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DE RUEHBJ #1306/01 0201048
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6179
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1235
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2724
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8059
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3631
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0311
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0755
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1129

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 001306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR EU AORC CH
SUBJECT: STRONG DOMESTIC PRESSURE DRIVING IRAN'S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM; CHINA LOOKING AFTER ECONOMIC  INTERESTS 
 
REF: A. BEIJING 00550 
 
     ¶B. BEIJING 00094 
     ¶C. STATE 02147 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David Sedney. 
Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  A strong domestic consensus in Iran 
is driving the government to restart enrichment 
activities and to pursue an indigenous nuclear 
program, according to MFA West Asia and African 
Affairs Iran Division Director Xu Wei.  In a January 
19 meeting, Xu said that Beijing believes it is the 
only viable go-between to resolve the Iranian nuclear 
program.  China has not yet received detailed 
briefings from the Russians on its proposal to assist 
Iran's nuclear program.  Beijing and Tehran have 
healthy economic ties and Beijing does not believe 
Iran will use punitive oil pricing or sales measures 
against it, if China in the end supports a referral to 
the UNSC.  Iranian VFM Safari held previously 
undisclosed meetings with China's Economic Planning 
Vice Minister Zhang Guobao while in Beijing earlier 
this month.  A German Embassy officer told us that 
China is pressuring Iran to quickly close a deal on 
Iran's last untapped oil field.  End Summary. 
 
Domestic Pressure Pushing Iran to Restart Nuclear 
Program 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C) Domestic pressures are forcing the Iranian 
Government to restart its uranium enrichment 
activities and to pursue an indigenous nuclear 
program, MFA West Asia and African Affairs Iran 
Division Director Xu Wei told poloff on January 19. 
During his January 8-9 visit to Beijing, Iranian Vice 
Foreign Minister Mehdi Safari told PRC officials that 
Iran restarted its uranium enrichment activities 
because of pressure from three groups: frustrated 
young scientists and technicians who fear they are 
losing their skills because they are out of work, 
deputies in the Iranian Congress seeking to raise 
Iran's international prestige and mullahs who view 
Iran's nuclear program as a symbol of power as well as 
an affront to western hegemonism that will shine as an 
example of a perfect Muslim state that the Islamic 
world can aspire to.  Moreover, young people who are 
desperate for opportunities and seek to raise Iran's 
international profile increasingly drive Iranian 
politics.  Xu said the current situation is very grave 
and that Iran is not likely to back down because the 
government has too much to lose domestically. 
 
¶3. (C) Iran is unified in its desire to pursue an 
indigenous nuclear program, according to Xu.  He 
stated that the people and the various factions within 
the government all share the desire and goal of Iran 
having its own nuclear program but have different 
ideas on how to achieve that goal.  Iran's President 
believes confrontation over the nuclear issue provides 
the Islamic world with an example of a Muslim state 
successfully standing up to the West.  Other Iranian 
Government officials (Xu would not provide names) see 
the President's approach as exacerbating tensions 
needlessly.  Regardless, all factions defend Iran's 
right to develop nuclear technology. 
 
¶4. (C) In a separate January 19 meeting, German 
Embassy Officer Aron Mir Haschemi stated that the 
German Embassy in Tehran shares the same assessment of 
Iran's domestic situation.  The German Embassy in 
Tehran reports that popular support for restarting the 
uranium enrichment 
activities has prevented Iranian politicians from 
being able to negotiate with the West on the issue. 
Furthermore, moderates within Iran are not willing to 
speak out because of fear of government reprisals 
including bodily harm and exile. 
 
China Views Itself as a Go-Between for Iran and the 
West 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
¶5. (C) China continues to pursue normal, healthy 
relations with Iran in order to benefit the 
international community, according to Xu.  China views 
itself as the only possible middleman between a 
revolutionary Islamic state and western liberal 
democracies.  Iran will never accept proposals from 
the outside, particularly from the "Great Satan." 
Beijing urges the international community to adopt a 
patient attitude towards Iran and recognize that it is 
facing domestic pressures. 
 
China's Perspective on the Russian Proposal 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Russian proposal to conduct Iranian uranium 
enrichment in its territorial boundaries surprised 
Iran, according to Xu.  The proposal is totally 
different from how the Iranians envisioned the 
development of their nuclear program and may run 
counter to their desire to become a beacon for the 
Islamic world.  At this time, however, Tehran has not 
rejected the goal outright and will weigh carefully 
every aspect of the Russian proposal. Lamenting that 
"working with the Iranians takes years off your life," 
Xu said that based on his five-year experience living 
in Iran, he finds the Iranians to be top negotiators 
"bar none."  They are able to reach deals that 
maximize their interests while returning very few 
benefits to the other side. 
 
¶7. (C) When asked about China's opinion of the 
proposal, Xu stated that Russia has yet to provide an 
outline or details of its plan to Beijing.  China 
welcomes all proposals that may provide a solution to 
the current impasse with Iran.  Xu said China has not 
discussed the Russian proposal in Moscow nor has 
Russia discussed the proposal in Beijing.  Xu noted 
the possibility that Zhang Yan was provided more 
details on the plan during the January 16 London 
talks. 
 
Iran's Nuclear Intentions 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) When asked if Iran's ultimate goal in 
restarting its nuclear program is to develop a nuclear 
weapon capability, Xu carefully avoided answering, 
instead repeating that Iranians are the world's best 
negotiators who "always will leave you with nothing." 
 
¶9. (C) German officer Aron said that German 
intelligence services have met with the Chinese 
intelligence services to discuss how close Iran is to 
achieving a nuclear weapon capability. 
 
China - Iran Economic Relations 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Beijing and Tehran enjoy healthy economic 
ties, according to Xu.  Currently, China does not have 
any outstanding oil contracts under negotiation.  Xu 
said that China has a huge need for oil and Iran is 
willing to sell its oil to China.  Last year China 
purchased over 16 million tones of oil from Iran. 
During Iran's Vice Foreign Minister Mehdi Safari's 
January 8-9 visit to Beijing, Safari met with National 
Development and Reform Commission Vice Minister Zhang 
Guobao to discuss further cooperation on energy 
issues. (Note: The MFA Arms Control and Disarmament 
Department provided a read out of the Safari visit 
(reftel A) and stressed that the topic of discussion 
was Iran's nuclear program.  The readout did not 
mention the Zhang meeting.  UK Embassy Officer Clare 
Filshie and German Embassy Officer Aron Mir Haschemi 
confirmed during separate January 18 meetings that 
they were not told about the Zhang meeting either. End 
Note.) When asked if China was worried about Iran 
adopting punitive oil pricing or oil sales policies in 
reaction to its referral to the UNSC, Xu stated that 
Iran has not threatened China with any retaliatory 
measures if China agrees to the UNSC referral.  Xu is 
convinced that the Iran situation will cause oil 
 
prices to increase dramatically. 
 
¶11. (C) German Emboff Aron said that Germany believes 
China is still in negotiation with Iran to tap Iran's 
largest untapped oil field at Yadavaraon.  A framework 
for the agreement has been signed but China is 
aggressively pressuring Iran to close the deal, 
according to Aron and Germany Embassy sources. 
 
¶12. (C) Aron said that the German Government has 
initiated economic impact studies on the loss of trade 
with Iran in preparation for a referral to the UNSC 
and possible sanctions. German analysts are looking at 
trade between China and Iran as well.  Germany has 
considerable concern that as one of Iran's largest 
trading partners, German industries and the overall 
economy could be hurt by a downturn in German-Iran 
relations.  According to Aron, Germany is concerned 
that China could supplant its market share in key 
industries such as automobiles if Germany supports a 
UNSC referral and China does not. 
Randt