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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000169 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO 
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND 
NSC FOR DFISK 
USCINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SOCI ELAB CI BL
SUBJECT: CHILE'S LAGOS HOPEFUL ABOUT BOLIVIA'S MORALES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: During their January 22 meeting in La Paz, 
President of Chile Ricardo Lagos told WHA A/S Shannon that 
the U.S. should keep the doors open with Evo Morales to 
prevent Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez from gaining 
disproportionate influence.  Lagos said he had explained 
Chile's historical efforts to negotiate a solution to 
Bolivia's maritime access claim (reminding Morales that the 
formal blessing of Peru was indispensable to any agreement) 
and believed Morales' popular mandate would enable him to act 
sensibly on this issue, but felt that deeper regional 
integration would better serve Bolivia's interests. 
Referring again to Chavez, Lagos saw South America as 
"complicated" by unrealistic political visions that are 
impossible to implement and that only generate frustration, 
and suggested Brazil and Mexico could play a stabilizing 
role.  Lagos said high-level U.S. representation in Chile's 
transfer of power ceremonies in March would be an important 
signal.  Shannon said we wanted to keep the doors with 
Morales open, and, in consultation with our friends and 
allies in the region, to ensure our engagement helped 
consolidate democracy and prevent radicalization.  Lagos was 
hopeful that President Evo Morales' popular mandate would 
help reduce tensions with Chile, and was clearly seeking ways 
to avert future problems.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon met with 
President of Chile Ricardo Lagos in La Paz on January 22, 
immediately before the "transmission of power" ceremony in 
which Evo Morales formally acceded to the presidency of 
Bolivia.  (President Lagos' meeting with Morales just before 
was the subject of widespread and largely favorable coverage 
in the Bolivian media.)  Lagos was accompanied by his son, 
Ricardo Lagos, chief of the future Chilean government's 
transition team, and by Chilean Deputy Foreign Minister 
Cristian Barros.  Ambassador Greenlee and poloff Ludwig 
(note-taker) accompanied A/S Shannon. 
 
Keep the Door Open 
------------------ 
¶3.  (C) Following initial niceties, President Lagos told A/S 
Shannon he accepted Morales' invitation to the transmission 
of power ceremonies in La Paz to build on the concrete 
successes achieved during the productive six-month tenure of 
former President Rodriguez.  Lagos pointed to the recent 
bilateral agreement enabling citizens of both countries to 
cross their shared borders without a passport, and Chile's 
unilateral decision to eliminate tariffs on all Bolivian 
products save sugar and wheat, as intending to demonstrate 
good will and to facilitate further advances.  He believed 
Evo Morales, as President of Bolivia, would be able to pick 
up where Rodriguez had left off.  Shannon agreed that Lagos' 
presence in La Paz sent a welcome signal. 
 
¶4.  (C) Lagos said Chile and the U.S. should keep the doors 
open to Evo Morales, noting his impression that Morales had 
learned a great deal during his recent world tour and could 
be encouraged to act reasonably and pragmatically given the 
correct guidance.  Lagos mentioned his concern about 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in this respect, and 
emphasized the need to counter Chavez's potentially 
radicalizing influence.  "If we close the doors, Chavez will 
only gain more leverage here," Lagos said. 
 
Negotiations on Sea Access 
-------------------------- 
¶5. (C) President Lagos explained that he had reviewed with 
Morales Chile's efforts during the past six years to 
negotiate with successive Bolivian leaders a resolution to 
Bolivia's maritime claim.  Morales appeared to absorb the 
 
LA PAZ 00000169  002 OF 003 
 
 
lesson that Chile had made good faith efforts, and seemed to 
understand it was not easy for a Chilean leader to hand over 
a piece of its sovereignty with nothing in exchange.  Lagos 
noted that negotiations with former President Hugo Banzer 
(1997-2000) were on the verge of success when Banzer resigned 
from office with cancer (he died soon thereafter), leaving 
Chile to live with the consequences of unfinished business. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Chilean President speculated that Morales' 
decisive popular mandate would enable him to act sensibly on 
this issue, without using Chile as a bogeyman to shore up 
political support at home -- as former President Mesa, for 
example, had done.  He explained that negotiations with 
President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada had foundered when, with 
his legitimacy in question, the then-Bolivian President had 
pleaded for sovereign maritime access from Chile in order to 
save his collapsing government.   Lagos said he had 
underscored to Sanchez de Lozada at the time, and to Morales 
in their meeting, that any bilateral agreement between Chile 
and Bolivia on this issue would need the formal blessing of 
Peru in any case.  DFM Barrios interjected that the U.S. 
could demonstrate its willingness to work with Bolivia by 
supporting a resolution to this issue; Shannon said we would 
heed Chile's signals, but also underscored Peru's role. 
 
Integration, Not Sea Access, is Answer 
-------------------------------------- 
¶7.  (C) Lagos further opined that Bolivia's gaining an outlet 
to sea would not solve the country's problems.  Rather, 
agreements on a fuller range of issues, including trade, 
transportation infrastructure and the like aiming to deepen 
regional linkages, were a much better bet.  In this 
connection, he mentioned a proposed road project linking 
Brazil, Argentina and Chile that would also necessarily 
include Paraguay and Bolivia.  Lagos said prospective IDB 
loans for the project could go exclusively to Bolivia and 
Paraguay to support their participation.  "We can do this 
quickly," he said; success could improve Bolivia's outlook. 
Lagos noted that Morales would have problems resolving the 
coca issue --  "when we broached free trade, Morales said it 
should include coca too" -- but that some kind of agreement 
could probably be reached. 
 
Lagos: Region is Complicated 
---------------------------- 
¶8. (C) Shannon asked President Lagos how he saw the regional 
situation.  Lagos answered that it was "complicated," and 
referred again to Chavez's behavior and designs.  The problem 
now, he continued, was that the proclamation of unrealistic 
"big visions" with no possibility of being implemented only 
raised expectations that could not be met.  This caused 
increasing frustration, and raised the prospects of social 
conflict.  Lagos said that Brazilian President Lula, for his 
own social sector background and the diplomatic heft of 
Brazil in the region, could play a crucial role in countering 
Chavez-led destabilization.  He also believed Mexico should 
increase its involvement in South America, and said he had 
suggested as much to President Fox (who was traveling to 
Chile the following week).  Shannon said Mexico was beginning 
to understand this, and had recognized the need to counter 
Venezuela's influence in the region.  Lagos said he had also 
told British PM Blair to get involved, particularly in the 
Caribbean where British cultural ties and influence remain 
strong. 
 
U.S. Representation in Chile's Transfer of Power 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶9.  (U) Lagos asked Shannon to secure the highest possible 
U.S. representation for Chile's own transmission of power 
ceremonies in March.  "We need a strong signal from you." 
Shannon said he was working on this. 
 
LA PAZ 00000169  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
U.S. Wants to Deepen Engagement 
------------------------------- 
¶10.  (C) Shannon told Lagos that the U.S. was consulting with 
its regional partners, including Chile and Mexico, about how 
to deal with Bolivia under a Morales government.  He noted 
that we were keeping the door open with President Morales and 
had had a positive meeting with him the night before in which 
we made these intentions clear (septel).  We were approaching 
the sensitive issue of coca with great care, he averred, and 
hoped to find some reasonable modus operandi on that front. 
Shannon acknowledged that "if we close the doors, then Chavez 
will open them," and expand his influence here; at the same 
time, if we show a willingness to seek common ground --  "as 
I suggested in public statements from Brazil last week" -- 
then Chavez spouts off accusations that the U.S. is plotting 
to assassinate Morales.  Shannon emphasized that the U.S. 
wanted to deepen our relations with our friends and partners 
in the region, to better understand their perspectives and 
concerns, and to ensure that our engagement promoted 
democratic consolidation and prevented Chavez from carrying 
out his radicalization plans. 
 
Comment: Hope About Morales 
--------------------------- 
¶11.  (C) It was clear from his command of the issues that 
President Lagos is deeply engaged on Bolivia, and seeking 
ways to preempt future problems in their bilateral relations. 
 He expressed hope that Evo Morales would respond to the 
challenge of leadership with seriousness, and believed that 
the new Bolivian President's secure mandate would help him do 
this, particularly in regard Chile.  Lagos' presence in La 
Paz, extremely well-received by most Bolivians, was a good 
first step.  Morales will have the opportunity to reciprocate 
in March. 
 
¶12.  (U) A/S Shannon did not have the opportunity to clear 
this cable. 
GREENLEE