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Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD215, WITH COMPETING PROGRAMS, UNITY GOVERNMENT WILL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD215 2006-01-26 12:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO2839
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0215/01 0261226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261226Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2293
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: WITH COMPETING PROGRAMS, UNITY GOVERNMENT WILL 
TAKE TIME TO ASSEMBLE SAYS TAWAFFUQ LEADER 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 195 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons 
1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
 1.  (C)  Summary:  One of Iraq's top Sunni Arab political 
leaders, Tariq al-Hashemi, told us January 25 that while 
his constitutents are not happy with the election process, 
he will move forward on unity government talks.  He 
anticipated difficulties finding common ground with the 
Kurds and the Shia Islamists on a government program.  He 
underlined that security is the top issue for the Tawaffuq 
leadership.  He hoped constitutional issues like federalism 
could be put off (since he knows he'll lose any vote in the 
parliament).  A senior member of the Shia Islamist 
Coalition, meanwhile, told us that the Coalition will work 
for a unity government even though a deal with the Kurds is 
"legally sufficient" to stand up a government.  He brushed 
off Sunni Arab worries about militia-driven killings and 
said the Shia Coalition will bring its own security 
concerns --  Sunni Arab religious extremists and ex- 
Baathists -- to the negotiating table.   Discussions 
between the political blocs are still in their early 
stages, but already the future of the Interior Ministry is 
shaping up as one of the contentious issues.  For the Sunni 
Arab political bloc, it might be the make-or-break issue. 
End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
SUNNI ARABS STILL GRUMPING ABOUT ELECTION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Tariq al-Hashemi of the Tawaffuq Front told us 
January 25 that the Sunni Arab community is still unhappy 
with the election results.  The fraud, especially in the 
South, was well documented and the IECI did not investigate 
the complaints properly, he claimed.  He sought 
compensation - either extra seats awarded from the 45 
compensatory seats or extra ministries in the government. 
PolCouns told Hashimi that the IMIE report provided 
recommendations on how to improve the complaints process 
and better ensure IECI staff obeyed the boundries of 
propriety.  The U.S. would support IECI and UN effort to 
implement those recommendations.  PolCouns cautioned, 
however, that the U.S. had no plan to intervene to boost up 
Tawaffuq's seat total, whatever it turns out to be. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
SECURITY, NOT THE CONSTITUTION, IS VITAL 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Pol Counselor said the best way to address Sunni 
concerns would be for the Tawaffuq to negotiate to obtain 
real power in the new government.  Hashimi said that he 
understood this and Tawaffuq will be seeking key ministries 
rather than symbolic political posts like the Presidency. 
While conceding that the discussions on government 
formation and ministry allocation among the political 
groups may take some time, Hashimi continued to point to 
security as the number one concern for the Sunnis. 
Something must be done about MOI Bayan Jabr, said Hashimi. 
People are being killed every day, he fulminated.  He 
claimed that 16 Sunnis were killed by people wearing police 
uniforms and driving police vehicles in Baghdad's al-Salam 
district on January 24.  The Coalition is doing nothing to 
stop the killings, pleaded an angry Hashimi.  PolCouns 
advised that a good police force and army are needed to 
protect the Sunnis.  Making sure that the Minister of 
Interior and Minister of Defense are non-sectarian 
professionals is essential.  Hashimi readily agreed and 
underlined that security issues top the agenda of the 
Tawaffuq Front. 
 
4.  (C)  Hashemi said the Tawaffuq Front would not push the 
constitutional issue of federalism when the new parliament 
sits.  He readily admitted that the Sunni Arabs would lose 
a vote about moving forward on federalism badly in the next 
parliament as alignments stand now.  He suggested that it 
would be easier to form a national unity government with 
Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Shia Islamists if the debate on 
Constitutional changes (including the setting up of any new 
regions) could be put off for several years. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
SUNNI ARABS AND KURDS - NOT NATURAL PARTNERS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Hashimi told PolCouns on January 25 that it will 
be difficult to reach agreement on a unity government deal 
with the Kurds.  The Sunnis and Kurds have incompatible 
 
BAGHDAD 00000215  002 OF 003 
 
 
views on the key Constitutional issues of federalism and 
the status of Kirkuk.  Hashimi doubted that the Kurds will 
be flexible on these issues.  A government coalition must 
have a common program on security, the Constitution and the 
economy, said Hashimi.  Discussions with Ayad Allawi are 
proceeding well and the prospects of a Sunni/Allawi block 
representing 83 seats appear good, Hashemi observed.  He 
asserted that convincing the Kurds to join the coalition 
would depend largely on the extent of American pressure. 
Hashimi readily agreed with ideas agreed upon by Allawi and 
the Kurds on issues such as a four-way unity government, 
dividing ministries into functional groups each headed by a 
deputy prime minister and ensuring each unity government 
bloc had representation in each functional group.  He liked 
the idea of a top-level national security council as well. 
(Comment:  his discussions with Allawi may be progressing, 
but Allawi apparently didn't brief Hashimi in detail on the 
discussions in the Irbil.  End Comment.) 
 
6.  (C)  Hashimi underlined that opposition to the Shia 
plurality in the COR is not a sufficient bond for coalition 
government partners.  A coalition that excluded key Shia 
Islamist parties would only trigger a sharply negative 
reaction from the Shia and the Iranians.  Moreover, the 
option of breaking the Shia coalition seemed unlikely to 
Hashimi.  Fadhila's leader Nadeem al-Jabiri is also seeking 
Tawaffuq backing for his prime ministerial bid, but Hashimi 
dismissed the likelihood of Tawaffuq supporting him. 
(Comment:  Hashimi did not discount Jabiri on ideological 
grounds but rather in a rapid-fire manner in line with 
Hashimi's perception of the weight of political forces. 
End Comment.) 
 
------------------------------------- 
SHIA ISLAMIST VIEW:  DON'T LECTURE US 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  (C) Later January 25 Saad Qandil of the Shia 
Islamist party SCIRI told PolCouns that the Shia Islamist 
Coalition is willing to form a unity government that 
includes the Sunni Arabs, but people like Hashimi must stop 
claiming the Sunni Arabs have a "right" to participate in 
the next government.  Qandil sniffed that that the Shia 
Coalition and the Kurdish Alliance can practically gain 2/3 
of the next parliament alone; they don't need the Sunnis, 
he stated flatly.  (He added that American insistance on 
the unity government theme grates some Shia because it 
ignores the legal reality.)  PolCouns said the math may 
back Qandil's argument, but excluding the Sunni Arabs or 
presenting them with a marginal role at the end will narrow 
the chances of undercutting the insurgency.  He cautioned 
that the U.S. wants the political process to dampen the 
insurgency, not aggravate it. 
 
8.  (C)  PolCouns reviewed the types of complaints about 
the Interior Ministry raised by Tawaffuq in general, and 
the Hayy as-Salam incident January 24 allegations in 
particular.  Qandil denied that there are militia members 
operating in the guise of the Interior Ministry.  He 
suggested that those responsible for the killings were 
Sunni religious extremists (takfiris) in police garb. 
PolCouns rejoined that no other part of the political 
spectrum outside SCIRI believed that.  It would be best to 
address the credibility problem at the Interior Ministry 
directly, he advised.  PolCouns noted that the Sunni Arabs 
might be flexible about the next minister as long as it was 
a person with subject expertise and no sectarian agenda. 
Qandil insisted that the Shia Islamist Coalition would 
demand a Shia as Interior Minister.  He pointed to the many 
terror attacks on Shia and stated that the Shia are the 
real victims of violence, not the Sunni Arabs.  PolCouns 
urged Qandil to consider also how to use deputy minister 
positions in the negotiations to enhance the chances of a 
deal. 
 
------------------------------ 
THE PM CHOICE WILL BE - JAFARI ? 
------------------------------ 
 
9.  (C) Qandil told PolCouns that negotiations to choose 
the next Prime Minister would be more difficult than in the 
spring of 2005.  Qandil said the Shia Coalition would not 
vote to settle the Jafari-Abd al-Mahdi competition because 
the tight margin of whatever result came out would be very 
divisive.  Qandil commented that he thought PM Ja'fari is 
the frontrunner, but Abd al-Mahdi would make a better Prime 
Minister.  Qandil discounted the possibility of a 
compromise candidate, such as Fadhila's Nadeem Jabiri or 
Deputy TNA Speaker Husayn Shahristani, getting the nod. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000215  003 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (C)  Both Hashimi and Qandil agreed on the importance 
of a unity government, but we doubt the Shia Islamists and 
Tawaffuq will agree on much after that.  Notably, feelings 
run high among members of both the Shia Islamist Coalition 
the Sunni Arab Tawaffuq Front about the Interior Ministry 
and security problems.  Even once we get past the prime 
minister choice and the Presidency Council, we can expect 
an sharp fight over the choice of the Interior Minister. 
Indeed, it is easy to imagine the Tawaffuq Front quickly 
threatening to walk out of the unity government talks 
unless they get satisfaction on the choice of the Interior 
Minister.  We are quietly gathering names of possible 
choices should we need them later. 
KHALILZAD