This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001349 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV GG EZ PREL RS
SUBJECT: CZECH ARMS TRANSFERS TO GEORGIA:  PRACTICAL STEPS 
TO AVOID LICENSING DELAYS AND DENIALS 
 
REF: A. IIR 6 824 0046 05 
 
     ¶B. PRAGUE 1004 
     ¶C. IIR 6 824 0037 05 
 
Classified By: Political-Military Officer Brian Greaney for reasons 1.4 
 (b) and (d) 
 
1) (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 8. 
 
2) (C) Summary: In light of both the large volume of Czech 
ammunition being transferred to Georgia under USG-directed 
programs, and subsequent Russian complaints about these 
transfers, the Czech government will be taking a closer look 
at future license applications.  The Czechs support efforts 
to bolster Georgian capabilities, but are concerned about 
potential instability in the region as well as the potential 
impact on Russian relations with the CR and NATO.  The GOCR 
believes any public discussion on this matter is unhelpful, 
and asked that the United States refrain from raising the 
profile of these transfers. The Czechs plan to conduct an 
analysis of the appropriateness of arms transfers to Georgia 
in the near future. USG information sharing with the Czechs 
may be the key to ensuring their continued cooperation. U.S. 
Embassy Prague has assisted on these cases in the past. We 
believe early information-sharing with the Czechs on USG 
plans to procure Czech arms for transfer to Georgia may 
reduce the risk of Czech delays or license refusals in the 
future. Contact information for Embassy Prague on this issue 
is provided in para 8. End summary. 
 
3) (C) ADCM and Pol-Mil Off September 14 discussed U.S. 
transfers of Czech arms/ammunition to Georgia with Acting 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Martin Povejsil and CFSP 
Director Petr Kaiser. The discussion stemmed from GOCR 
concerns over possible transfers as part of EUCOM's ongoing 
Sustainment and Stabilization Operations Program. Povejsil 
noted the Russian MFA's 13 Sept public objection to such 
transfers which received widespread press coverage, but 
stressed that GOCR concerns stemmed primarily from their own 
requirement to assess the impact of arms exports.  Commenting 
on the Russian protests (first voiced in diplomatic channels 
in June, ref B), Povejsil said Tbilisi-Washington-Prague 
information exchange could be a "useful forum" to approach 
the challenges presented by Moscow's protests. He believed 
earlier notification of U.S. plans to procure Czech arms for 
Georgia would help both Prague and Washington manage the 
delicate political environment surrounding the issue. 
 
4) (C) Povejsil said he was determined that all Czech arms 
exports strictly follow the rules of the Czech licensing 
system. The MFA's role, he said, is to advise on the foreign 
policy implications of potential transfers, with the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade actually issuing the license. To that 
end, the MFA plans to undertake an analysis of the 
implications of transfers of Czech arms to Georgia in the 
context of overall stability in the Caucasus, as well as the 
Czech-Russian relationship and also the EU-Russia and 
NATO-Russia relationships. Povejsil insisted that the Czechs 
fully supported the interests of the democratically-elected 
Georgian government in building a more capable military. 
However, the Czech MFA would also have to ensure that Czech 
arms being sent to Georgia would not increase regional or 
internal instability. Future export license requests would 
have to be accompanied by detailed information on the 
destination, storage, and intended purpose of the material. 
Any requests to procure ammunition merely to build Georgian 
ammunition reserves would not meet this threshold. 
 
5) (C) Moving to the Czech internal situation, Povejsil said 
publicity about Czech arms exports to Georgia would be 
harmful to the process. The average Czech could wonder why 
Czech arms should be sent to an unstable area.  Povejsil 
observed that unhelpful public complaints from Russia on the 
issue had not/not been preceded by consultations at the 
working level (i.e., no diplomatic exchanges since ref B). He 
did not believe this to be a coincidence, but did not 
elaborate on possible GOR motivation. Povejsil asked that the 
United States refrain from raising the public profile of the 
transfers. 
 
6) (C) Kaiser, who heads the MFA's arms-licensing unit, 
reiterated that early warning of U.S. intentions to procure 
Czech arms for Georgia would help avoid problems. He also 
believed that exchange of specific information on the needs 
of the Georgian military could facilitate better Czech 
decisions on arms exports and alleviate Czech concerns about 
possible destabilizing influences of Czech arms in Georgia. 
 
7) (C) Comment: The Czechs, while committed to ensuring a 
responsible arms export licensing process, have their own 
financial motivations for sending arms to Georgia, even if it 
means risking Russian disapproval. We know that a Czech 
company applied for a license for a major sale of arms to 
Georgia earlier this year (REF A). However, the GOCR remains 
cautious, and working-level staffers have begun to predict 
that licensing for USG transfers of arms to Georgia including 
those under SSOP, might not be approved, even in the case of 
applications currently at the MFA. If the U.S. is to continue 
to assist in the development of Georgia's military 
capabilities over Russian objections there are two immediate 
steps we can take to make this process easier vis a vis the 
Czechs: 1) Tell the Czechs earlier in the planning process. 
2) Try to avoid a public debate with Russia on the issue. As 
we have done in the past, Embassy Prague is working on 
addressing Czech concerns about SSOP transfers to Georgia 
that are already in the Czech licensing application process. 
The volume of Russian complaints has now risen to a point 
where the Czechs are concerned about Czech-Russian and 
Czech-NATO relations. Post looks forward to working with 
Embassy Tbilisi and EUCOM as the Czechs review their policy 
on arms-transfers to Georgia. Effective information sharing 
on our objectives in the region may be the key to ensuring 
continued cooperation from the GOCR. 
 
8) (C) Often Embassy Prague's first notification of a U.S. 
procurement of Czech arms comes from the Czech MFA when they 
have problems with a deal. This is also the case for 
transfers that do not involve Georgia. Embassy Prague would 
like to help ensure USG procurements of Czech military items 
are not refused by the Czech Government. Our ability to help 
depends on being made aware of planned transfers. Once the 
normal U.S. approval process for procurements is completed 
and implementation is being planned, implementers are welcome 
to send information to Pol-Mil Officer Brian Greaney, either 
classified e-mail: GreaneyBE@State.sgov.gov, unclassified 
e-mail: GreaneyBE@State.gov, or fax number ( 420) 257 532 
¶717. We will use this information to help address MFA 
concerns about each transfer. In order to overcome the MFA's 
standard questions, such information should include full 
itemization of the material to be procured, the purpose for 
which the material is being procured, details of secure 
storage for the items in the destination countries, and 
copies of any applicable LOAs and End User Certificates. This 
will be necessary even if the USG has hired a private 
contractor to procure the items on its behalf.  Failure to 
provide this information in advance will usually result in 
licensing delays within the GOCR as they query Embassy 
Prague. GOCR refusal of licenses is a definite possibility in 
some politically sensitive cases. We would like to help avoid 
that outcome. End comment 
CABANISS