This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000294 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/FO AND SA/FO AMB QUINN 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN/KAMED 
 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR KCRM AF
SUBJECT: SURVEY POINTS TO SUCCESS IN COUNTER NARCOTIC 
COMMUNICATIONS 
 
REF: N/A 
 
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SUMMARY 
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(1) Counter narcotic (CN) messages are reaching Afghans 
nationwide and within the poppy eradication provinces 
(PEP), reports a public opinion survey conducted in late 
November by a major polling company commissioned by 
INL/Kabul. Some 75 percent of Afghans have heard CN 
messages on radio; 73% have heard CN messages from 
President Karzai, and 80% have discussed CN issues with 
family and friends. CN messages resonate with between 
2/3rds and 4/5ths of Afghans depending on the specific 
issue: they overwhelmingly agree that narcotics trade 
damages the nations reputation, that narco-traffickers 
should be stopped, and that the proximity of narcotics 
leads to addiction. However, barely half are aware of 
addicts in their own communities and two-thirds think that 
poppy cultivation is essential to farmers survival. 
While Afghans most readily turn to President Karzai, other 
national officials and indigenous media to point out right 
from wrong on national issues, local decisions are 
overwhelmingly influenced by family and neighbors, 
suggesting that more aggressive local initiatives are 
needed to increase social pressure, converting CN 
understanding into CN action. 
 
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SCIENTIFIC POLL ADVANCES CN UNDERSTANDING 
ING 
----------------------------------------- 
 
(2) INL/Kabuls first poll since spring 2005 was conducted 
by Kabul-based D3/ASCOR, an international firm formerly 
tied to Gallup/Pakistan, that has done survey work in more 
than 80 countries. They surveyed 31 provinces (but not 
Nimruz, Oruzgan and Zabul due to security concerns) on a 
demographically representative national sample of 1041, 
with an additional 200 each in the PEP provinces of 
Nangarhar, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Balkh, and Badakshan 
making 2240 total. 
 
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MEDIA DELIVERING CN MESSAGES 
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(3) Television use is growing rapidly, with 35% nationwide 
claiming to see television news weekly or more, rising to 
75% in Balkh attributed to high urban television ownership 
there. This controversial figure is still less than 88% of 
Afghans getting news from radio. Newspapers (7%) and 
magazines (4%) influence small urban elite. Nationally, 42% 
turn first to BBC radio, 31% to Afghan state radio, 30% to 
Azadi FM; 22% to Afghan state television and 20% to the 
Voice of America (Ashna FM). These numbers vary by province 
but not dramatically. 
 
(4) Some 75% nationally have heard CN messages on radio, 
dropping as low as 2/3rds in Nangarhar and Helmand but 
rising as high as 91% in Balkh. CN messages heard on 
television average 20-30 percent, dropping to the high 
teens and low 20s for print media. Importantly, 73% 
nationwide have heard CN messages from President Karzai, 
and 80% from family or friends. Somewhat less than half 
report hearing CN messages from village elders, clergy and 
governors. CN posters, stickers and matchboxes have reached 
between 25 and 40 percent of respondents. 
 
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AFGHANS ANTI-POPPY BUT SYMPATHETIC TO FARMERS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
(5) The poll went into detail following findings in spring 
2005 that showed 90% of Afghans thought poppy farming 
wrong. Nationally 82% now say poppy cultivation makes 
warlords and criminals rich (down to 61% and 69 % 
respectively in Badakshan and Helmand). Some 78% said it 
corrupts Afghan government officials (47% in Badakshan and 
64% in Kandahar). Some 80% said it harms the reputation of 
Afghanistan (62% in Badakshan and 63% in Helmand).  Three- 
quarters said that drug crops cause addiction locally; but 
50% saw no addicts where they lived (up to 79% in Nangarhar 
and 67% in Kandahar). Some 67% said that local government 
wishes to stop narcotic cultivation but is unable (down 
slightly to 62% in Helmand and 63% in Kandahar). 
 
(6) Afghans are strongly opposed to narcotics buyers and 
traffickers.  Some 79% nationally say that they take 
advantage of poor farmers (up to 91% in Balkh); 74% say it 
puts farmers into debt; and 66% describe buyers and 
traffickers as outsiders (this falls from 79% in Balkh to 
49% in Kandahar and 51% in Farah). Some 79% describe them 
as violent and dangerous, and 76% say that local people 
ple 
are afraid of them. Large numbers agree that they should 
be forced to stop  81% nationally to a low of 63% in 
Helmand. 
 
(7) Yet Afghans are sympathetic to poppy farmers. Some 62% 
of Afghans believe that income from poppy is essential 
(rising to 73% in Balkh and 75% in Nangarhar, where the 
poppy crop was reduced by around 90% last year, suggesting 
that there the loss of last years illicit income is being 
felt this year). At the same time, in most places Afghans 
term poppy farming a large crime rather than a small one. 
Nationally, 68% said it is a big crime (in Nangarhar and 
Helmand 65% dissented, terming it a small crime). 
 
(8) Significantly, many Afghans believe that poppy farming 
is a major crime, but that nonetheless it is essential for 
the survival of farmers. 
 
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AFGHANS LOOK LOCALLY FOR MORAL LEADERSHIP 
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(9) On national issues, Afghans overwhelmingly turn to 
urn to 
national authorities for advice. Some 32% rely on President 
Karzai or other national figures, 33% turn to Afghan 
government broadcast media; only ten percent to foreign 
broadcast media and eight percent to local leaders such as 
elders. Yet overall, factoring in local and regional 
issues, Afghan overwhelmingly listen to local sources. 
Family and friends, elders and maliks added together scored 
four times higher than President Karzai and three times 
higher than Afghan national broadcast media. Mullahs polled 
lower than expected, about the same as President Karzai, 
but presumably many local issues have no religious or moral 
component on which clerical advice may be most valued. 
 
(10) Overall, Afghans pay attention to facts delivered from 
trusted national sources, but it could be argued that on 
local issues their behavior is more strongly affected by 
local influences by a factor of 3:1 or 4:1. 
 
(11) Afghans are talking about the ethics of poppy farming, 
and 57% nationally say that CN issues are discussed at 
home; and 47% say they are discussed a lot. This rises to 
Helmand where 65% of families discuss CN issues, 84% 
talking a lot. Nationwide, people say that these 
discussions make people less in favor of poppy farming (as 
opposed to more in favor) by 64:6 (this drops to 28:23 in 
Kandahar where poppy appears to have more vocal defenders). 
 
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STRATEGY: THINK GLOBAL, ACT LOCAL 
--------------------------------- 
 
(12) Forthcoming governor-led and central-led eradication 
may generate popular support for protest or opposition, if 
people are motivated out of sympathy for poor farmers; or 
it may enjoy support if people concentrate on their strong 
moral and practical opposition to narcotics and narcotics 
traffickers. However it is clear that Afghans tend to 
generalize that all poppy farmers are so poor as to be 
reliant on poppy income for survival. This needs to be 
 be 
challenged through advertising and promoted through news 
coverage, but there is no solid qualitative or quantitative 
evidence to present to the Afghan public or to journalists. 
 
(13) Anticipating eradication, the current crop of 
communications outputs include radio and television ads, 
comic booklets, matchboxes, stickers, banners, etc. These 
are being designed to focus on two issues primarily. First 
is rule of law issues to demonstrate that traffickers are 
being arrested and that farmers will not solely bear the 
burden of poppy eradication. Second is Alternative 
Livelihoods interventions, stressing that these are 
provided for all poor law-abiding farmers, not as 
recompense for poppy growers. However there is a limited 
number of AL activities that can be profiled in a small 
number of ads. 
 
(14) The CN campaign swiftly needs a comprehensive 
livelihoods survey in the PEP provinces, gauging family 
incomes, discretionary incomes, debt, elasticity, sources 
of farm and non-farm earning, irrigated and unirrigated 
land ownership etc, at a district level or lower. Only then 
can the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and other GOA 
agencies defend eradication in general and in specific 
areas, thus shatter the notion that all poppy farmers are 
driven to break the law by cruel necessity. 
 
(15) Meanwhile, the communications officers in the PEP 
programs have been tasked by the MCN to compile 
comprehensive lists of social contact points and potential 
stakeholder allies, for a protracted campaign by district 
to increase social pressures on poppy farmers. This 
strategy aspires to mobilize students, health workers, shop 
owners and others as well as clergy and local government, 
to increase the climate of social resistance to poppy, 
generating pressure at the local level where Afghans say 
that it will make the biggest impact. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
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(16) Print and broadcast messages, plus CN statements from 
senior GOA officials, have attracted notice and spurred 
discussions that clearly help strengthen Afghans need to 
eliminate poppy cultivation. Yet the recent CN poll 
indicates that the strongest motivational messages come 
from friends, family and local leaders. An optimal CN 
communications campaign will inform and mobilize those 
social forces, helping to turn ethical perceptions into 
social pressure, and social pressure into action. 
 
 
 
 
NORLAND