This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001423 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2015 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM PINS PREL BM NGO
SUBJECT: UNHCR AWAITS APPROVAL TO WORK IN THE SOUTHEAST 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1413 
     ¶B. RANGOON 749 
 
Classified By: Poloff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a December 14 meeting, the UNHCR 
Representative for Burma described the UNHCR's relationship 
with the GOB and UNHCR's access to the southeastern border 
region with Thailand.  The UNHCR has informal support to do 
needs assessments, but still lacks an MOU to officially work 
in the Southeast Region.  Its designated GOB counterpart 
ministry is known for its work relocating ethnic Burmans into 
"model villages" in territories traditionally occupied by 
other ethnic groups.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In Charge's December 14 courtesy visit to the UNHCR 
Representative for Burma, Jean-Francois Durieux described 
UNHCR's relationship and work with the GOB among the Rohingya 
of northern Rakhine State (ref A) and in the Southeast 
Region.  In May the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) informed 
the UNHCR that it should coordinate its work in the Southeast 
Region, which includes Mon and Karen States, with the 
Ministry for Progress of Border Areas, National Races, and 
Development Affairs (NaTaLa) and no longer with MOHA.  The 
UNHCR began working with NaTaLa in September.  Durieux 
described NaTaLa as "reasonably open."  NaTaLa agreed to help 
the UNHCR re-activate its stalled projects in the Southeast 
Region after the MOHA stopped the UNHCR's access there in 
June (ref B).  NaTaLa also agreed that the UNHCR could 
operate its own radio network and allowed the UNHCR to select 
its own local implementing partners.  The arrangements remain 
informal as NaTaLa wants to proceed on a "trial basis."  This 
suits the UNHCR, which has never worked with NaTaLa before, 
as a useful test period. 
 
¶3. (C) Since working with NaTaLa, the UNHCR has not sent 
international staff to the southeast, on the advice of the 
NaTaLa director-general that he could not sell the idea to 
his superiors.  The UNHCR's local staff are "absolutely free" 
to travel in Karen and Mon States, and local people talk 
freely to them, allowing for good data collection, according 
to Durieux.  The UNHCR would like to send mixed groups of 
local and international staff, with government escorts, to 
the southeast, with the eventual goal of unhindered access by 
all staff.  This will not happen until the UNHCR and NaTaLa 
sign an MOU.  NaTaLa told the UNHCR that an MOU cannot be 
signed before February 2006, and UNHCR has informed NaTaLa 
that they must have a signed MOU by mid-2006, at the latest. 
The UNHCR cannot continue to justify use of donor funds, 
absent a MOU and activities.  In the meantime, local UNHCR 
staff have been allowed to carry out needs assessment in 
target communities, giving the UNHCR a presence in the field. 
 
AN NGO BITES THE DUST 
 
¶4. (C) In a related development, Medicins Sans Frontieres - 
France told poloff on December 16 that it informed the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) a week earlier that MSF France will 
terminate its projects in Karen and Mon States and cease its 
operations in Burma in February 2006.  MSF France has been 
waiting since April 2005, when the GOB ordered it to stop 
further fieldwork, to re-activate its activities in the 
Southeast Region.  While the MOH regretted MSF France's 
decision, it admitted to MSF that it lacked the authority to 
permit MSF France to resume its work. 
 
CHOOSE YOUR VOCABULARY CAREFULLY 
 
¶5. (C) Durieux stressed the UNHCR works along the eastern and 
western borders because that is where refugees live.  The 
UNHCR had earlier sought to work in Chin State with Burmese 
who fled to India for refuge.  The GOB denied there was a 
problem, as the Chin did not live in camps, which is the same 
logic they use for Shans in Thailand, calling the Shans 
instead "migrant workers."  To appease the GOB the UNHCR 
refers to the Karen refugees in Thailand as "people of 
Burmese origin who UNHCR can help to return." 
KAREN REFUGEES: RESETTLEMENT OR REPATRIATION? 
¶6. (C) Durieux called the recent agreement by the Royal Thai 
Government (RTG) to allow some Burmese refugees to be 
resettled in third countries as a positive sign, given the 
harsh treatment of refugees by the RTG in the past.  However, 
he warned the Thais could crack down on refugees again, if 
resettlement is seen as a "pull" factor.  The attitude of the 
Karen National Union (KNU) is another important factor.  The 
KNU, which views the refugees as its power base, might be 
reluctant to see them resettled.  While nobody actively 
discusses repatriation of Karen refugees now, Durieux sees a 
possibility of voluntary repatriation sometime in the future. 
 He doubted that the 140,000 refugees in Thai refugee camps 
would all be resettled.  Those remaining behind may think 
seriously about returning; The UNHCR will not support forced 
repatriation. 
 
INTERNAL REFUGEES 
 
¶7. (C) Durieux did not know how many IDPs live along the 
eastern border, but concurred with the Thai-Burma Border 
Consortium's figure of 600,000.  He said, in the past, the 
KNU made people move around, but now he blamed the GOB for 
creating IDPs.  According to Durieux, people moved because 
the Burmese Army has burned down thousands of villages, 
because they are tired of being rounded up for portering, and 
because war destroyed the local economy.  He said most IDPs 
are tired of moving and would prefer just to remain where 
they are, and not be relocated to yet another site.  The 
UNHCR would like to help IDPs cope in their current 
circumstances. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT: Should the UNHCR be permitted to work in the 
Southeast Region -- not a given, as evidenced by MSF France's 
experience in the same region -- it could provide some 
improved protection for the local people.  However, as in 
northern Rakhine State, the UNHCR cannot directly counter 
military repression, just alleviate it somewhat.  NaTaLa 
should also be viewed cautiously.  It has not worked much 
with international organizations.  Instead, it concentrated 
on relocating ethnic Burmans to land vacated by IDPs and 
refugees (often forcibly) and establishing "model villages" 
in traditional ethnic territory.  End Comment. 
VILLAROSA