This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL FR GM PINR EUN
SUBJECT: MFA CABINET ADVISOR ON FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND 
EU BUDGET 
 
REF: PARIS 7787 
 
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
¶1.  Summary:  FM Douste-Blazy's advisor for Franco-German 
relations Heldt and German Ambassador Neubert, speaking about 
German Chancellor Merkel's November 23 inaugural visit to 
France, both predicted continuity in the Franco-German 
relationship while emphasizing more a marriage of reason than 
of passion for the famed EU couple.  French officials are 
reportedly relieved to have found Merkel less "liberal" than 
her reputation, a misperception based largely on the fact 
that she was not "well known" in France.  Douste-Blazy was 
reportedly the first foreign minister to congratulate FM 
Steinmeier following his consultations, and all indications 
are that contacts between the German and French governments 
are continuing apace as before.  Separately, Heldt indicated 
that the MFA was currently "obsessed" with finding a solution 
to the EU budget impasse, without holding out much hope that 
the UK Presidency would succeed in brokering one.  He 
suggested it would be a mistake for PM Blair not to stop in 
France, following his consultations in new member states, in 
advance of the December ministerial and summit meetings.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Pol Deputy met November 30 with Counselor for 
Franco-German relations in FM Douste-Blazy's cabinet and 
German national, Christian Heldt, to explore French reactions 
to German Chancellor Angela Merkel's November 23 visit to 
Paris. German Ambassador Klaus Neubert provided a couple of 
additional insights to Ambassador Stapleton during a December 
1 meeting. 
 
Franco-German relations 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Heldt described Merkel's visit to Paris as correct 
and business-like; there were no fireworks, but nor were 
there any problems.  Given Merkel's cooler, analytical 
nature, it was clear that her relationship with President 
Chirac would never be as "affective" as that of former 
Chancellor Schroeder.  While it thus was clearly no longer 
possible to speak about a Franco-German "axis," the overall 
relationship would be marked by broad continuity, and the 
Franco-German relationship would remain a key one within the 
EU.  Neubert also conveyed, almost offhand, a 
business-as-usual approach in his enumeration of a steady 
stream of high-level officials, from the German Defense 
Minister to the new State Secretary for European affairs, who 
were already making their pilgrimages to Paris.  Citing 
Germany's liberal market philosophy as another example, 
Neubert stated that while France and Germany had always been 
and would always be very different in many of their outlooks, 
this had never prevented them from working closely together. 
 
¶4.  (C) Heldt nonetheless blamed the GOF for some missed 
opportunities, judging that French officials and politicians 
had committed a grave mistake in ignoring the CDU and Merkel 
over the past two years.  Although he had repeatedly argued 
with his colleagues at the Quai that it would be normal for 
French officials to cultivate relationships with promising 
German opposition party politicians early on and on a routine 
basis, his advice had largely been ignored and she was not 
"well known."  The one exception was Interior Minister 
Nicolas Sarkozy, who regularly met with his CDU counterparts 
in his capacity as president of the center-right governing 
party.  (Note:  Merkel did meet with President Chirac, PM de 
Villepin, and Interior Ministry Sarkozy in July when she 
visited France in her capacity as opposition leader.)  Heldt 
said the lack of a longer and deeper acquaintance with 
Merkel, combined with the Schroeder "propaganda machine's" 
success in depicting her as a radical liberal who would flee 
France's embrace for the arms of the UK, had led some French 
officials to expect the worst.  It was highly important that 
Merkel -- reportedly after some discussion of alternatives -- 
finally chose Paris as her first foreign destination to send 
a signal of the continuing viability and importance of the 
Franco-German relationship. 
 
¶5.  (C) Asked about Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier's relationship with his counterpart Philippe 
Douste-Blazy, Heldt responded that the two had gotten off to 
an auspicious beginning.  He related how he (Heldt), using 
his connections in the German MFA, had succeeded in ensuring 
that Douste-Blazy would be the first foreign minister to call 
Steinmeier when the latter assumed his new duties.  Heldt 
proudly announced that, Douste-Blazy had called Steinmeier 
within eight minutes of the end of the press conference that 
followed his confirmation as foreign minister. 
 
EU budget the key current concern 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Heldt volunteered at the outset of the meeting, and 
returned to the point at the end of the meeting, that the 
main "obsession" at the Quai at the moment was to see a 
resolution of the EU budget crisis (see reftel for a fuller 
discussion).  He asserted that failure by the UK to find a 
solution by the December EU summit would put a permanent blot 
on its six-month EU Presidency, given that the opening of 
accession negotiations with Turkey was its only 
accomplishment to date.  He contended that uncertainties 
about PM Blair's authority, with Chancellor Brown waiting in 
the wings, were not all that different from the weakened 
domestic standing attributed to Chirac.  It should not be 
taken for granted that Blair would be able to deliver a 
budget agreement in the end.  Neubert reasoned that paralysis 
in Paris and London, which made both capitals risk-averse to 
any concessions, made a budget agreement unlikely. 
 
¶7.  (C) Pol Deputy asked Heldt if Paris had received word 
that Blair also intended to travel to Paris following his 
consultations among new members, assuming that he thought a 
deal was in the making.  Heldt responded that the Quai 
currently had no information to that effect.  He believed, 
however, that Blair would be making a big mistake if he 
failed to consult "with the major players" in advance of the 
EU summit meeting. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton