This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001108 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/B; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR PHUM CM BM
SUBJECT: A CHINESE FLY-ON-THE-WALL VIEW OF THE BURMESE 
REGIME 
 
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  A courtesy call on the departing Chinese 
Ambassador to Burma, who has the greatest access among the 
diplomatic corps to senior GOB officials, gave us unique 
insight into the mind set of the regime's top generals. 
Although his views reveal little common ground between China 
and the United States on the most effective approach to the 
Burmese regime, he acknowledged that many of the SPDC's 
current practices do not guarantee long-term stability, a 
major concern for China's interests in Burma.  The Chinese 
Ambassador agreed with us that the generals need to pursue, 
rather than evade, dialogue with the international community 
and he committed to raising this notion during his remaining 
farewell calls with senior officials.  End Summary. 
 
THE MISUNDERSTOOD GENERALS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Charge, joined by P/E Chief and visiting EAP/MLS 
Director, made a September 21 courtesy call on departing 
Chinese Ambassador to Burma, Li Jinjun.  Li, who noted that 
the Charge is the third U.S. chief of mission that he has met 
while in Burma, is in the final weeks of a tour that has 
lasted over four and a half years.  He has traveled widely 
throughout Burma during his tenure and has gained greater 
access to top SPDC generals and GOB officials than any other 
diplomat in Rangoon. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Li said that few people, "even in China," 
understand the mentality of the Burmese generals or make any 
real effort to get to know the country.  Most people, he 
said, expect the SPDC to behave like other military regimes 
which have seized power.  The SPDC, however, is unique in 
that the top generals did not undertake a coup (in 1988) to 
gain short-term wealth, but rather to shift away from (former 
dictator General Ne Win's 26 years of) authoritarian rule to 
a leadership based on "strategic thinking and interest in 
political and economic reform." 
 
INTEREST GROUPS 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The SPDC generals, according to Li, sit at the top of 
"the country's largest interest group," the armed forces and 
its many members and dependents.  "We can't look only at the 
senior generals," said Li, "because the decisions of SPDC 
Chairman Than Shwe effect not only the (12-member junta), but 
also several million Burmese who have tied their fate to the 
regime."  The generals, he added, want to "find a way out" 
and transfer power to an elected government, but they must 
protect their commercial interests, meet the needs of the 
entire armed forces community, and gain assurances there will 
be no retribution against those who now rule. 
 
¶5. (C) The Charge said that while some people benefit from 
the regime and its rule, it is a small fraction of the 50 
million Burmese who have suffered from a steadily declining 
standard of living.  She noted that in order to prepare for 
an eventual transition, the Burmese people need education, 
access to health care, and basic infrastructure.  The regime 
has denied such services to the vast majority of the 
population as a means of perpetuating, not ending, military 
rule. 
 
17 YEARS AND COUNTING - JUST THE SHORT TERM 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Li disagreed with outside observers who reject the 
SPDC's road map to democracy.  He related that Than Shwe has 
told him in private that military rule is only planned for 
the short term and that the SPDC sees a need to return to 
civilian rule, "but not so abruptly that chaos forces the 
military to return quickly to power."  Li added his personal 
perspective that there is no difference between the 
objectives of Than Shwe and ousted Prime Minister General 
Khin Nyunt, "they just had different tactics."  As an 
example, Li said that the SPDC did not reject Khin Nyunt's 
road map, but actually speeded up implementation following 
his October 2004 "resignation." 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Li asserted that Than Shwe is "very aware 
of the big picture" and much stronger than Khin Nyunt ever 
was.  "Never look down on, or underestimate the Senior 
General," advised Li, "it is impossible to isolate him and 
pressure him to change."  Li added that the West believed, 
incorrectly, that external pressure had been a factor in 
convincing the SPDC to relinquish the 2006 ASEAN Chair. 
"This was actually a victory for Than Shwe," he asserted, 
"hosting ASEAN would have required that the generals make 
some changes to accommodate the international community." 
 
HAVE GUNS, WILL TALK 
-------------------- 
¶8. (C) In addressing the role of the democratic opposition, 
Li said that the regime does not allow the participation of 
Aung San Suu Kyi in the road map process "because her 
influence with the ethnic groups is significant and would 
retard the GOB's progress."  Furthermore, he said, the SPDC 
must contend with the ethnics because "they have weapons, and 
ASSK does not."  Li added that he previously had "indirect" 
contact with ASSK, but denied her 2002 request for a dialogue 
"because this would have upset the SPDC."  Li said he 
suggested that ASSK put her proposals in a letter to Than 
Shwe in order to build trust, "but instead she regrettably 
went on a nationwide tour and encouraged her supporters to 
provoke the regime." 
 
¶9. (C) Li said it was a just a matter of time ("not if, but 
when") before the generals resolve relations with the ethnics 
and turn their attention back to ASSK and her party, the 
National League for Democracy (NLD).  "The generals will let 
ASSK participate in the final steps of the road map," said 
Li, "but for now she represents the minority, and the 
majority is responsible for finishing the constitution."  He 
added that the responsibility for poor relations between the 
GOB and the NLD lies not only with Than Shwe, but also with 
ASSK.  "She is a good statesman," said Li, "but she's not 
God; the NLD needs to be a 'cooperative opposition' and they 
can't be one under a leader who is out of touch and under the 
influence of the West." 
 
¶10. (C) The Charge countered Li's notion that the SPDC places 
a priority on dealing with the ethnics because they are armed 
and the NLD is not.  "The generals fear the democratic 
opposition because they fear ideas and those who advocate 
change," she said, pointing out that the SPDC's greatest 
surprise since assuming power has been the widespread 
popularity of ASSK and those who advocate for democracy.  She 
added that it was disingenuous to blame ASSK for poor 
relations, "since she is in detention and denied any role 
whatsoever; it is the military that has denied her access to 
information." 
 
LOOKING FOR SOME LOVE 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The U.S. media, according to Li, has a fundamental 
misunderstanding of China's interests in Burma.  "It is 
wrong," he said, "to assume that one-party China wants to 
perpetuate military rule in Burma."  He offered that China 
places a priority on stability, given its long border with 
Burma.  "Without interfering, we want a peaceful environment 
and Beijing will maintain the same good relations we have now 
with a future democratic Burma."  The Charge responded that 
the U.S. and China can agree that Burma needs stability, "but 
China should be concerned that the regime's tactics and 
policies are leading to greater poverty and instability." 
Stability requires a government that is representative of all 
the people. 
 
¶12. (C) The Charge continued that the generals claim Burma is 
"misunderstood," but they refuse to see most diplomats and to 
engage with the international community.  She encouraged 
Ambassador Li to use his high-level access to press the 
generals to open up.  Li agreed to do so, but added, "To be 
frank, whenever the regime opens up, the United States and 
the EU respond with sanctions."  Li said after May 2003 Than 
Shwe held his hand and asked "Why do they sanction me - I 
have no villas and no foreign bank accounts, and yet they 
idolize a female (ASSK) who has done nothing for the country?" 
 
¶13. (C) The Charge replied that the last round of U.S. 
sanctions, under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, was 
imposed in response to the May 2003 violent attack on ASSK 
and her convoy, "hardly an effort by the regime to open a 
dialogue."  She added that it was wrong, and unproductive, 
for the Burmese regime to target ASSK.  "She represents the 
hopes and desires of the majority of the people," the Charge 
said, "and the generals should see that it is in their best 
interests to work with her, and not against her." 
 
¶14. (C)  Bio Note:  Ambassador Li rarely socializes with the 
diplomatic community, perhaps because he has much better 
access and so does not feel compelled to discuss the latest 
rumors with other diplomats.  He speaks at great length about 
his European expertise, particularly in Germany where he 
studied at Heidelberg University in the mid-1970s.  Burma was 
his first SE Asian experience, and he goes to Manila next. 
While he understands a bit of English, he heavily relies on 
an interpreter.  He is married and his wife is officially 
based in Beijing, where she is involved in prison 
administration.  End Bio Note. 
 
COMMENT: THE STATUS QUO 
----------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Ambassador Li, and presumably the Chinese government, 
accepts the Burmese military's desire to hold on to power. 
He also understands, however, that in closing ranks to 
protect their own positions the generals cannot succeed in 
the long term.  Ambassador Li acknowledged the irony of his 
recognition that Burma needed to become more democratic. 
Perhaps he figures that a gradual opening, a la China, would 
enable the military to maintain control and provide 
stability.  Unfortunately, the Burmese regime is not 
providing improved standards of living to garner any public 
support and Ambassador Li did not dispute the fact that 
economic conditions are deteriorating for most Burmese.  So 
it appears that his confidence that the military leaders will 
continue to hold on to power rests on their having the 
weapons, which China, among others, continues to supply.  End 
Comment. 
Villarosa