This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003657 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR MOPS KPKO ET ER EE BORDER UNSC
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BORDER: UNMEE FEARS MORE 
RESTRICTIONS, PEACE-KEEPERS' WITHDRAWAL 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 3624 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CHARGE VICKI HUDDLESTON.  REASON: 1.4 (B, D). 
 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: UNMEE officials told Charge on October 20 
that they fear the Eritrean Government will continue to 
impose new restrictions on its operations in order to 
increase pressure on the international community to force 
Ethiopian compliance with the EEBC border decision.  UNMEE 
warned of the possible withdrawal of Jordanian and Indian 
peace-keepers -- the bulk of UNMEE personnel -- if increasing 
restrictions further weaken their ability to defend 
themselves or evacuate.  While UNMEE military advisors still 
characterize the military posture of both sides as 
"defensive," they point out that the forced redeployment of 
UNMEE observers following the GSE's ban on helicopter 
operations has left gaps of up to 600 km between UNMEE 
posts.  Deputy SRSG Azouz Ennifar asked whether the USG could 
provide detailed satellite imagery to fill the new gaps in 
UNMEE's ability to physically monitor the border.  Ennifar 
(strictly protect) told the Charge privately that the UNMEE 
may be consolidating too rapidly in response to the Eritrean 
flight ban.  Ennifar urged that the U.S. act urgently to 
"cool down" the Eritrean Government and "push" the Ethiopian 
Government on EEBC implementation.  He reiterated his hope 
that the U.S. will move quickly to appoint an envoy and 
launch a sustained diplomatic initiative on the border. Post 
believe that a US envoy -- with previous experience and 
garvitas -- is needed to calm the situation before it spins 
up into a new conflict and to get both governments agreement 
to border demarcation. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Charge, Pol/Econ Counselor and Poloff called on United 
Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Deputy 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (DSRSG) 
AMB. Azouz Ennifar on October 20 to receive a detailed 
briefing on the recent redeployment of UNMEE personnel 
(reftel) in the wake of Eritrea's Oct. 4 ban on helicopter 
flights.  Ennifar was joined by UNMEE Senior Political 
Affairs Officer Dr. Abdul-Kader Haraiche and Chief Military 
Liaison Officer Col. Jarmo Helenius. 
 
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INDIA AND JORDAN CONSIDERING WITHDRAWAL FROM UNMEE 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3. (C) DSRSG Ennifar said the UN had not received any 
response from the Eritrean Government (GSE) to an October 18 
letter from UNSYG Annan to President Isaias, which expressed 
concern about the "major impact" the GSE's flight ban and 
other restrictions had on UNMEE operations.  UNMEE political 
advisor, Dr. Haraiche said that such restrictions were 
"disabling"  and were likely to increase as the GSE sought to 
force the international community to enforce the 2002 
decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). 
He noted that observing the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) 
from the Ethiopian side of the border would still require 
coordination with the GSE to avoid aerial patrols from being 
shot down.  Col. Helenius noted that UNMEE lacks the 
capability to monitor the TSZ via unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), and asked if the USG could assist with collection of 
information via satellite or other means. 
 
¶4. (C) For the last two to three weeks, Ennifar said, UNMEE 
peace-keepers faced daily violations of the right to freedom 
of movement, but had not fallen victim to any violent acts. 
Nevertheless, he added, concern about the safety of 
peace-keepers had prompted Jordanian and Indian permreps to 
observe during October 19 UNSC consultations in New York that 
they were both considering withdrawal of their forces. 
Ennifar noted that the potential withdrawal of Jordanian and 
Indian contingents would cripple UNMEE, as they constitute 
more than two-thirds (India: 1,000; Jordan: 1,300) of UNMEE's 
current force strength of 3,292. 
 
¶5. (C) UNMEE currently assesses that the deployment of 
Eritrean and Ethiopian forces is "not offensive in posture." 
Ennifar added, however, that there was "no doubt" of some 
military buildup by Eritrea; he confirmed Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi's October 19 assertion to the media that 
additional Eritrean militia had entered the Temporary 
Security Zone (TSZ), explaining that Eritrean troops often 
changed uniforms and returned disguised as militia members. 
Eritrea had also begun calling up reservists earlier this 
year.  Dr. Haraiche noted that additional reinforcement of 
Ethiopian troops at the border was also possible in the near 
future. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
MORE THAN HALF OF BORDER AREA GOES UNOBSERVED 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Col. Helenius underscored that with the GSE's 
restrictions and UNMEE's October 17 decision to vacate 18 of 
40 observation posts (reftel), UNMEE faced significant gaps 
along the 1,100km border: including a 600km "blind spot" in 
UNMEE's central sector to Bada, and two 100km gaps in the 
western and eastern sectors.  Ground troops could infiltrate 
through these gaps, he said, but difficult terrain would 
impede the movement of tracked vehicles.  He hypothesized 
that any offensive by Eritrean forces would likely occur 
along the same four avenues of approach used during previous 
hostilities: along the north-south Barentu corridor; along 
the main road from Asmara to Addis Ababa; from the port of 
Assab to Ethiopia; and along the western border with Sudan. 
 
--------------------------- 
APPEAL FOR USG INTERVENTION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) DSRSG Ennifar asked whether, in the absence of aerial 
patrols that previously accounted for most of UNMEE's 
monitoring, the USG could provide satellite imagery to help 
UNMEE monitor the border.  Better equipment and capabilities 
could reduce UNMEE's costs, he added, as UNMEE's force 
strength (which was already being downsized) could be reduced 
even further.  He also noted that leased helicopters 
currently cost UNMEE $15 million annually. 
 
¶8. (C) Ennifar underscored the need for action by the 
international community, and particularly the United States, 
to forestall future conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
He added that no action had been taken to address the impasse 
since the 2002 EEBC decision. He asked if we had any further 
information on the planned appointment of a U.S. envoy.  We 
responded that we were hopeful but had no further 
information. 
 
¶9. (S) Ennifar (strictly protect) told the Charge privately 
that the UN may be overreacting to force protection concerns 
in the wake of the flight ban, in order to force the UNSC to 
engage on the border issue.  He appealed for UNSC action to 
press the GSE to reverse its restrictions on UNMEE, and 
advocated the appointment of a U.S. envoy to the region, 
noting that some observers considered the "weak" reaction of 
the United States to Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE 
tantamount to "giving a blank check to Asmara."  Ennifar 
called for urgent action to "cool down" Eritrea and press 
Ethiopia, so that the political process could start again. 
Noting that disputed areas awarded by the EEBC to Ethiopia 
were largely uninhabitable desert, Ennifar recommended 
providing Ethiopia with a package of economic incentives: 
such as guaranteed access to the port of Assab, as well as 
World Bank assistance to resuscitate Assab's port operations 
for the joint benefit of Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
 
¶10. (C) Dr. Haraiche observed that while the EEBC declared 
that its decision would be "final and binding," thereby 
giving no provision for discussion, article 416 of the 2000 
Algiers peace agreement specifies that the UN can use its 
good offices to facilitate consultations between the parties 
on implementation. 
 
¶11. (SBU) UNMEE officials noted the lack of any mechanism 
bringing together Ethiopian and Eritrean representatives, 
other than the Military Coordination Commission (MCC) headed 
by UNMEE's force commander, most recently convened two weeks 
ago in Nairobi.  UNMEE has proposed that the next meeting 
occur in Nairobi on November 18, as both parties refuse to 
meet in either Addis Ababa or Asmara, citing concerns for the 
safety of their delegations. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT: The GSE's current restrictions on UNMEE, as 
well as the threat that troop-contributing countries may 
withdraw contingents, jeopardizing UNMEE's effectiveness as 
well as setting the stage for a spinning up of tensions on 
both sides of the border that could result in unintended 
consequences.  This is the ideal time for the USG to name an 
envoy -- with clout -- who could first calm the roiled waters 
and then began the process of resolving the border 
demarcation dispute.   END COMMENT. 
HUDDLESTON