VZCZCXRO5752
RR RUEHLZ
DE RUEHSK #1422/01 3271049
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231049Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3370
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0277
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0767
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 001422 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS USTR FOR ALLGEIER AND DWOSKIN 
EB/OT FOR CRAFT 
USDOC FOR ITA/JACOBS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD WTRO PGOV USTR BO
SUBJECT: MFA Begs for WTO Help 
 
Refs: (A) Minsk 1159, (B) Geneva 2599, (C) Minsk 1393, (D) Minsk 
 
1383, (E) Minsk 1355 
 
MINSK 00001422  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: One week after publicly lambasting the U.S. for 
"blocking" Belarus' WTO application for political reasons, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Mikhnevich summoned Ambassador to complain about 
the USG position and ask for assistance in moving forward. 
Ambassador replied it was the GOB, not USG, that politicized this 
issue, and that Belarus has had many opportunities in the past to 
make progress on its application.  The USG has always been clear in 
its requests for information, while the Embassy's experience has 
been that the GOB is often dismissive of requests for data. 
Mikhnevich closed by asking to meet the U.S. delegation in Hong 
Kong to reach agreement on tariffs.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On November 21, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Mikhnevich 
called Ambassador to the MFA to complain about the U.S. blocking 
Belarus from joining the WTO.  Also present were Anton Kudasov, 
Deputy Director of the MFA's Directorate of Foreign Trade, and 
Pavel Pustovoy, of the MFA's Americas desk. 
 
 
"U.S. Not Ready For Belarusian WTO Membership" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (U) Mikhnevich opened by explaining the GOB has the impression 
the United States is trying to block Belarus' WTO bid.  He cited 
three "facts" proving this: 1) the GOB invited the U.S. to conduct 
bilateral talks on membership, but the U.S. refused; 2) Belarus 
needs an initial draft WP report, but the U.S. is blocking; and 3) 
twelve countries have told the GOB that Belarus is ready for 
membership, but the U.S. says it is too early.  Moreover, 
Mikhnevich claimed the GOB has already answered "500" questions, 
yet the U.S. and EU keep giving more questions.  Now the GOB is 
being asked to explain the Golden Share (ref D) and customs 
confiscations (ref E), even though the GOB "has already given all 
these facts."  Mikhnevich did concede that Belarus does violate WTO 
rules and international norms with confiscations, but said the GOB 
is ready to "explain this practice in an intelligent manner." 
 
¶4. (U) Mikhnevich lamented that the GOB does not know why the U.S. 
is causing such problems.  He stressed GOB officials are ready to 
discuss with their American counterparts in any format or venue, 
and that Belarus simply wants it clearly spelled out what the GOB 
must do next.  Mikhnevich complained that, unfortunately, the USG 
has politicized Belarus' WTO application. 
 
 
Who Politicized the WTO? 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (U) Ambassador responded that it was the GOB, not the USG, that 
politicized this issue.  He reminded that Mikhnevich himself held a 
press conference on November 11 denouncing the American position 
(ref C), and that President Lukashenko publicly accused the U.S. of 
blocking Belarus' WTO accession for political reasons on November 
¶17.  The GOB is blaming the USG for its own unwillingness to give 
the requested information.  On the contrary, the USG stands ready 
to work with the GOB on the WTO, as long as the GOB is prepared to 
make real steps forward.  Ambassador stressed there is no political 
element, the USG is only concerned about economic and trade issues. 
However, joining the WTO is not a game of poker, so the GOB should 
not think it can bluff or bluster its way into the organization. 
Ambassador stated that instead of political posturing, the GOB can 
either make concrete steps or withdraw its application.  The USG 
cannot understand how the GOB does not know what to do next, since 
we have told the GOB many times over what is needed.  He noted that 
Belarus has been a difficult WTO applicant, and U.S. negotiators 
cannot devote so much attention to a country that is unwilling to 
give basic information. 
 
 
"Can the Embassy be a Neutral Party?" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) In reply, Mikhnevich asked if the Ambassador could serve as 
a "neutral party" and review the answers the GOB has provided to 
judge whether Belarus has supplied enough information.  Ambassador 
retorted that the Embassy has asked several times for information 
 
MINSK 00001422  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
on the use of the Golden Share and confiscations, only to be 
brushed off.  "If that is how you answer in Geneva, it is no wonder 
Belarus has problems." 
 
¶7. (U) Mikhnevich then maintained that "countries with ten times 
more trade with us than America" have no problem with Belarus' 
application.  All the neighbors are happy with Belarus' trade 
policies, including Poland, who would support the GOB if it did not 
have to follow the EU position.  [Comment: diplomats from all 
neighboring countries have complained to Econoff about Belarus' 
economic and trade policies many times.]  Kudasov interjected that 
the Golden Share and confiscation may impact the investment 
climate, but have nothing to do with the WTO.  He claimed no other 
country had to answer such questions. 
 
 
What Next? 
---------- 
 
¶8. (U) Kudasov explained the GOB is closely watching Russia's WTO 
negotiations.  He stated Russia and Belarus have "virtually 
identical" tariff regulations, therefore it can be expected the 
U.S. will have the same requirements of both Russia and Belarus. 
Anything else would be a sign of double standards.  Mikhnevich, by 
this time heavily chain smoking, asked for a clear road map of what 
needs to be done.  He exclaimed, "Even if you say Belarus is not a 
market economy and cannot join, we can accept that."  Mikhnevich 
also complained that every time Belarus answers a question, new 
questions appear.  He argued an initial draft WP report would show 
the GOB what it needs to do next. 
 
¶9. (U) Kudasov asked if Belarus' delegation, headed by Mikhnevich, 
could meet the U.S. delegation in Hong Kong to solve the tariff 
question.  He wants the USG to commit to demanding the same 
requirements from Belarus as it does from Russia.  If the U.S. 
delegation refuses to do so, it will prove the U.S. applies double 
standards.  Kudasov asked for a POC at the Embassy to pass answers 
to, as it takes much longer to give information via Geneva. 
Kudasov also stated that Russia meets with the USG on WTO monthly, 
so Belarus would like the same treatment.  Ambassador replied that 
above all the GOB should remain professional and avoid emotional 
political statements that only complicate the situation. 
 
¶10. (U) Ambassador advised Mikhnevich that if he wanted to meet the 
U.S. delegation on the margins of Hong Kong he should make a formal 
request and also provide some material on the subject to prepare 
the U.S. delegation and also to convince them that such a meeting 
would not be a repetition of previous meetings in which the GOB has 
nothing new to offer.  The U.S. is not interested in empty talk or 
political posturing over WTO, only concrete, professional 
discussions on trade issues.  That has been and will remain the 
U.S. position.  It is up to the GOB to respond, not the U.S., 
Ambassador observed.  Ambassador suggested perhaps the Belarusian 
Embassy's Trade Counselor could discuss the situation with USTR in 
Washington before proposing a Hong Kong meeting. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The GOB seems eager to cast the blame onto others for its 
own failure to meet basic WTO requirements.  After years of failing 
to cooperate, the GOB now demands exceptional treatment from the 
U.S.  Why Mikhnevich wants to meet the U.S. delegation in Hong 
Kong, after he so clearly did not want to cooperate in Geneva, may 
be due to the pressure he is under from the Presidential 
Administration to achieve WTO accession ASAP.  We suspect 
Mikhnevich knows full well Belarus cannot accede without making 
necessary reforms.  But he also knows his government cannot commit 
to reforms that would undermine the state's control over the 
economy.  To get itself out of this predicament, the MFA has 
resorted to the blame game, as well as attempting to give the 
impression of active discussions with the U.S.  Regardless, GOB 
trade policy currently seems to be constrained by the political 
orientation of the Lukashenko regime.  Lukashenko wants Belarus to 
be part of the club of more economically developed countries (WTO), 
but not at the expense of loss of state control over the economy. 
 
 
KROL