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Viewing cable 05KINGSTON2144, BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: PRE-LICENSE END-USE CHECK ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05KINGSTON2144 2005-09-13 21:42 2011-05-26 11:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kingston
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS KINGSTON 002144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAR (BENT) 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/DTCC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC JM
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: PRE-LICENSE END-USE CHECK ON 
APPLICATION 05-969107 
 
REF: STATE 144361 
 
1. (SBU) On August 22, Poloff spoke with Senior 
Superintendent XXX of the Jamaica Constabulary 
Force (JCF).  XXX explained that the JCF is currently 
participating in a training course led by London-based Task 
International (http://www.task-int.com).  The technical 
training includes segments on hostage rescue, public order, 
and other policing activities, including sniper training. 
Twelve people will receive the sniper training: six teams, 
each with one sniper and one spotter.  Fairclough added that 
the JCF was advised by Task International to purchase six 
sniper rifles, which would be used in the training course. 
He said that the weapons will not be used by untrained 
officers.  Fairclough said he was grateful for Poloff's call 
and invited Embassy personnel to observe the training, if 
desired. 
 
2. (SBU) One August 31, Poloff spoke with Mark Waller, 
Political Affairs Officer at the British High Commission in 
Kingston.  Waller said that the High Commission was aware of 
but was not funding the police training by U.K. contractor 
Task International.  He said that the JCF originally sought 
to import sniper rifles from the U.K., but London refused the 
request based on consolidated EU and national arms export 
licensing criteria.  Specifically, their concerns included 
what they deemed to be the JCF's insufficient accountability 
measures, weapons handling procedures, maintenance schedules, 
and poor human rights record.  In addition, London reported 
that the JCF had not yet decided where the weapons would be 
stored, and that the exported weapons "might be diverted to 
an undesirable end user." 
 
3. (SBU) Post recommends deferring the approval of this 
export application until the JCF's anti-kidnap unit is 
operational.  To date, the unit has been formed but is in its 
very early stages.  Post also recommends that approval be 
deferred until the JCF can establish definitively where the 
weapons will be stored and whether any accountability 
measures have been implemeted in perparation for the arrival 
of these weapons. 
TURNER