This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 004064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IT ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: PRODI SEES CENTER-LEFT LEAD, PLEDGES NO SURPRISES 
ON IRAQ 
 
Classified By: Ambassdor Ronald P. Spogli 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  Center-left leader Romano Prodi December 14 called 
on the Ambassador at the embassy.  The center-left leader 
broke no new ground on domestic or foreign issues and 
appeared to have no obvious agenda with us except to 
establish a dialogue.  In the meeting, which took place at 
his initiative, Prodi was at pains to reassure the Ambassador 
that -- campaign rhetoric notwithstanding -- in the event of 
a center-left victory, he would seek to work closely and 
cooperatively with the USG.  There would be no surprises on 
Iraq and he wanted to be in close contact with the United 
States during the likely two-month intervallum between April 
elections and a new government actually taking office 
sometime in June.  Prodi said he did not wish to be 
over-confident, but estimated that his coalition currently 
had an eight- to ten-point margin in the polls.  He 
criticized Italy's new electoral law as calculated to 
stimulate electoral factionalism and a setback to the 
country's political stability.  A close vote, he said, could 
lead to the center-left controlling the Chamber of Deputies 
and the center-right the Senate.  End summary. 
 
Prodi Sees Eight-Point Electoral Lead 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Center-Left leader Romano Prodi December 14 called on 
the Ambassador at the embassy.  Pol MinCouns and long-time 
Prodi aide Riccardo Levi also attended. 
 
¶3.  (C) Prodi said he did not wish to be over-confident, but 
indications were that his center-left Olive Tree coalition 
currently had an eight- to ten-point lead in public opinion. 
While elections were still several months off, the 
center-left's recent gain of the mayor's office in Messina, 
Sicily was a significant indicator.  Main issues for voters 
were likely to be the economy and, a fairly distant second, 
personal security concerns such as crime.  Prodi expressed 
concern that recent turbulence in Italy's banking sector 
could affect the credibility of the Bank of Italy (a senior 
Banca Populare Italiana executive was arrested this week for 
alleged misdealings, and there has been much controversy and 
press attention to the propriety of the Bank of Italy 
governor's actions in connection with recent domestic bank 
takeover bids). 
 
¶4.  (C) He noted that there was no public financing of 
campaigns and he had no income except pensions as former EC 
commissioner and ex-university president.  However, a 
fund-raising organization had collected about a million Euros 
in contributions, including 200,000 from the US.  He also 
received some fees from political parties to cover expenses 
for some appearances. 
 
Elections in April, New Government in June 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador asked Prodi what political timeline he 
envisioned for the spring.  The center-left leader said 
elections would take place April 9, and the new government, 
parliament, and president of the Republic should all be in 
place roughly two months later, possibly by mid-June.  Local 
elections would take place in late May. 
 
¶6.  (C) Prodi considered the recently passed electoral reform 
measure a major setback for political stability in Italy, 
deliberately crafted by the Berlusconi government to 
encourage factionalism.  He expected a solid majority in the 
lower Chamber of Deputies, but saw a margin of no more than a 
few seats ("if we're lucky") in the Senate.  He added that 
there was a real possibility, in the event of a close 
election, that the Center-Left could end up controlling the 
lower house and the Center-Right the upper one.  Despite his 
misgivings, Prodi was resigned to the electoral reform 
becoming law because he saw no possibility that President 
Ciampi would attempt to challenge it on constitutional 
grounds (although, he maintained, experts from various 
political parties had questioned its constitutionality). 
 
 
Prodi Acknowledges Internal Challenges 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Ambassador asked whether far-left leader Fausto 
Bertanotti was likely to seek a government position in the 
event of a center-left win.   Prodi said this was not the 
issue, Bertanotti had no real interest in a ministry; what he 
wanted was presidency of the Chamber of Deputies.  And it 
would be better, he felt, for Bertanotti to have to function 
in an institutional framework, with accountability, although 
his assumption of such a position could create other 
problems.  Prodi said managing his coalition, and delivering 
its votes reliably, would be a challenge. 
 
¶8.  (C) Asked if he had a specific time in mind to press for 
a referendum on the controversial devolution bill providing 
greater autonomy to Italy's regions, Prodi confirmed he would 
pursue a referendum to overturn the measure but did not 
speculate about the timing. 
 
No Surprises on Iraq, Wants Contact with USG 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) On external relations, Prodi cited the fundamental 
importance to Italy of the trans-Atlantic alliance and the 
European Union.   He acknowledged the need for Italy's 
continued role in the Balkans, and the Middle East, singling 
out the Rafah involvement as a positive example.  He saw Iran 
and Syria as significant problems for the international 
community, but offered no ideas for dealing with them when 
the Ambassador invited comment. 
 
¶10.  (C) On Iraq, the Ambassador observed that there appeared 
to be a growing convergence of views between government and 
opposition.   Whatever the outcome of the Italian elections, 
he said, the USG hoped that Italy would decide its level of 
involvement in Iraq on the basis of conditions on the ground, 
not setting arbitrary dates.  Prodi said there would be no 
surprises, and indicated that, in the event of a center-left 
win, he would want to be in close contact with the United 
States during the likely two-month intervallum between the 
April elections and a new government actually taking office 
in June. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) This meeting took place at Prodi's initiative.  He 
came unaccompanied except by one trusted longtime aide. 
Discussion was entirely in Italian.  The center-left leader 
broke no new ground on domestic or foreign issues and had no 
discernible agenda except to establish the contact.  He was 
at pains to reassure us that -- campaign rhetoric 
notwithstanding -- in the event of a center-left victory, he 
would seek to work closely and cooperatively with the USG, 
including coordination on Iraq and other issues in the two 
months between elections and the seating of a new government. 
 He freely acknowledged he faced tough internal coalition 
management challenges, including a role for Bertinotti, whose 
abrupt withdrawal had prompted the collapse of the last 
center-left government.  After Prodi left, our public affairs 
office began to receive calls from Italian journalists 
seeking to confirm the meeting (which we did, without 
comment).  This suggests he not only wanted to reach out to 
us, but to be seen doing so.  That, in turn, may be part of 
an effort to consolidate the support of the "center" part of 
his center-left coalition.  No surprise there -- because, 
despite Prodi's seeming optimism about an eight- to ten-point 
lead, most of our contacts see this race as tightening up 
considerably and much too early to call at this point.  End 
comment. 
SPOGLI