VZCZCXRO5307
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0219/01 0291058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291058Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1222
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI 0022

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000219 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SU
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER BREAKFAST WITH SPLM 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000219  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: POL: Michael Honigstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  On January 25, Assistant Secretary Jendayi 
Frazer, Roger Winter, and the Charge met with three senior 
SPLM officials resident in Khartoum: Yassir Arman, Chairman 
of the SPLM National Assembly Caucus; Malik Agar, Government 
of National Unity (GNU) Minister of investment; and Deng 
Alor, GNU Minister of Cabinet Affairs.  They said that the 
SPLM was drifting due to the leadership of GNU First Vice 
President Salva Kiir. They explained that Kiir is the only 
one who could lead the SPLM, but said he did not represent 
the mainstream, and warned that the party could collapse if 
Kiir did not take action.  The trio also said the NCP has 
attempted to divide and neuter the SPLM leadership in the 
GNU.  A/S Frazer responded that the U.S. interest was the 
transformation of the governance of Sudan and emphasized that 
SPLM officials should manage their ministries to effect this 
change.  On Darfur, Arman, the SPLM representative in Abuja, 
said that a new dynamic is linking the rebels with Chad and 
Eritrea.  End summary. 
 
------------------- 
SPLM Drifting Apart 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The three SPLM leaders explained the dynamics within 
the SPLM and its growing lack of cohesion.  Deng said that 
Kiir had inherited absolute power, but seemed unable to 
handle it.  A number of SPLM leaders from Garang's inner 
circle -- which includes Arman, Deng and Agar - discussed 
this drift with Kiir on January 9 in Juba. 
 
¶3.  (C) Deng described the January 9 meeting as positive. 
The Ganrangists allayed Kiir's fears that they were trying to 
remove him, and Kiir had agreed to create an interim body to 
manage the SPLM.  According to Deng, Kiir had been getting 
bad advice from Bona Malwal and Lam Akol, which has caused 
chaos in the SPLM and risked splitting the movement. The 
three requested U.S. assistance in sensitizing Kiir to the 
need for greater SPLM coherence, a request they have also 
made to influential African heads of state. 
 
¶4.  (C) Arman referenced the 2004 struggle between Garang and 
Kiir factions, the latter supported by Malwal and Akol, and 
acknowledged that Kiir had inherited an SPLM/A dominated by 
Garang supporters.  Kiir had chosen to move his own people 
into various sensitive positions, including the GNU Foreign 
Minister. Unfortunately, this played into the hands of the 
NCP and northern security forces.  Arman acknowledged that 
Kiir was the only logical leader of the SPLM, and the Garang 
loyalists were prepared to follow Kiir if he started to lead 
the mainstream. 
 
---------------------- 
NCP Seizes Opportunity 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Arman said that the NCP had wasted no time in 
exploiting the change of leadership in the SPLM.  NISS Chief 
Salah Ghosh had passed Kiir a report on an internal SPLM 
conspiracy to replace Kiir.  It was the tested NCP tactic of 
dividing opposition.  Kiir was also told that the Americans 
did not want him.  However, Arman said their goal was to 
reform the SPLM and keep Kiir, and they have made headway 
toward this goal.  Kiir had agreed to establish a leadership 
convention that would establish clear policies, including a 
position on Darfur.  The interim working group that Kiir 
agreed to establish would set policy until the SPLM 
convention, which had been moved from March until June. 
 
¶6.  (C) Deng said that the NCP was also unhappy that other 
African leaders were talking to the SPLM.  Ghosh had 
personally entered one of Kiir's meetings during the AU 
summit to see who was there. The NCP believed that the SPLM 
had helped frustrate Bashir's quest for the AU Chairmanship 
(all three expressed satisfaction at Bashir's failure).  Deng 
concluded that the NCP wanted the South to separate so the 
NCP could rule without constraints in the North.  Arman asked 
A/S Frazer to help convince Kiir that Garang's vision of 
Sudanese unity should prevail, in spite of Kiir's known 
position on separation.  Arman said that Uganda, South 
Africa, and Ethiopia could also help in this manner, 
especially Obasanjo and Mbeki. 
 
--------------- 
SPLM Challenges 
--------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The trio described some current problems facing the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000219  002 OF 002 
 
 
SPLM/A, most seriously the fact that the SPLA soldiers had 
not been paid, including the southern JIU forces to be paid 
by the GNU.  Deng said the problem was now resolved and the 
SPLA would be paid three months' back salaries. 
 
¶8.  (C) Another problem was the viability of the SPLM as a 
national party.  In the North, the SPLM had started 
registering large numbers, which alarmed the NCP.  However, 
Kiir had refused to release funds to Abdel Aziz, SPLM 
organizer in the North.  Six months earlier, Deng said the 
party was gaining strength, but the failure to take clear 
positions and meet overly high expectations had undercut its 
appeal, which could jeopardize the entire movement. 
 
¶9.  (C) Arman believed that clarity was the paramount issue. 
The NCP had taken advantage of SPLM policy drift to counter 
SPLM growth in the North.  The group around Kiir has played 
into NCP hands by eschewing national issues.  Arman stressed 
that the SPLM could not meet its stated goals unless it 
remained a formidable source in the center.  Arman said that 
even the choice for succession would only be possible if the 
SPLM was strong in the GNU. 
 
---------------- 
The USG Position 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) A/S Frazer responded that many in the U.S. believed 
Garang's vision of national unity was not widely supported in 
the South and Kiir was seeking to consolidate his position 
with his constituency.  While a leadership vacuum was 
inevitable considering Garang's strength, the party should be 
strong enough to continue, and party development was 
therefore critically important.  Frazer pointed out that 
every member of the Politburo in South Africa was qualified 
to assume the top position, if this were necessary. 
 
¶11.  (C) Frazer continued that while friendship between the 
SPLM and USG officials was important, the interests of the 
U.S. were her first priority.  State transformation and the 
weakening of the NCP are jeopardized by an ineffective SPLM. 
She noted that those who produced, not those who complained, 
would help keep the SPLM united and assist Kiir's leadership. 
 Good results were the test, and it was essential that the 
SPLM leadership in the GNU not be, in Charge's words, "me 
too" partners. The SPLM must take control of their portfolios 
and strengthen their place in government. 
 
-------------- 
SPLM on Darfur 
-------------- 
¶12.  (C) On Darfur, Yassir Arman described an emerging 
dynamic that had created an Eritrean, Chadian, and rebel 
axis, with Turabi playing a supporting role in Khartoum. All 
were united by their opposition to the NCP.  Arman described 
the Abuja talks as a "bazaar" with too many negotiators that 
would "take us nowhere."  Nonetheless, negotiations were 
strengthened by the NCP's fear of a UN military force being 
deployed.  Arman felt that the priority should be disarming 
the militias and the jinjaweed.  He believed that the 7,000 
SPLA troops still in the East could be integrated into Joint 
Integrated Units (JIUs) and sent to Darfur for this purpose, 
a concept that Garang had repeatedly espoused.  The Charge 
noted that it would take six months to stand up the JIUs, at 
the rate of a battalion a month. By this calculation they 
could be in place by the end of the year, which would be an 
affirmative step to resolving the crisis. 
 
¶13.  Deng interjected that Obasanjo had advised Kiir to brief 
Sassou-Nguesso on the SPLM view of Darfur.  Obasanjo told 
Kiir that "someone" from the NCP indicated that the South was 
only focused on separation and therefore not interested in 
Darfur.  Arman, the SPLM representative in Abuja, felt that 
the SPLM could do more on Darfur but said he was only 
empowered to act on direct orders from Kiir. 
 
¶13. A/S Frazer has cleared on this cable. 
 
¶14. Tripoli minimize considered. 
HUME