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INFO RUEHMEP/THE MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0306
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1097
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1506
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 3919
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0047
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 1098
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 000080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016 
TAGS: KDEM PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: SECULARIST-ISLAMIST DIVIDE IN NEW DEMOCRACY 
NETWORK 
 
Classified By: Peter Mulrean, Director, MEPI Regional Office, Reasons 1 
.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY AND COMMENT:   The Network of Democrats in 
the Arab World was officially launched in Casablanca on 
December 17, 2005.  Funded by DRL, the network brings 
together democracy activists of both "secular" and "Islamist" 
leanings.  While differences between those two camps emerged 
quickly around the details of the network,s organization, 
charter, etc., participants also found significant common 
ground on the importance of promoting democracy in the face 
of challenges from both authoritarian regimes and Islamic 
extremists.  They have formed working groups to hash out the 
details of the network,s founding documents and work plans, 
which will be adopted when they meet again in Istanbul in 
April.  The conference exposed the difficulties secularists 
and Islamists face in attempts to collaborate on promoting 
democratic reform, given disagreement on significant 
underlying philosophical issues.  At the same time, 
participants demonstrated a determination to overcome 
differences in order to build moderate alternatives in the 
middle of the political spectrum.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
¶2. (U)  Note: This cable uses the term "Islamist" with some 
hesitation, but for lack of a better word.  Individual 
participants in the Casablanca conference who are described 
as Islamist have views ranging from full commitment to an 
open, democratic system, which they believe is compatible 
with a personal pursuit of Islam; to those who are seeking a 
democratic system that can accommodate Islamic practices more 
formally; to a couple, who seem interested in finding a 
hybrid that includes democratic practices, but is consistent 
with Sharia law. 
 
------------------- 
LAUNCHING A NETWORK 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) On December 16-17, 62 Arab democracy activists and 
four observers, including representatives from DRL and the 
MEPI Regional Office in Tunis, attended a conference in 
Casablanca to discuss the formal constitution of the "Network 
of Democrats in the Arab World" (NDAW).  Creation of the 
network is the objective of a DRL-funded project being 
implemented by U.S.-based NGOs Partners for Democratic Change 
(PDC) and the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy 
(CSID).  While never stated explicitly, the objective is also 
to bridge differences between secularists and Islamists who 
are committed to democracy.  The hope is that they can make 
common cause in a pan-Arab network that will expand from 
conference participants to include other NGOs and individuals 
concerned with the promotion of democracy in the Arab World. 
Discussions included development of a network charter and 
statutes, as well as a short-term work plan to include 
training, reports and publications and future meetings. 
 
¶4. (U) The Casablanca meeting was an expansion of a September 
gathering arranged by CSID, when 15 Arab activists in the 
fields of democracy and human rights -- including both 
leading secularist and Islamists -- met in Amman to discuss 
development of the network.  While the Casablanca conference 
was the official launch of the new network, there was no 
agreement on the charter, statutes and other key issues. 
 
-------------------------- 
SHAKY ON THE LAUNCHING PAD 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Several procedural differences among participants 
were related to the role of CSID.  One major point of 
contention had to do with the structure of the proposed 
network.  As initially conceived in the agreement with DRL, 
the Network was to be led by CSID, as the organizing body, 
and to include a Coordination Committee of 15 members, in 
addition to several working groups (e.g., Membership, Parties 
and Associations, Training and Capacity Building, Advocacy, 
Constitutional Reform, Funding). Two offices are to be 
created, in Jordan and Morocco.  While there was general 
agreement on the need for such a network, an overwhelming 
majority at the conference opposed the idea of CSID 
controlling this new entity. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Participants suggested instead that a General 
Committee be formed, with controlling members elected once 
 
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the charter and statutes were approved.    Participants 
agreed to split into the several working groups to outline 
activities and develop a common schedule.  Subcommittees were 
constituted to design the charter and statutes, to promote 
the network among Arab NGO,s active in the field of 
democracy and human rights, and to conduct a public advocacy 
campaign to attract donor attention and funds.  The next 
meeting will take place in Istanbul in April, when working 
groups will submit their reports and the charter and statutes 
are expected to be adopted. The immediate objective is to 
register the network legally and start collecting membership 
requests and fees from participants to reach a membership 
base of 1,000 within one year. 
 
¶7. (C) During the conference, it was clear that for many 
secularist participants, some of the concern about CSID had 
to do with its views on Islam.  They wondered whether CSID 
could accurately reflect the full range of views of the 
proposed network, since they view CSID as having Islamist 
leanings, however moderate.  Interestingly, at the same time, 
a number of the Islamists expressed wariness about CSID, 
which they felt had made too many "concessions" to secularism 
in its approach. 
 
------------------------- 
COMMON GROUND NONETHELESS 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In spite of the differences, the network,s 
initiators were able to identify essential common ground 
around a set of objectives, including a variety of ways to 
move forward in the face of authoritarian regimes and to 
support persecuted democrats and human rights activists 
across the Arab World.  Throughout the conference, 
interactions between the Islamist and secularist 
representatives were seen as extremely positive and 
productive, not only during the official sessions, but also 
during breaks and after working hours.  While Islamists 
represented about two-thirds of the participants, the 
discussions were balanced, with everyone participating 
including critical comments by each group of the other -- 
aided in large part by the skills of the moderators -- until 
a consensus could be reached. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The key theme for the gathering emerged from 
remarks by opening speakers: it is essential for all Arab 
democrats to move beyond their differences regarding the role 
of religion and work together to face authoritarian regimes. 
Participants stressed that present regimes have been taking 
advantage of weak opposition, which is scattered in a 
multitude of parties and entities, resulting in the waste of 
resources and competences. There was strong consensus that 
Arab activists should focus on three major areas: 
-- countering misrepresentations about Islam inside and 
outside the region; 
-- engaging the West where its interests overlapped with the 
interests of the Arab world; and 
-- encouraging youth to become more active in public life. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) A lively, but collegial, Islamist-secularist 
debate permeated the sessions.  When some speakers preached 
the democratic values of Islam and the virtues of Muslim 
theories, they were immediately countered by "secular" ideas, 
especially regarding freedom of thought and choice. 
Participants agreed that democracy can in no way be imposed 
from outside, although learning from others, experiences 
should be recommended.  Apart from one Moroccan, Mohamed 
Yatim, MP for the Islamist Party for Justice and Development, 
all expressed appreciation for DRL funding of the conference. 
 Participants even selected the MEPI RO representative to 
moderate the working session on financing.  MEPI information 
packets were distributed to all participants, and 10 
individual meetings were held to further describe MEPI,s 
goals and programs. 
 
----------- 
Key Players 
----------- 
 
¶11. (C)  Due to CSID,s role in launching the network, Radwan 
Masmoudi, CSID President, was the main actor prior to the 
conference in designing the list of participants, 
coordinating the program, and ensuring logistical support. 
Masmoudi contends that democracy and Islam are not only 
 
TUNIS 00000080  003 OF 003 
 
 
compatible, but that Islam in fact requires democratic 
practices by its faithful.  The key is finding a way to 
promote these democratic values inspired by Islam in the face 
of both authoritarian governments and Islamic extremists. 
During the conference, three other figures emerged as key 
actors during debates: 
-- Dr. Fayez Al Rabeh, former Jordanian Ambassador and 
currently Secretary General of the Amman-based Moderation 
Assembly for Thought and Culture, an NGO trying to build up 
an international moderate Islamists, network, including 
activists from South-East Asia, Sudan and the Middle East. 
Dr. Al Rabeh was lobbying to place Jordanian activists from 
the pro-Islamic and centrist Al Ghad party in the different 
sub-committees. 
-- Amel Aouidha, an Egyptian woman journalist and researcher, 
working for the Cairo Al Ahram, active in the Nationalist 
movement, espousing pan-Arab views and support for a clear 
separation of church and state.  Amel,s role in the Network 
will focus on coordinating advocacy and research 
-- Mohsen Marzouk, a Tunisian activist working for Freedom 
House, with strong secularist views, completely opposed to 
the use of religion in politics. 
Other key players included the Tunisian moderate Islamist 
Slaheddine Jourchi (the Network,s spokesperson), the 
Jordanian secularist Samir Al Jarrah (coordinating the 
Charter subcommittee), and the Algerian Islamist Abderrazzak 
Kassoum, Member of Parliament on behalf of the Algerian party 
Hamas. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  The Casablanca meeting laid bare the challenges 
facing attempts by Islamist and secularist camps to 
collaborate, even when they can agree on priority areas for 
common action.  Despite all the collegiality, there is no 
denying underlying wariness by each side of the other.  At 
the same time, the participants demonstrated a determination 
to try to focus on the common ground and find a modus 
operandi that will allow them to support each other,s 
efforts.  They realize that the political spectrum across 
most of the region has had the middle excised, excluding 
moderates of all stripes.  This often leaves people with a 
"false choice" between the extremes of maintaining an 
authoritarian regime or turning to a radical Islamist 
alternative.  While many participants with whom we spoke are 
sanguine that this experiment could fail if their 
philosophical differences are insurmountable, they believe it 
is a potentially important step in the fight to create the 
moderate "middle band" with broad appeal.  Most previous 
attempts to forge democratic forces in the center have not 
enjoyed cooperation between secularists and Islamists, nor 
have they attempted to directly address how Islam and 
democracy are compatible. 
 
¶13.  (C) The network will certainly last as long as the 
current funding brings it together.  Its ultimate success and 
sustainability, however, will depend on a combination of 
getting some of the details right early on and managing the 
secularist/Islamist differences in a way that keeps the 
network,s eye on the longer-term democratic goal.  In the 
short term, the efforts by the working groups on the charter, 
statutes, financing, and action plan will be essential.  If 
the April meeting in Istanbul can demonstrate strong 
consensus on both the founding principles and road ahead, the 
network will be able to move beyond internal debate to the 
real work of promoting the democratic midle. 
HUDSON