This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 000006 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO 
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND 
NSC FOR DFISK 
USCINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV ENRG SOCI ELAB BL SIPDIS
SUBJECT: INITIAL MEETING WITH EVO MORALES: BRASS TACKS 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 3807 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 3803 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In a January 2 "breaking the ice" meeting 
with the Ambassador, President-elect Evo Morales claimed he 
had not publicly maligned President Bush (at least not in the 
post-election period) and expressed deep resentment about 
being branded a "narco-terrorist" by U.S. officials.  Morales 
confirmed he was prepared to cooperate on counter-narcotics, 
with the 3.2 thousand hectare set-aside in the Chapare 
serving as the basis for future work (ref).  The Ambassador 
acknowledged the GOB-cocalero agreement as a continuing 
reality, but clarified that we were not party to it.  The 
president-elect said he would change the existing 
"neo-liberal" model because it had failed to help the poor, 
but seek a strictly Bolivian (not a Cuban, Venezuelan or 
American) solution to the country's economic challenges. 
Throughout the discussion, Morales repeatedly stated that he 
wanted to resolve disagreements, including with the U.S., 
through dialogue, and that eliminating corruption was his top 
priority.  The Ambassador reviewed the range of our 
cooperation (which eclipses that of all other countries by 
far), underscored our interest in maintaining a constructive 
relationship, but emphasized that this would depend on the 
words and actions of government leaders.  VP-elect Alvaro 
Garcia Linera affirmed the future government's commitment to 
democracy and its desire for U.S. cooperation in creating a 
better future for all Bolivians.  This initial meeting 
included some necessarily frank exchanges on thorny issues; 
the president-elect came across as guarded and somewhat 
defensive, but also as sincere and at ease in his role as 
number one.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) President-elect Evo Morales and VP-elect Alvaro 
Garcia Linera came to the Ambassador's residence in the late 
afternoon of January 2, at our invitation, for an initial 
"breaking the ice" session that lasted just over one hour. 
(In accordance with long-standing policy, U.S. diplomats had 
not previously met with Morales.)  Ambassador Greenlee, DCM 
Robinson and acting Ecopol counselor Ludwig (note-taker) 
represented the Embassy. 
 
Congratulations, Please Clarify Your Comments 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶3.  (C) The Ambassador began by congratulating Morales for 
his electoral victory, and noted that the decisive result 
gave the government at once a clear mandate and great 
responsibility.  He welcomed the opportunity to review issues 
of shared concern with the future Bolivian president 
(remarking that the term "indigenous President" was in our 
view misleading and narrow), and also to turn the page on our 
testy relations of the past.  At the same time, the 
Ambassador said, we were interested in receiving 
clarifications regarding the president-elect's reported 
verbal attacks against President Bush and the United States. 
Morales thanked the Ambassador for the invitation, and joked 
that he would travel the next day to visit "a friend of 
yours" (i.e., Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.  Note: 
Morales is visiting Venezuela on January 3, before continuing 
to Europe - ref B).  The Ambassador replied that it then must 
be a mutual friend. 
 
¶4.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Morales 
claimed he had never referred to President Bush as a 
"terrorist" and was not even aware of having given an 
interview with the Arab TV network Al Jazeera (at least not 
after the December 18 elections), but, backtracking somewhat, 
acknowledged that he might have made that kind of remark in 
the heat of the campaign.  Seeking to make light of the 
situation, Morales said he had referred to Secretary Rice as 
"Condolencia" partly because he wasn't sure how to pronounce 
her name.  The Ambassador retorted that Washington officials 
were researching the veracity of the Al Jazeera quote and 
that Morales' reported mocking references to U.S. officials 
were seen as indicative of his political intentions, and had 
been unhelpful thus far.  He also suggested that Morales 
practice pronouncing the Secretary's name correctly. 
 
Morales: I'm No Narco-Terrorist! 
-------------------------------- 
¶5.  (C) Morales, with a defensiveness bordering on vehemence, 
responded that efforts by U.S. officials to brand him as a 
narco-trafficker and narco-terrorist were totally inaccurate, 
unjust and counterproductive.  He was, he said, a committed 
democrat who had competed in three successive national 
elections and, in the most recent vote, had been chosen by a 
clear majority of Bolivians to lead the country into the 
future.  That, he emphasized, is "why you have agreed to meet 
with me."  (Comment: Rightly or wrongly, Morales clearly 
nurses a psychological wound rooted in what he views as the 
patent unfairness of our past treatment of him.  End Comment.) 
 
Coca: Some Room to Work 
----------------------- 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador then turned to coca, and asked the 
president-elect about the accuracy of reports we had read in 
the press and received from his alleged collaborators that 
the future government would be disposed to continued 
cooperation on this important front (ref A).  He noted that 
U.S. assistance in this area had three intertwined facets - 
eradication, interdiction and integral development - that 
were difficult to separate from one another.  Morales said 
that his public declarations underlining his opposition to 
cocaine production and narcotics trafficking were accurate 
and true, and reiterated his commitment to cooperating with 
us in countering them. 
 
¶7.  (C) He noted that, while his government would face 
pressures from certain sectors, it would be able to work with 
us on the basis of the existing agreement setting aside one 
"cato" (actually, 3.2 thousand hectares, slightly less than 
one cato) per family in the Chapare as an eradication free 
zone, which had demonstrably eased tensions there.  He also 
claimed that cocalero syndicates in the Chapare were already 
assisting in the eradication of coca in excess of that limit. 
 The Ambassador acknowledged the existence of the so-called 
cato agreement - signed by the Mesa Government and cocaleros 
- but reminded Morales that the U.S. was not a party to it 
and that, while we admitted its apparent effectiveness in 
practice of reducing anti-eradication violence, we did not 
support the agreement in principle.  In response to further 
probing, Morales suggested that other counter-narcotics 
cooperation, including with military support forces, could be 
negotiated and go forward. 
 
Change the Model 
---------------- 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador asked about the MAS's government plan 
and the concrete significance of its campaign pledge to 
change the economic model, calling attention to the fact that 
state-led planning had failed everywhere in the world it had 
been tried.  An impassioned Morales explained that 
"neo-liberalism" had proved incapable of helping the 
country's poor majority - who had only grown poorer since the 
model was implemented - and needed to be replaced.  He 
emphasized, however, that his government would not borrow a 
Cuban, Venezuelan, North-American or any other foreign 
prescription to address economic challenges that were 
Bolivian in origin and that therefore required strictly 
home-grown solutions.  In concrete terms, he continued, this 
meant he would respect the foreign investment, private 
property and juridical security that the Bolivian economy 
needed to grow.  He noted that he himself owned land and 
would not want to lose it.  At the same time, the government 
would diversify its economic approach, including with 
autonomous zones that respected the communitarian practices 
of indigenous peoples where private property did not exist. 
 
¶9.  (C) Unprompted, Morales acknowledged that the future 
government would "reclaim ownership" of Bolivia's 
hydrocarbons resources, which he said had been exploited by 
foreign interests at the people's expense under the old 
system.  The Ambassador responded that, while the U.S. 
attached great importance to the respect for contractual 
obligations and the need for legal certainty, other 
governments such as those of Spain, France and Brazil had 
greater commercial interests in the gas sector, and would 
likely be raising these interests with his government in the 
near future. 
 
The Importance of Dialogue 
-------------------------- 
¶10.  (C) Throughout the discussion, Morales reiterated his 
interest in resolving problems and disagreements through 
dialogue (which he emphasized was an integral part of Aymara 
culture) and his commitment to democracy.  He said he had 
long been willing to meet and speak with U.S. officials, and 
that his presence in the Ambassador's residence clearly 
showed his belief in talking things through.  He claimed he 
had demonstrated his commitment for negotiation over 
confrontation, and that the violence in Bolivia's immediate 
past had flowed either from the absence of dialogue or a lack 
of good faith efforts during negotiations.  In this 
connection, Morales stated that the syndicates he led had an 
unparalleled track record in keeping their promises and 
meeting their side of the various bargains they had entered. 
Similarly, he mentioned repeatedly that corruption had been a 
major obstacle to Bolivia's development, and that eliminating 
it would be a top government priority. 
 
U.S. Cooperation 
---------------- 
¶11.  (C) The Ambassador next reviewed the range of U.S. 
cooperation to clarify, he explained, apparent misconceptions 
about the significance of our role in Bolivia.  Using a 
series of slides prepared by USAID-Bolivia, he showed that 
U.S. bilateral contributions over the last four years dwarfed 
those of other top donors - including Germany, Holland and 
Japan - that tended to get the lion's share of the media 
recognition.  He also showed the crucial importance of U.S. 
contributions to key international financial on which Bolivia 
depended for assistance, such as the International 
Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund.  "When you think of the IDB, you should think 
of the U.S.," the Ambassador said.  "This is not blackmail, 
it is simple reality."   He also noted that the U.S. led 
other creditors in having fully forgiven Bolivia's debt. 
 
¶12.  (C) The Ambassador underscored the U.S. Government's 
interest in maintaining a constructive relationship with the 
future government of Bolivia, but noted that the need for 
respect and dignity (focal points in the MAS's campaign and 
post-electoral rhetoric) was a two-way street.  He emphasized 
that countries acted, at bottom, according to their perceived 
national interests, and hoped that we could continue working 
together in pursuit of our shared interests.  In this 
connection, the Ambassador stated that this prospect would 
depend on the words and actions of the Bolivian government. 
"I hope you as the next president of Bolivia understand the 
importance of this," he said, "because a parting of the ways 
would not be good for the region, for Bolivia or for the 
United States." 
 
Garcia Linera: We Want to Work With You 
--------------------------------------- 
¶13.  (C) VP-elect Alvaro Garcia Linera closed the meeting by 
reaffirming the commitment of the president-elect and the 
future government to democracy and to the principle of open 
dialogue ("as demonstrated today") on the full range of 
issues.  (Note: Morales said they cabinet members had not yet 
been selected, but that in the interim Garcia Linera and 
Felipe Caceres - on coca - could serve as our principal 
interlocutors.  End Note.)  He further asked us for patience 
- "give us six months before making any judgments" - and 
stated his desire that the U.S. accompany the future 
government in its efforts to create a more inclusive 
democracy and a better future for Bolivians. 
 
Frank Exchange with Number One 
------------------------------ 
¶14.  (C) This initial meeting, while cordial throughout, 
included frank exchanges on a number of thorny and sensitive 
issues.  As such, it should lay a productive foundation for 
more detailed future discussions on the broad menu of 
bilateral issues.  President-elect Morales projected an air 
of caution and guardedness throughout, and on several 
occasions baldly conveyed his resentment for the allegedly 
false accusations by U.S. officials.  During the Ambassador's 
description of U.S. assistance to Bolivia, Morales' body 
language - arms crossed, eyes darting from side to side - 
suggested impatience and even exasperation.  At the same 
time, his expressed commitment to fight for the interests of 
Bolivia's poor appeared to us personally sincere and 
politically authentic.  By his strong demeanor and lead role 
throughout the discussion, Morales also appeared to put to 
rest rumors that he is the junior partner in a political 
dupla dominated by the more sophisticated and worldly Garcia 
Linera.  Whatever else he may be, in person Evo Morales 
struck as a politician to be reckoned with -- and potentially 
one with whom, in certain areas, we might be able to deal 
effectively. 
GREENLEE