This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 RABAT 002004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
For R U/S Hughes from Ambassador 
Also for NEA, NEA/PPD, NEA MAG, and IIP/G/NEA/SA 
 
 
E.0.12958:N/A 
TAGS: KPAO SCUL OIIP PGOV KMPI CVIS ECON MO
SUBJECT: Favorable Views of U.S. surge upward in Arab/Muslim 
Morocco.  What Went Right? 
 
Ref: 2004 Rabat 2171 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  The Pew Global Attitudes Project survey published in 
July 2005 recorded a startling 22-point increase in 
favorable attitudes toward the United States among 
Moroccans. 49 percent of Moroccans held favorable views of 
the U.S., compared to only 27 percent in each of the two 
prior years.  Morocco had the most favorable views of the 
U.S. of any predominantly Muslim country, and is the only 
such country in the Pew study where favorable views of the 
U.S. outnumber unfavorable views (49 percent favorable 
versus 45 percent unfavorable).  In the 18-34 age group, a 
majority of Moroccans-53 percent-reported positive views of 
the U.S.  The percentage of Moroccans viewing the U.S. 
favorably was greater than that in traditional U.S. allies 
including France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. 
 
¶2.  Although the Embassy views such survey results with 
healthy skepticism, even if the reality is less dramatic 
than the survey suggests, a combination of factors in 
Morocco appears to be having a positive impact on public 
attitudes toward the U.S.  The Embassy has analyzed Moroccan 
views of the U.S. (including via the use of focus groups in 
the year prior to the 2005 survey) to try to better identify 
factors that may be having a positive impact. 
 
¶3.  Our conclusion is that some improvement may have 
resulted from external events, and that domestic improvement 
most likely resulted not only from public diplomacy efforts 
per se, but from a multi-faceted government and non- 
government engagement with Morocco that has de-emphasized 
policy differences between Morocco and the U.S. and 
projected our countries as equal partners, in trade, in 
promoting democracy, in military relations, and in direct 
interaction between cities and individuals.  Outreach 
efforts buttressed by a media plan to bring the Ambassador 
and Mission personnel in direct contact with Moroccans 
throughout the country may also have played a role. 
 
¶4.  We also believe that cultural engagement with Morocco, 
aimed at a youth audience that appreciates American people 
and their way of life, has been an important, positive 
factor.  Radio Sawa, the number one station in Morocco, 
appears to be having a major impact.  Rapid, visible 
American response to humanitarian disasters has also helped. 
U.S. engagement in conflict resolution may also have a 
positive impact subsequent to the survey; U.S. facilitation 
of the release of the 404 remaining Moroccan prisoners of 
war held by the Polisario has generated an outpouring of 
goodwill toward the U.S. 
 
¶5.  Based on this review, the Embassy in the coming year 
will: 
 
--expand cultural diplomacy and outreach to youth through 
American performing artists, including via participation in 
cultural festivals and sports exchanges; 
 
--support public and private U.S.-Morocco partnership, 
especially via the Chicago-Casablanca sister city program 
and similar private initiatives, the Peace Corps, support 
for Moroccan democratic reforms, and by publicly aligning 
the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account with Morocco's Human 
Development Initiative; 
 
--continue extensive nationwide public outreach via travel 
of the Ambassador and other Mission personnel, establishing 
at least four American corners, opening an American Presence 
Post in Marrakech, and regular programming in Dar America; 
 
--provide diplomatic support for the continued operation and 
expansion of Radio Sawa; 
 
--persist in providing and publicizing U.S. humanitarian 
relief via military and other programs; 
 
--keep listening to and learning from those whom we are 
trying to reach. 
 
¶6.  The most important support we could receive from the 
Department to achieve these goals would be additional staff 
(two additional officers for our public diplomacy section to 
support American Corners, media outreach, and expanded 
cultural programming, and an officer to staff an American 
Presence Post), and expanded funding for cultural exchanges, 
especially to bring more American performing artists and 
other cultural envoys to Morocco. 
 
End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
What Happened and Did It Really? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  A Pew Global Attitudes Report published on July 14, 2005 
provided startling news:  Favorable views of the United 
States among Moroccan citizens, according to the report, had 
surged upward by 22 points during the previous 12 months. 
Whereas only 27 percent of Moroccans had viewed the U.S. 
favorably in the March 2004 and May 2003 Pew surveys, 49 
percent of Moroccans surveyed held a favorable view of the 
U.S. in the survey conducted in June 2005. 
 
¶8.  A closer look at the number brought more welcome news. 
Favorable views of the U.S. outnumbered unfavorable views, 
49 percent to 44 percent, the only predominantly Muslim 
country where that is the case.  Moreover, favorable views 
of the U.S. were strongest among the young.  Among the 18-34 
age group, a majority (53 percent) viewed the U.S. 
favorably.  Among Moroccans age 35 and older, 45 percent 
viewed the U.S. favorably.  Favorable views of Morocco were 
proportionately greater than in countries traditionally 
allied with the U.S. including France, Germany, Spain and 
the Netherlands. 
 
¶9.  Those who live in the desert learn to suspect that any 
vision of an oasis may be a mirage.  In this vein, our 
Mission must assess the survey with healthy skepticism and 
careful acknowledgement of what we know and do not know 
about the results.  The Pew Global Attitudes Project is 
conducted and published by a nonpartisan research 
organization in the U.S., and is co-chaired by former 
Secretary Madeline Albright and former U.S. Senator John C. 
 
SIPDIS 
Danforth.  Data collection in Morocco was carried out by the 
Pan Arab Research Center, which conducted face to face 
interviews with adults 18 years and older from June 6 to 16 
¶2005. 
¶10.  The 1000 survey respondents were disproportionately 
drawn from urban areas, and the study reports a margin of 
error of three percent.  We do not know whether the result 
is sustainable, what the trend line looks like, whether it 
is currently moving up or down, whether the result 
represented a "spike," or what factors specifically 
influenced the views of the respondents.  But we do think it 
is credible that attitudes toward the US are softening, and 
that our own efforts to reach and connect with a broader 
cross-section on non-elites are having positive results. 
 
------------------ 
First, We Listened 
------------------ 
 
¶11.  Embassy Rabat first took notice of the Pew survey in 
March 2004, when the survey found not only that Moroccans 
held strongly negative views of the United States, but more 
troubling, that a strong majority of Moroccans opposed the 
U.S. led war on terror, and that 45 percent held favorable 
views of Osama bin Laden.  The findings did not square with 
our observations of Moroccans-especially young people-coming 
together in the aftermath of the Casablanca terrorist 
bombings to oppose terrorism, a commitment brought to life 
by a nationwide "Don't Touch My Country" campaign carried 
out by a youth group network with support from the Moroccan 
government. 
 
¶12.  To better understand the 2004 results, the Embassy 
commissioned two focus groups to further explore Moroccan 
attitudes toward the U.S. and terrorism (reftel).  One group 
was composed of young, poor and poorly educated men age 18- 
25 from slum districts-a demographic deliberately designed 
to resemble that of the young people who carried out the 
Casablanca terrorist bombings.  A second group was drawn 
from the middle and upper-middle income classes and had high 
school or higher levels of education.  The local office of 
the National Democratic Institute conducted the focus groups 
in Rabat in May 2004.  The participants had contact only 
with Moroccan interviewers, and had no knowledge of U.S. 
sponsorship of the study. 
 
¶13.  Via these focus groups, the Embassy learned that even 
poorly educated urban Moroccans had some knowledge of U.S. 
foreign policy, although they tended to ascribe negative 
motives to U.S. goals.  The focus group study also confirmed 
what has been stated elsewhere-that like their counterparts 
throughout the Arab world, young Moroccan men strongly 
disapproved of U.S. policy and action in the Middle East, 
but admired the American people and their way of life. 
Focus group participants strongly condemned terrorism, and 
viewed poverty, ignorance and lack of education as factors 
that rendered young Moroccans susceptible to recruitment by 
extremists.  The focus group participants linked the U.S. to 
violent acts directed against Palestinians. 
 
¶14.  Moroccans' positive views of U.S. lifestyle and 
economic opportunity are also reflected in the record number 
of Moroccans who have won the annual diversity visa lottery, 
with 3083 winners in 2003 and 5069 in 2004. 347,000 
Moroccans applied for the diversity visa lottery in 2004 and 
443,000 have applied in 2005. For many young Moroccans who 
would have responded to the Pew poll, the U.S. symbolizes 
hope for a better life.  In fact, one of the focus group 
participants told us, "Everyone dreams of winning the (visa) 
lottery to go to the U.S." 
 
----------------------- 
Accentuate the Positive 
----------------------- 
 
¶15.  The Embassy country team used the Pew survey and focus 
group findings as the basis for a September 2004 off-site 
review of public diplomacy objectives.  Our conclusion was 
to recognize but minimize in terms of public diplomacy the 
concentration on our differences concerning policy in the 
Middle East, and to try to capitalize upon those facets of 
American life that Moroccans admired, emphasizing cultural 
and educational engagement with non-elite, especially young 
Moroccans. By emphasizing what Moroccans like about U.S. 
society (educational opportunity, pop culture, sports, youth 
exchange programs, economic opportunity), we hoped to 
nurture positive impressions.  The Embassy adopted an 
increase in favorable views of the U.S. as a performance 
measure in our Mission Program Plan. 
 
¶16.  To our knowledge, there have been no formal studies on 
market penetration for radio and television audiences in 
Morocco.  It is generally recognized among media contacts 
that most Moroccans get their information first from the 
radio, followed by television and print media. Satellite 
dishes are widely used in Morocco, and the Government does 
not impede reception of foreign broadcasts.  The most 
watched and respected news media are almost certainly Al- 
Jazeera and Al-Arabiyah. No reliable statistics on print 
media readership available, but newspapers and magazines are 
believed to reach a very small percentage of the total 
population, in part due to extremely high illiteracy rates. 
 
--------------------------- 
Showing Up - With Reporters 
--------------------------- 
 
¶17.  During the period in which favorable attitudes toward 
the U.S. increased, the Mission conducted two major nation- 
wide outreach efforts, in addition to travel and public 
diplomacy conducted by the Ambassador and mission officers 
throughout the year. 
 
¶18.  The first such effort occurred in August 2004, when the 
Ambassador took advantage of the traditional August lull in 
Rabat to travel to remote areas of Morocco.  Over a period 
of four weeks, the Ambassador and other Mission officers 
traveled to the cities of Oujda, Nador, Al Hoceima, 
Marrakech, Agadir and remote rural areas to emphasize U.S. 
partnership with Morocco.  Visiting Peace Corps sites, AID 
projects, local government officials and civic and business 
organizations, the outreach visits visibly demonstrated U.S. 
interest in Morocco beyond Rabat and Casablanca. 
 
¶19.  A media plan was developed for each visit, and 
reporters from national media were invited and assisted to 
come along on the trips, resulting in extensive and 
favorable national media coverage.  Interviews for local 
reporters were also arranged at each stop.  Anecdotal 
feedback highlighted Moroccans' appreciation for the 
Ambassador's interest in what was happening throughout the 
country.  Visits to many other locations continued 
throughout the year. 
¶20.  By a large margin, the topic that resulted in the most 
news coverage during the twelve-month period was the U.S.- 
Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA).  There had been a steady 
significant stream of negative press coverage leading up to 
and immediately following the conclusion of negotiations in 
March 2004, with the media focused on the risks to Morocco 
posed by the agreement. However, the tide turned decisively 
toward positive coverage of what both countries stood to 
gain from the agreement after the Embassy launched a major 
outreach program, the "FTA Caravan," in September 2004. 
 
¶21.  The caravan was a road show in which the Ambassador, 
Embassy officers, experts from the U.S., and Moroccan 
government officials participated.  Caravan participants 
interacted directly with students, businesspeople and 
workers throughout Morocco, and generated 76 positive news 
articles on the FTA, as well as significant nightly 
television coverage of caravan events.  In a series of 
cities throughout Morocco, the group held business round 
tables, met with students and journalists, toured factory 
floors, answered questions and distributed information 
packages in French and Arabic to explain the benefits of the 
agreement. By providing seats on the bus to a national 
television crew and a journalist from the Moroccan national 
news agency, the Embassy ensured daily media coverage of 
this six-day information blitz. 
 
---------------------------- 
Partnership, Not Paternalism 
---------------------------- 
 
¶22.  Formal public diplomacy activities were only one 
portion of what may have influenced an increase in favorable 
attitudes toward the U.S.  In fact, Mission public affairs 
functions experienced significant staffing gaps during the 
year, and some projects, including Mission plans to launch 
American Corners in Morocco, progressed more slowly than 
desired.  Instead, opinions of the U.S. appear to have been 
influenced through a broad range of factors with a unifying 
theme: partnership. 
 
¶23.  The Free Trade Agreement negotiation illustrated this 
theme as did other initiatives: American-Moroccan co- 
chairmanship of the first Forum for the Future, the U.S. 
decision to designate Morocco as a Major Non-NATO Ally, and 
the restoration of the Peace Corps program. 
 
¶24.  After the FTA, The Forum for the Future was the second 
most heavily reported U.S. related news story during the 
twelve-month period.  Although initial media reaction to 
prematurely leaked U.S. proposals for supporting democratic 
reform in the region were very negative, of 44 news items 
the Embassy collected by the time of the Forum itself, a 
large majority were generally positive.  Embassy believes 
this result was due in part to media outreach by the 
Ambassador and other Embassy officers, and the Moroccan 
government. 
 
¶25.  The Major Non-NATO Ally designation was reinforced in 
the media by positive coverage of Moroccan participation in 
large scale U.S. and NATO naval exercises, and by coverage 
of U.S. military humanitarian assistance projects throughout 
the country. 
 
¶26.  Another vital partnership initiative has been the 
resumption of the Peace Corps program in Morocco, one of 
only two such programs in the Middle East/North Africa 
region. After a security-driven suspension prior to the Iraq 
War, the Peace Corps was restored its full program of more 
than 140 volunteers in rural areas of Morocco.  Although the 
Mission does not publicize volunteers' locations or specific 
activities, the work of the Peace Corps is well known by 
word of mouth, and the impact is nearly universally 
favorable. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Private Partnership and Sister Cities 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  The single most successful non-Federal government 
activity projecting Morocco and the U.S. as equal partners 
with common interests has been the Chicago-Casablanca sister 
city program, which received crucial support from the 
Mission and appears to be among the most successful sister- 
city relationships in the world. 
 
¶26.  Private sector resources were used to bring a variety 
of organizations and individuals from the two cities closer 
together through professional, educational and cultural 
exchanges. High schools in both cities were paired, 
professionals in the areas of urban planning and medicine 
traded expertise, Chicago brought American basketball 
trainers to Morocco, and elected officials, students and 
academics traded visits with the goal of sharing solutions 
for common problems. Under Sister City auspices, Chicago 
opticians provided eye examination clinics and eyeglasses 
for Casablanca's poor. 
 
¶27.  Moroccan television and print media coverage of the 
Chicago-Casablanca sister cities program has been abundant 
and consistently positive. One particular program that 
sparked high media interest and saw both flags flying over 
the signing ceremony in Casablanca's main square was "CASA- 
BASKET" a ten-year basketball training program co-sponsored 
by the U.S. sports organization "One on One Basketball," and 
launched in December 2004. Each year CASA-BASKET will teach 
basketball to 900 children from Casablanca's poorest 
neighborhoods. 
 
¶28.  Moroccan print press sports pages, probably the most- 
read pages of any newspaper by young Moroccan males, carried 
photos of the program launch for several days following the 
signing. Similarly, Chicago's South Shore Drill Team gave 
seven performances to an estimated 60,000 Moroccans in three 
cities, and "jammed" with young Moroccans from Casablanca's 
impoverished neighborhood schools. 
 
¶29.  The activities of private American charities operating 
in Morocco, such as Operation Smile and Bridge to Morocco, 
appeared regularly in the Moroccan media in 2004.  A State 
Department-assisted private sector effort that was widely 
praised by the Moroccan press, civil society associations 
and individual beneficiaries was the Wheelchair Foundation, 
which donated over 600 wheelchairs for poor Moroccans 
between July 2004 and July 2005. 
 
¶30.  American generosity was an antidote to damaging stories 
that appeared in the Moroccan press 2004/2005, such as the 
Abu Ghraib prison scandal.  Editorial comment in Moroccan 
media, particularly print media, noted that the sort of 
humanitarian activity exemplified by the Wheelchair 
Foundation provided an image of America completely different 
from the perceived negative images related to Iraq. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Impact of Radio Sawa and Al Hurra Television 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶31.  For many reasons, including a high illiteracy rate, 
most Moroccans get their information from radio and 
television.  Radio Sawa, launched in Morocco in August 2003, 
rapidly became the most popular radio station in Morocco. 
According to the latest ACNielsen surveys, 53% of 15-29 year 
old Moroccans in the broadcast area tune in every week.  59% 
of Radio Sawa listeners said that its news was reliable, and 
74% said Radio Sawa was one of their top news sources. Many 
Moroccan news articles, and Mission employees, have noted 
Radio Sawa's omnipresence in Moroccan taxis and cafes. 
 
¶32.  Contributing to the rise in Radio Sawa's popularity in 
Morocco during the twelve-month period was Sawa's expansion 
during 2004.  Under an agreement with the Moroccan 
government, the International Board of Broadcasters 
installed transmitters in five new cities between April and 
August 2004, for a total of seven transmitters throughout 
Morocco. In addition, Radio Sawa introduced a Morocco- 
specific stream with news reports and "Sawa Chat" comments 
in the Moroccan dialect. 
 
¶33.  The attraction of American pop music that Radio Sawa 
broadcasts and the use of "neutral" vocabulary in its Arabic 
language news broadcasts may be making headway in changing 
perceptions of the U.S. among its many Moroccan listeners. 
The broadcast sector in Morocco is undergoing 
liberalization.  There are currently only three other radio 
stations.  The test of Radio Sawa's staying power may be its 
market-share after other stations, including European 
competitors, begin broadcasting, which is likely to occur in 
early 2006. 
 
¶34.  While most Moroccans prefer to watch satellite 
television for entertainment, and Al Jazeera in particular 
for 24/7 Arabic news coverage, the Alhurra satellite network 
funded by the U.S. Congress has made some headway since 
beginning broadcasting in 2004. In the latest ACNielsen 
survey, 27% of adults (over age 15) surveyed said they 
watched Alhurra at least once a week, and 70% of those said 
its news is reliable. 
 
---------------------------- 
Rapid U.S. Disaster Response 
---------------------------- 
 
¶34.  Although they prefer to watch satellite television 
stations, Moroccan viewers still tune in to the two state- 
run television stations for local and national news. 
Embassy Rabat was featured on both stations and in the print 
media in a positive light for U.S. rapid response to two 
humanitarian crises in Morocco: the Al Hoceima earthquake 
and the locust invasion.  The earthquake occurred before the 
twelve-month period under review, but the Embassy's timely 
humanitarian response (ahead of almost any other country, 
including the EU) was well remembered and highlighted by the 
Ambassador's follow-up visit to Al Hoceima in August 2004 
(and again in July 2005) where he and his wife were given 
extensive media coverage working alongside a group of 
American volunteers rebuilding damaged homes.  In addition, 
the U.S. was the only country to contribute on a bilateral 
basis to combating last year's locust infestation, garnering 
wide, favorable media coverage. 
 
---------------------------- 
Expanding Cultural Diplomacy 
 
---------------------------- 
 
¶35.  -- 
MMission Morocco has an unusual public diplomacy asset that 
undoubtedly contributed to Moroccans' favorable views of the 
U.S.: "Dar America" in Casablanca, one of the last remaining 
U.S. cultural centers in the Arab world. Dar America 
continues to attract more than 20,000 students every year to 
its many activities. The October 2003 Report by the Advisory 
Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (the 
"Djerejian Report"), whose members visited Morocco in August 
2003, including the Casablanca slums that produced the 
suicide bombers, singled Dar America out for its 
contribution to public diplomacy, and called for expanded 
use of cultural diplomacy to influence attitudes toward the 
United States. 
 
 
¶36. It is impossible to know whether U.S. Embassy/Dar 
America youth programs actually touched directly any of 
those surveyed by Pew in 2004.  However, among other steps 
taken consistent with the Advisory Group's recommendations, 
the Embassy doubled the number of Moroccans sent on exchange 
programs (including International Visitor, Voluntary 
Visitor, MEPI Youth Leadership, P4L programs and other 
educational/press exchange programs), and expanded in 2003 
and 2004 participation in Foreign Press Center-sponsored 
press reporting tours to the U.S. 
 
 
 
¶37. In addition to continuing diverse cultural programming 
in 2004/05, including a well-received Jazz Ambassador's 
program, the Embassy added several highly successful 
cultural events targeting a younger audience that may have 
had some influence on young Moroccans' perceptions of the 
U.S.  For example, in March 2004, one of New York City's 
finest modern dance troupes, the Battery Dance Company 
(BDC), performed twice to packed theaters in Rabat and 
Casablanca, winding up the Rabat show with several dozen 
Moroccan teens joining the BDC dancers on stage for a 
spontaneous hip-hop performance. The Embassy estimates that 
the trendy artists directly reached 2,700 Moroccans through 
their live performances and 13 dance workshops. Extensive 
television coverage of the performances amplified this 
program's positive effects on an estimated television 
audience of up to 30 million viewers.  The dance company 
received 18 favorable newspaper articles. 
 
¶38.  As part of our effort to expand cultural diplomacy, we 
targeted Moroccan cultural festivals that garner 
particularly good media coverage.  More importantly, 
participation of U.S. artists in cultural festivals 
throughout the country, like the travel of Mission officials 
to remote areas, conveys U.S. respect for Moroccan culture. 
U.S. performing artists-some U.S. government sponsored and 
some not-participated in cultural festivals in Rabat, 
Casablanca, Asilah, Fez, and Marrakech during 2004. 
 
¶39.  Country-Folk duo Bob and Tucker Livingston, who played 
at the 2004 Asilah cultural festival and a youth festival in 
Mohammedia, reached an audience of 60,000 in Mohammedia, 
north of Casablanca, in August 2004. In February 2005, the 
Basketball Cultural Envoys reached approximately 2,250 young 
sports fans and generated a spike in positive media coverage 
for the Mission.  The May 2005 Embassy-sponsored "I Love Hip 
Hop in Morocco" tour directly reached an estimated 36,000 
young Moroccans via performances in three cities and also 
received extraordinarily upbeat media coverage.  A privately 
organized American Christian rock festival in Marrakech in 
May 2005 drew an estimated 100,000 concert goers over three 
days. 
 
----------------- 
Help From Friends 
----------------- 
 
¶40.  Less easy to measure, or even define, are 
characteristics particular to Morocco that could be shaping 
attitudes toward the U.S.  Easily the most influential 
individual in Morocco is the popular reform-minded King 
Mohammed VI, who has guided the country toward economic, 
political and social liberalization since inheriting the 
throne in 1999.  Through his public statements, the King has 
contributed to the general view that government-to- 
government bilateral relations with the U.S.-including the 
King's visit to the White House in July 2004--are excellent 
and the "trickle down" effect of this view, regularly 
projected by state-run television and print media, cannot be 
discounted. According to some Embassy contacts, the U.S. is 
perceived as "behind" the democratic reforms in Morocco 
because the U.S. government, from President Bush down, has 
lauded them frequently, and U.S. support for democratic 
reform is perceived as having a positive influence on 
Morocco's future. 
 
------------- 
The Way Ahead 
------------- 
 
¶41.  Over the coming year, the Embassy will continue efforts 
to identify strategies that build upon the strengths of the 
U.S. image in Morocco, and direct resources to support those 
strategies.  We will continue to actively target youth with 
programs that emphasize what Moroccans most like about the 
U.S.  This means utilizing American performing artists to 
expand cultural diplomacy (especially through U.S. 
participation in Moroccan cultural festivals).  It also 
means seeking opportunities to highlight U.S. partnership 
with Morocco via the Chicago-Casablanca sister city program, 
the Peace Corps, public outreach by the Ambassador and other 
Mission personnel, the establishment of at least four 
American corners, and the opening of an American Presence 
Post in Marrakech as forecast in our Mission Program Plan. 
 
¶42.  The dramatic and highly publicized August release of 
the remaining Moroccan 404 Prisoners of War held by the 
Polisario in July generated extensive favorable coverage of 
the U.S. role in facilitating the release.  The event 
prompted spontaneous phone calls and letters of appreciation 
to the Embassy, and may have been among the most significant 
public diplomacy accomplishments of the Mission in years. 
 
¶43.  Morocco's eligibility for Millennium Challenge Account 
funding will provide another opportunity to focus on 
partnership, especially as the Moroccan government seeks to 
align the Millennium Challenge Account with King Mohammed's 
Human Development Initiative. 
 
¶44.  As Morocco's broadcast sector undergoes liberalization, 
the Embassy will continue to provide diplomatic support for 
the operation of Radio Sawa, to ensure the station's 
continued viability and support its market expansion. 
 
¶45.  Department support to sustain the apparent improvement 
in favorable attitudes toward the United States is critical. 
In post's estimation, the most important resources that 
Washington could provide are people.  The Mission has been 
severely understaffed for the past two years, partly as a 
result of Department need for personnel in places like 
Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq.  For extended periods, public 
staffing country wide has hovered near 50 percent.  To 
maintain and sustain favorable attitudes toward the United 
States, the resource we most need is reinforced Mission 
staffing.  Our highest priorities in this regard would be 
two additional officers for public diplomacy to support 
media operations, expanded cultural programming, and 
implementation of American corners.  In addition, a 
generalist officer to staff an American Presence Post in 
Marrakech is needed.  The position the Mission had 
previously identified for this function has instead been 
required on a nearly full time basis to manage programs to 
support reforms in Morocco and the Broader Middle East and 
North Africa region, including MEPI and other regional 
initiatives. 
 
¶46.  Finally, and most importantly, as we move ahead we will 
continue to listen and learn.  The Ambassador and Mission 
officers will continue to engage in dialogue with Moroccans 
throughout the country, highlight these efforts by engaging 
the participation of the media, and demonstrate U.S. concern 
and interest in the process.  The Embassy intends to conduct 
additional focus groups to try to better understand what 
influences Moroccan views of the United States.  We believe 
that by obtaining and acting upon this knowledge, we will be 
better able to support U.S. national objectives.  Riley