This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 002157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2015 
TAGS: AM PGOV PHUM AID
SUBJECT: SQUEEZING THE ARMENIANS ON DEMOCRACY ISSUES 
 
REF: 12/09/05 DANILOVICH-EVANS SECURE TELCON 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Evans for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Post has been talking to various Armenians 
in and out of government in an effort to advance our 
democracy agenda despite the tactical set-back represented by 
the flawed November 27 referendum on the constitutional 
amendments.  While it is too early to say whether the 
Armenians "get it," one thing is clear: the fact of deep U.S. 
involvement through our assistance programs, particularly the 
special program aimed at democracy building in advance of the 
2007-08 elections and, prospectively, the Millennium 
Challenge Account Compact, mean that the Armenians are 
listening to us carefully.  END SUMMARY 
 
Heated Discussions 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C)  Last week the Ambassador hosted two lunches, one for 
media people (editors and media outlet managers) and another 
for a cross-section of politicians and civil society actors. 
The subject for discussion, at times heated, was inevitably 
the November 27 referendum and the prospects for building a 
genuine democratic society in Armenia.  Discussion revealed, 
if anything, increased polarization since the referendum 
within the politically conscious Yerevan-based elite along 
familiar lines.  There is a sense that the opposition is 
badly fragmented and commands less support than ever among 
the rank and file of Armenian citizens, who are basically 
turned off by the opposition's shenanigans, but also not 
inspired either by the governing elite, especially the 
shamefully derelict National Assembly, and are deeply cynical 
about politics in general. 
 
¶3. (C)  What is perhaps most interesting about the 
post-referendum situation is the degree to which people on 
both sides of the political divide seem at a loss as to what 
represents the best way forward.  Armenians we talk to 
universally express a desire to see Armenia become a leading 
democracy in the region.  They often blame their own national 
characteristics and peculiarities, especially their 
well-known extreme individualism, and sometimes the 
continuing Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate, for their seeming 
inability to step  smartly forward toward a more clearly 
democratic future. 
 
¶4. (C)  Another interesting phenomenon is the degree to which 
personal and family ties persist despite serious political 
differences.  We were struck by the familiarity of the 
language used by political opponents over our lunch table 
despite scathing accusations and vilifications that 
threatened to turn into a near-brawl. We are constantly 
amazed by the degree to which people on either side of the 
political divide remain in social contact with one another. 
 
Yerevan School of Political Science: Not Surprised 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C)  At a seminar last weekend of the Yerevan School of 
Political Science, a mixture of youngish scholars, 
bureaucrats and media people earnestly discussed the 
prospects for the growth of Armenia's democracy.  There was 
no apparent doubt among this group that ballot-stuffing and 
serious fraud had taken place during the November 27 
referendum, but also little surprise at that fact, and less 
openly expressed despair about the situation than one might 
have anticipated. In fact, the group as a whole seemed to 
take it for granted that democracy would eventually come to 
Armenia; they just were not certain how this might happen. 
In a side conversation with the Central Bank Governor and 
Shavarsh Kocharian, an opposition leader, the Ambassador 
discussed the prospects for lessening the current 
polarization through the efforts of some political actors who 
maintain contacts across the political divide and can be 
considered relative "moderates." 
 
Pressing in Private... 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  Taking advantage of the fact that the Board of the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation had not yet reached the 
point of approving the proposed compact with Armenia, after 
reftelcon, the Ambassador sought meetings December 12 with 
high-ranking officials in the Presidential Administration and 
the Government, namely the President's Chief of Staff, 
Artashes Tumanian, and the Minister of Territorial 
Administration, Hovik Abrahamian.  In both cases the goal was 
to make it clear that, although the United States had 
supported the constitutional amendments on substance, we were 
disappointed by the way in which the referendum had been 
carried out, with strong suspicions of vote-rigging and 
fraud, undue pressure on opposition members and inadequate 
follow-up to the allegations of fraud that had come even from 
the Speaker of the National Assembly.  The Ambassador avoided 
suggesting that the MCC decision might be affected by 
perceptions of back-sliding on democracy issues in Armenia, 
but did state that, as a matter of simple fact, the MCC Board 
had not reached its expected decision on December 6th, and 
that the Embassy was still waiting to hear what the decision 
would be.  In the context of the conversations, there is no 
doubt that the Armenian interlocutors made the proper 
connections. 
 
...On the President's Man 
------------------------- 
¶7. (C)  Presidential Chief of Staff Tumanian, who is setting 
up his own political party to contest the 2007 parliamentary 
elections, did not dispute the perception that the referendum 
was less than perfect, but he argued in a rather detached way 
that the opposition was largely to blame because of their 
boycott of the proceedings and withdrawal of their members of 
the electoral commissions shortly before the day of the vote. 
 He seemed surprised when the Ambassador told him that the 
decision not to invite international election observers had 
been taken in the Presidential Administration.  He was also 
surprised to learn that an MCC compact could be called off 
even after having been approved, if the beneficiary country 
failed to maintain the requisite standard of performance as 
judged against independent criteria.  He took the 
Ambassador's point that it would behoove the President and 
others in power to think carefully about the world's 
perceptions of Armenia after the referendum, but did not make 
any specific commitment.  He asked to have details of the US. 
program of intensified measures designed to help Armenia 
achieve free and fair elections in 2007 and 2008, and seemed 
particularly interested in the possibility of obtaining 
training for people in the political party that he is 
planning to establish. 
 
...And on the Probable Vote-Rigger 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C)  Minister of Territorial Administration Hovik 
Abrahamian, by contrast, was much more personally engaged in 
the immediate issue of the referendum and gave a detailed and 
rousing defense of its conduct, repeatedly stressing that 
there was no proof that violations occurred and boasting 
about the organizational and administrative efforts that had 
been made in the provinces (his beat) to educate the voters, 
induce them to turn out, and ensure the measure's victory. 
He was scathing in his criticism of the opposition for 
choosing to boycott the vote and withdraw their election 
commission members.  At the same time, he took aboard the 
Ambassador's message that the referendum "stank" and that it 
would be wise for the Prime Minister (his direct boss) and 
others in the Government to consider what to do to signal 
that Armenia remains on a democratic course.  Abrahamian 
seemed taken aback to learn that no decision had yet been 
made by the MCC Board on the Armenia Compact. Abrahamian 
insisted toward the end of the conversation that the 
elections of 2007 and 2008 would be free and fair, arguing 
that when opposing political parties had a direct interest in 
the voting, the natural tension between them would ensure 
that they would referee each other. 
 
¶9. (C)  COMMENT: In the wake of the referendum, a somewhat 
altered political situation exists in Armenia.  The 
opposition is weakened and demoralized, although key leaders 
remained determined to press on in their fierce rejection of 
Kocharian and all his works.  Former FM (and former AMCIT) 
Raffi Hovhanessian this week addressed twenty-one possibly 
libelous questions to President Kocharian in a letter that 
suggests the depth of passion still attaching to issues in 
the recent history of Armenia, especially the 1999 shoot-out 
in the National Assembly that has never been adequately 
explained. The Administration also has not covered itself in 
glory, and some of its members realize this.  Divisions 
within the ruling three-party coalition are also more visible 
after the referendum than they were, and, as Armenia 
approaches its next regularly-scheduled elections in 2007 
(legislative) and 2008 (presidential), the political 
infighting and maneuvering for position will undoubtedly 
intensify.  We are convinced that our program of measures 
intended to help Armenia attain free and fair elections is 
timely and highly relevant to the fate of democratization in 
Armenia.  We also have learned that the MCC compact, even 
when evoked in only a passing way, has the power to compel 
rapt attention;  this leverage needs to be wielded carefully 
in the months ahead in order to produce optimal results for 
the United States. END COMMENT 
EVANS