlled much of the party's 
political machinery.  He opined that Duarte was capable of 
overcoming that dichotomy by uniting political power with 
electability.  He alluded to a possible purge of corrupt 
Colorados in the 2008 elections, but noted that it would be a 
difficult task. 
 
¶4. (U) Benitez posited that Duarte's victory would enable him 
to more vigorously pursue his reform agenda.  He emphasized 
that Duarte took office in 2003 with two primary reform 
objectives: to formalize the economy and to address the 
country's persistent social problems.  He asserted that 
Duarte's challenger in the primaries, Osvaldo Dominguez Dibb, 
would have represented a return to an economy built on 
corruption and contraband.  The Ambassador stressed the 
importance of getting anti-money laundering legislation 
through Congress as a key indicator of Duarte's commitment to 
formalizing the economy and combating corruption.  Benitez 
highlighted a three-point reduction in poverty since Duarte 
took office (from 43 percent to 40 percent) and the USD 30 
million in Itaipu hydroelectric dam royalties Duarte has 
spent on social programs as evidence of his commitment to the 
second objective. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insecurity: Perceptions vs. Reality 
----------------------------------- 
¶5. (U) Benitez noted that his primary focus as Interior 
Minister was security, but highlighted differences between 
perceptions of insecurity in Paraguay and the reality of the 
current situation.  He cited four reasons for recent 
 
increases in perceptions of insecurity in Paraguay: an 
increase in the incidence of violent crime, sensationalized 
press reports about such crime, revelations that security 
personnel charged with combating crime are involved in it, 
and a general lack of faith in the country's criminal justice 
system due to widespread impunity.  In contrast to popular 
perceptions, however, Benitez noted that the incidence of 
kidnappings, murders, and other violent crimes in Paraguay 
was average or below average for Latin America and on par 
with Eastern Europe in many respects.  Benitez also noted 
that reductions in poverty levels typically lead to reduced 
incidence of crime. 
 
------------------------ 
Efforts at Police Reform 
------------------------ 
¶6. (SBU) Benitez acknowledged that the PNP is a generally 
corrupt and ineffective institution, but explained that he 
had to proceed with measured determination in cleaning it up. 
 He noted that corrupt PNP officials could bring down a 
heavy-handed Interior Minister by taking measures to increase 
perceptions of insecurity, such as orchestrating a series of 
bank robberies.  He said he is therefore ferreting out and 
firing the worst of the worst, but choosing his battles so as 
to avoid a major backlash from the PNP's uniformed ranks.  He 
highlighted the difficulty of taking on police officials with 
upwards of 30 years of service and powerful political 
backers, versus the relative ease of taking on corrupt 
prosecutors, for example, who tend to be younger, newer in 
their jobs, and less powerful politically.  (Comment: It is 
not clear which corrupt PNP officials Benitez was referring 
to when he said he was ferreting out and firing the worst. 
There has been no purge of police leadership since Benitez 
first took office (ref G), nor any high-profile firings of 
corrupt senior PNP officials.  Post will follow up with the 
Vice Minister for Security to clarify.  End Comment.) 
 
¶7. (U) Benitez said the new metropolitan police force he is 
creating would serve as a "fresh start" alternative to the 
PNP.  The new force is to be composed of recent high school 
graduates with relatively solid academic credentials and no 
prior police service.  Benitez lamented that the inaugural 
recruiting drive only netted 130 qualified recruits, and that 
the Ministry only received 750 applications.  He blamed the 
low number of applications on the stigma corrupt PNP 
officials have created for the law enforcement profession as 
a whole.  On the other hand, Benitez noted that requiring 
metropolitan police recruits to meet more rigorous selection 
criteria (a tougher entrance examination, for example) would 
produce a higher quality police force.  Whereas some 80 
percent of applicants typically qualify for entrance to the 
PNP, fewer than 20 percent of applicants qualified for the 
metropolitan police. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Benitez posits support for the metropolitan 
police force as his way of pursuing police reform.  He 
publicly characterizes the metropolitan police as "less 
corrupt than the PNP," and has military personnel, rather 
than PNP, training recruits.  An optimistic take on this 
would be that Benitez realizes the PNP is a lost cause and 
prefers to build a new police force from the ground up. 
However, a force of 400 recent high school graduates with no 
arrest powers cannot replace the PNP.  Others more cynically 
suggest that Benitez sees the metropolitan police program as 
a way to gain favor (and votes) for the Duarte administration 
among Asuncion residents.  Some sources advise that Benitez 
and other Duarte administration officials are using the 
metropolitan police program, as well as fictitious vehicle 
purchases and other Ministry programs, to rob money from the 
state.  Some see the new metropolitan police force as 
undercutting the police budget for a cosmetic fix, while 
others say improvements require such shock therapy.  End 
Comment. 
 
------ 
Cabral 
------ 
¶9. (C) Benitez sidestepped the Ambassador's direct question 
about the possible future promotion of corrupt police 
official Aristides Cabral (ref D).  The Ambassador stressed 
the fact that the USG would find it extremely difficult to 
 
work with any part of the PNP if it were headed by Cabral, 
who we knew to have ties to narcotics traffickers.  Benitez 
acknowledged that rumors abounded about Cabral's nefarious 
activities, but he did not go so far as to say Cabral would 
not be promoted.  Rather, he noted that Cabral enjoyed the 
support of powerful political backers, and that Cabral had a 
reputation for being tough on crime.  The Ambassador 
countered that Cabral might be tough on some criminals, but 
not on those he protected or with whom he did business. 
(Comment: Although Benitez did not make any commitments, he 
clearly got the message.  End Comment.) 
 
------------------------ 
Remnants of Patria Libre 
------------------------ 
¶10. (C) Benitez characterized a group of Patria Libre Party 
(PPL) militants in the Paraguayan countryside (ref A) as 
"remnants" of a movement the GOP had dismantled.  However, he 
acknowledged the difficulty of finding and eliminating those 
who remain, since they were trained in guerrilla tactics and 
hiding in a region that was difficult to access and 
unfamiliar to police and military personnel.  He also noted 
that the GOP lacked the USG's technical capabilities, and 
asked whether the Embassy might provide technical assistance 
(e.g., FLIR technology to determine the location of two 
columns of militants who remain at large).  The Ambassador 
said he would look into the possibility of providing 
technical assistance, and noted that two GOP helicopters 
being repaired with DEA funds soon would be back in service. 
(Comment: Our information suggests the militants in the 
countryside are active and receiving training and funding 
from outside.  End Comment.) 
 
--------------------------------------- 
USG Security Cooperation and Assistance 
--------------------------------------- 
¶11. (U) Benitez cited anti-kidnapping, anti-terrorism, and 
anti-money laundering training the USG recently provided to 
GOP personnel as invaluable.  In addition to imparting 
valuable knowledge, he noted that the training served to 
establish essential contacts between USG and GOP personnel. 
Benitez thanked the Ambassador for the training, the 
aforementioned helicopter repairs, and any technical 
assistance the USG might be able to provide.  The Ambassador 
noted that the USG would provide Paraguay over USD 55 million 
in assistance this year, including USD 35 million in 
Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Program funds.  He 
added that administration of justice was an important aspect 
of the Threshold Program proposal, as was strengthening 
oversight of the Interior Ministry's personal identification 
registry.  The Ambassador further noted that the USG could 
provide much more in terms of military assistance if Paraguay 
would sign an Article 98 agreement, and that visa revocations 
could be used as an effective tool against corrupt 
individuals.  Benitez agreed that visa revocations could have 
a significant impact. 
CASON