This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

201550Z Dec 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001716 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BRUCE NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C.COURVILLE, 
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2015 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KPAO ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND ZANU-PF INSIDER SIMBA MAKONI 
DISCUSS COMING TRANSITION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND ZIMBABWE'S 
FUTURE 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER DELL, REASONS 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) In a December 20 meeting with the Ambassador, ZANU-PF 
Politburo member and former Finance Minister Simba Makoni 
said ZANU-PF had finally acknowledged economic &problems8 
but would not be able to change its disastrous economic 
policies without a change in leadership.  The earliest that 
could come would be 2008, but 2010 was a better bet when both 
presidential and parliamentary elections could be held.  In 
the interval, the economy would continue its freefall. 
Makoni acknowledged that many in the ZANU-PF leadership were 
looking past Mugabe and planning and preparing for the 
post-Mugabe future.  The Ambassador noted that international 
reengagement was the only hope of reviving Zimbabwe,s 
economy and that potential successors would be held 
accountable for their actions and others would be well 
advised to begin reaching out to the West now.  End Summary. 
 
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Economic Problems Take Center Stage ) Even Within ZANU-PF 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Makoni said he had been out of the country and had not 
attended last week,s ZANU-PF party conference but agreed 
with the Ambassador that economics had played a greater role 
than in the past.  (N.B. ZANU-PF has conferences each year 
and congresses, where leadership questions are settled, every 
five years.)  Still, Makoni,s impression of the conference 
was that little had happened beyond the conferences most 
public moments, most of which, such as the ballyhooed 
declaration that Zimbabwe should accept no further UN envoys 
without proper vetting, were empty rhetoric.  However, there 
had been one change of significance, President Mugabe,s 
admission that the country had economic &problems,8 a term 
he had avoided in the past. 
 
¶3. (C) In fact, Makoni said Mugabe had identified eight 
problems, all connected with the agricultural sector, and had 
blamed the &government8 for these problems, conveniently 
ignoring the fact that he was the head of the government. 
However, the President had identified no solutions.  In fact, 
Makoni said the ruling party was bereft of solutions.  It was 
not that the GOZ did not know what to do.  There were still 
many bright and capable people in the country and in the 
government.  The problem was that nothing could be done as 
long as President Mugabe remained in power. 
 
¶4. (C) In the meantime, the economy would continue to 
deteriorate with inflation likely to hit 700 percent 
according to official figures by year,s end and a 1200 
percent by more reliable private assessments.  Moreover, the 
harvest was likely to be a disaster again next year, and 
Makoni speculated that Mugabe was preparing the public for 
the bad news by acknowledging problems now.  The Ambassador 
asked how much longer this could go on before the resources 
the state used to sustain itself dried up.  Makoni 
acknowledged that the ruling party,s patronage system was 
becoming ever more &concentrated8 but contended that as 
long as any meaningful economic activity was on-going, the 
regime would find a way to milk it. 
 
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Prospects For Change ) 2008 At The Earliest 
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¶5. (C) Makoni said he could think of only three ways that the 
regime would change.  The first was a mass uprising.  He 
discounted this possibility, not because the people weren,t 
angry, but because they were focused on trying to survive. 
The second was a military coup.  This also seemed unlikely 
given the loyalty of then senior commanders.  However, 
disaffected middle-ranking officers had launched many 
successful coups, and there were certainly plenty of those as 
pay increases had failed to keep up with inflation and perks 
had been cut.  The third possibility was a change of 
leadership.  This would happen inevitably.  However, the 
longer it took the more the country,s infrastructure would 
deteriorate and the more of the country,s elite would leave 
for South Africa and elsewhere in search of a better life. 
 
¶6. (C) Makoni initially said that in his view a change in 
leadership would not occur before 2008 at the earliest and 
more likely 2010.  The next presidential election was 
scheduled for 2008 and the next parliamentary election for 
¶2010.  The debate within the party, to this point informal, 
was whether to harmonize the two by bringing forward the 
parliamentary election or by delaying the presidential 
elections.  Makoni conceded that Mugabe would ultimately make 
the decision and predicted it was more likely to be 2010, 
allowing Mugabe more time in office to &cement8 his legacy 
as not only the country,s founder but also it,s savior from 
&recolonization8 after 2000.  The Ambassador noted in that 
regard an internal contradiction in Mugabe,s thinking ) the 
longer he stayed in office the longer he delayed real reform 
and ensured that his legacy would be the destruction of the 
country,s once thriving economy. 
 
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Accountability and Would-Be Successors 
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¶7. (C) Makoni agreed with the Ambassador that Mugabe was 
increasingly irrelevant and that many in party were already 
looking beyond him.  Makoni said most of the party elite fell 
into that category.  However, the party rank and file and 
those around the President preferred to defer thinking about 
the future until Mugabe was gone.  That said, succession 
planning was going on in both the Mujuru and Mnangagwa camps 
as well as elsewhere, to which Mugabe was not a party. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted, and Makoni agreed, that whoever 
succeeded Mugabe would have only one place to turn for the 
balance of payments support needed to revive the Zimbabwean 
economy ) the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
and the traditional donors.  Given that reality, the 
Ambassador suggested that it would be in their own interest 
as well as in the interest of Zimbabwe for would-be 
successors to begin reaching out to the West.  Makoni 
acknowledged this would be wise but said most, if not all, 
senior GOZ officials, among whom he did not include himself, 
would be reticent about meeting Western ambassadors and other 
interlocutors for such a discussion, fearing how it would be 
interpreted within the party. 
 
¶9. (C) That said, Makoni argued that there was a generic 
assumption in the party that Mugabe,s successor would not be 
as wedded to the past or to Mugabe,s ideology and rhetoric. 
The world would therefore be more welcoming and Zimbabwe less 
hostile and on that basis there could be reengagement.  The 
Ambassador responded that this might be right but it was not 
a given that Mugabe,s successor would be someone acceptable 
to the West.  Didymus Mutasa, for instance, would not be seen 
as credible reformer and there would even be doubts about 
Joyce Mujuru.  It was important that the senior leaders in 
the government understood that the West would hold them 
accountable for their actions.  It was equally important to 
find a way for quiet dialogue about the post-Mugabe system if 
a chaotic, possibly bloody, transition were to be avoided. 
Makoni agreed but lamented that most of ZANU's leaders were 
too fearful to engage in any such process. 
 
¶10. (C) Makoni acknowledged that ZANU-PF would need to seek a 
leader who could both appeal to the Zimbabwean people and to 
the outside world.  However, the right question was not who 
that person might be but how they would be chosen.  Makoni 
said the party,s current process was murky and could lead to 
chaos.  The Ambassador said this was almost certainly by 
design.  Many authoritarian leaders preferred not to 
designate a clear successor in order to reinforce their 
control.  Makoni conceded the point and lamented once more 
the likelihood of chaos should Mugabe die before designating 
a successor. 
 
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Comment 
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¶11. (C) Despite his disavowals, Makoni is an influential 
ZANU-PF insider whose star is likely to shine brighter as 
Mugabe,s dims.  He is widely considered to part of the 
Mujuru faction,s senior leadership and in that guise could 
emerge in a senior position in a post-Mugabe government.  He 
has even been mentioned as a potential successor to Mugabe 
himself.  What Makoni brings to the table is credibility with 
the West, which no other current ZANU-PF leader can claim. 
He would likely be a pivotal figure in the party,s 
inevitable efforts to reengage the international community 
and the IFIs.  He was therefore an ideal interlocutor through 
whom to pass to other ZANU-PF leaders the message that we 
know they will eventually have to seek the West's support to 
begin digging out of the hole they have dug for themselves 
and that we will necessarily condition our reengagement on 
real political and economic reform. 
 
 
 
DELL