This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 006915 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KNNP IN IR PK BG INDO PAK
SUBJECT: INDIAN DEPUTY NSA UPBEAT ON PAKISTAN, HESITANT ON 
IRAN 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 6804 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 6840 
     ¶C. STATE 163143 
     ¶D. NEW DELHI 6842 
     ¶E. NEW DELHI 5382 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Deputy NSA VK Nambiar told A/DCM and Poloff 
on September 7 that he was optimistic the Indo-Pak peace 
process would continue to make slow progress, and looked 
forward to PM Manmohan Singh's meeting with President 
Musharraf during the UNGA summit.  Nambiar highlighted 
instability in Bangladesh as a growing worry to Indian 
leaders, but was unbriefed on Foreign Minister Natwar Singh's 
recent visit to Tehran.  End Summary. 
 
Hoping Iran Crisis Blows Over 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) New Delhi does not yet have a clear idea of the 
direction that Tehran's new regime will take, Nambiar and NSC 
Joint Secretary Arvind Gupta told us.  There are sufficient 
historical precedents and ongoing projects in the Indo-Iran 
relationship to continue in a generally positive direction, 
but as of now the GOI does not know what Tehran's 
expectations of the relationship are.  The new regime appears 
to have increased interest in proceeding with the proposed 
gas pipeline across Pakistan, Gupta reported. 
 
¶3.  (C) Iran has not made any new approach to India on the 
nuclear issue, Nambiar said, admitting that he has not yet 
seen the report on the FM's September 3-4 Tehran visit. 
However, he observed, the GOI thinks Iran is gradually laying 
the groundwork to make requests of India for support in the 
IAEA.  Tehran puts a lot of weight on India's "standing" in 
the IAEA and the nuclear question, as well as its traditional 
good relations.  Gupta speculated that Iran is counting on 
China and Russia to avert sanctions, but wants to get India 
in its camp as well.  Nambiar promised to convey to us any 
insights New Delhi might gain on the Iranian regime's plans. 
Nambiar and Gupta gave the impression that New Delhi is 
hoping that a diplomatic solution will appear among all the 
interested parties, without India having to make any hard 
choices (Ref A). 
 
¶4.  (C) New Delhi has not approached Tehran with any offer to 
"bridge the gap" between the West and Iran, Nambiar stated, 
and Tehran has not contacted the GOI in this regard.  Indian 
media reports emphasizing New Delhi's "independent" policy 
toward Iran (vice US-aligned) are mostly for domestic 
consumption, Nambiar postulated, but the FM may be trying to 
send a message to Iran that India could be a go-between if 
needed.  Additionally, the media "spin" of PM Singh's July 
Washington Post interview in which he admitted to financial 
uncertainties in the pipeline proposal increased the pressure 
on FM Natwar Singh to demonstrate that India was not acting 
on Washington's bidding.  A/DCM went over our recent demarche 
on Iran's nuclear activities (Refs B and C), echoing the 
Ambassador's point that an Iranian WMD capability could be a 
menace to India.  Nambiar agreed with this point more 
forcefully than his MEA counterparts. 
 
Optimistic Progress on Indo-Pak and Kashmir 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Foreign Secretary Saran's September 1-2 Islamabad 
visit was a helpful preparation for the PM-Musharraf meeting 
planned for the UNGA margins in New York, Nambiar said.  The 
September 5 PM dialogue with Hurriyat leaders (Ref D) also 
has given the GOI confidence in the ability to make parallel 
progress in Indo-Pak peace and Kashmir peace discussions. 
However, Nambiar cautioned, progress will have to be matched 
by a sense that cross-border infiltration and training camp 
activity has actually stopped, before New Delhi will believe 
that the Indo-Pak process has reached a new stage.  The 
Indo-Pak peace dialogue progresses incrementally through 
these meetings, Nambiar observed, speculating there could be 
some significant new step forward at New York. 
 
¶6.  (C) The next events following New York will be an Indian 
FM visit to Islamabad in November, Nambiar said, as well as 
the planned November SAARC summit.  (Note: Nambiar's mention 
is the first we have heard of a November date for the FM 
meeting.  The FS Joint Statement last week gave October 3-5 
as the date.  End Note)  With all the "markers" laid out in 
the form of high-level bilateral interactions and meetings 
with J&K groups, the incremental progress should continue, he 
opined.  The GOI would like to believe that progress is 
sustainable, and sees evidence of that on the surface, but 
still receives indications from intelligence and other 
sources that Pakistan is continuing to export terrorism to 
India.  However, Nambiar added, the PM's optimistic outlook 
forces the Indian intelligence community to make a persuasive 
case for any negative views, giving Singh credibility when he 
raises those concerns with Musharraf. 
 
¶7.  (C) A/DCM pressed on the need for us to be clear about 
the metrics we use to determine whether the GOP is clamping 
down effectively on terrorism.  Nambiar agreed that a renewal 
of India-US contacts to pass GOI data on continued training 
camp activity and infiltration, including coordinates, would 
be helpful in informing USG analysis of Pakistan's actions. 
 
Bangladesh: Rising Concern 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The August 18 blasts in Bangladesh were "genuinely 
worrying," Nambiar said, stressing the GOI's surprise that it 
had no advance notice from intelligence sources of an 
operation so widespread.  New Delhi is still uncertain of the 
"essential purpose" of the blasts, he said, pointing out that 
India had believed that the Islamic parties led by 
Jamat-e-Islami (JEI) wanted to take an electoral path to 
power, whereas the bomb blasts indicated an attack on the 
ruling BNP and the democratic process.  If the blasts were in 
fact targeting the BNP's power, this would indicate a "far 
more extreme" Jama'atul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) than 
previously assumed, and one that was out of JEI's control. 
The severance of ties between the BNP and Islamist groups 
might lead to increased instability and could endanger the 
continuation of democratic government in Dhaka, Nambiar 
worried.  He was, nonetheless, hopeful that the SAARC summit 
would proceed as planned. 
 
Comment: Upbeat on Pakistan 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Nambiar's optimistic outlook on Indo-Pak relations is 
a welcome change from the gloom of early summer amid rising 
concerns of terrorist attacks (Ref E), and indicates that FS 
Saran's Islamabad visit and the Hurriyat talks must have gone 
well.  We expect that the Manmohan Singh-Musharraf meet in 
New York will result in additional small, but tangible, steps 
forward in the peace process. 
 
¶10.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http//www.state.sgov/p/sa/newdelhi) 
MULFORD