This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ET ELEC UNREST
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: CUD'S BERHANU ON OCT. 2 DEMONSTRATION, 
POSSIBLE STRIKE 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3276 
 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 3382 
     ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 3250 
 
Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  CUD leader and Addis mayor-elect Berhanu 
Nega told Charge Sept. 26 that if the GOE denies permission 
for the demonstration the opposition has called for Oct. 2, 
the CUD and UEDF plan to stand down, but instead call an 
immediate general strike in which people would stay at home. 
Charge urged that the CUD comply fully with any GOE decision 
to prohibit the demonstration in order to avoid bloodshed. 
Berhanu argued that the ruling coalition will only reverse 
its steady backsliding on democracy under concerted popular 
pressure.  The CUD leader reiterated that the opposition was 
unlikely to take its seats in parliament unless government 
harassment ceased and the GOE agreed to a dialogue concerning 
the country's democratic institutions prior to the seating of 
Parliament.  Charge said that the opposition had much to lose 
and little to gain by boycotting parliament.  Berhanu 
criticized the lack of international pressure on the GOE 
concerning harassment and human rights violations, and 
expressed skepticism that PM Meles would really engage in 
dialogue once the opposition had entered parliament.  Berhanu 
appears to be looking for alternatives to confrontation, but 
has yet to find sufficient political cover to appease his 
constituencies. GOE appears to be hardening its position as a 
scheduled meeting between Mayor Arkebe and Berhanu to review 
plans for turning over City Hall was canceled shortly after 
the Opposition request permission to demonstrate in Maskel 
Square and in 30 other towns around the country on October 2. 
 If the Opposition calls off the demonstration or it is 
relatively peaceful the difficult process toward seating 
Parliament will continue.  Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Berhanu Nega called on the Charge Sept. 26 to discuss 
political tensions in the run-up to the opposition's planned 
demonstrations on Oct. 2.  Berhanu formerly served as the 
vice president of the opposition Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD), but recently stepped down from his formal 
party office in preparation for taking over as mayor of Addis 
Ababa.  Septel discusses the CUD's reconstitution as a 
unified political party.  Berhanu attended the meeting alone, 
and was less combative and more cordial than on previous 
occasions (ref. A).  ADCM, USAID Director and Pol/Econ Chief 
accompanied Amb. Huddleston. 
 
If Demonstration is Nixed, Opposition Will Call General Strike 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Charge asked Berhanu for a status report on opposition 
plans for a large demonstration on Oct. 2.  She reiterated 
USG concerns about the potential for violence, and asked what 
the opposition would do if, as expected, the Addis city 
government turned down their request for a demonstration 
permit.  Berhanu confirmed that the CUD had requested permits 
that afternoon (Sept. 26) not just in Addis, but in some 30 
locations throughout the country.  He confirmed that the 
Addis demonstration was planned for the capital's large 
central plaza, Meskal Square, and would not march elsewhere. 
Berhanu questioned on what legal basis the permits could be 
denied, but nonetheless indicated that opposition leaders 
would call off the demonstrations if they were deemed 
illegal.  He hastened to add that if demonstrations were not 
permitted, CUD and UEDF leaders planned to "ask people to 
stay home" beginning Oct. 3.  The Charge welcomed the news 
that the CUD would comply with any GOE prohibition of the 
demonstration, and urged that opposition leaders communicate 
that message clearly to its followers by all available means. 
 Berhanu agreed, while noting ironically that state media had 
refused to broadcast such a message from the CUD prior to the 
deadly June 8 demonstrations. 
 
Berhanu: GOE Will Only Democratize Under Pressure 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4. (C) When the Charge asked Berhanu to explain the strategy 
of the opposition, Berhanu replied that the ruling coalition 
had been totally surprised by the initial results of May 15 
elections and had spent the last four months trying to close 
the democratic opening it had begun during the campaign.  For 
example, the EPRDF had passed a restrictive new set of rules 
on the parliamentary opposition as soon as it became clear 
that the CUD and UEDF would have around 200 seats in the new 
assembly, he said.  The new rules were designed to keep 
parliament as fully controlled and irrelevant as it had been 
previously.  Berhanu also cited the increasing harassment to 
which opposition parties were being subjected, including the 
seizure of the Oromo National Congress (ONC) office by a 
government-engineered splinter group.  (Note: the ONC is the 
largest party in the UEDF coalition.)  He also mentioned the 
arrest on Sept. 26 of some 40 CUD members in the Amhara 
region, claiming that the gun-holding CUD personnel were 
actually the gate guards from party offices throughout the 
region. 
 
Why Do You Assume They'll Win a Showdown? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Given this sort of GOE behavior, Berhanu argued that 
it made little sense for the opposition to simply accept its 
seats in parliament.  He emphasized that he had repeatedly 
sought out long-time contacts in the ruling party to seek a 
dialogue to address opposition concerns, but to no avail. 
The only way to change the GOE's approach to the opposition 
and democratic institutions would be through strong popular 
pressure, he said, like the planned demonstration or a 
strike.  When emboffs questioned how the opposition could 
consolidate its gains and press its agenda if its leaders 
were in jail or underground, Berhanu asked, "why do you 
assume that the government would win?  We may be risking a 
lot, but the government is risking even more.  They could 
arrest our leaders and shoot 1,000 people a day, but how long 
could they continue to do that?"  Berhanu later retreated, 
saying that the CUD did not want violence and did not want to 
see anyone die, and for that reason would not pursue a 
demonstration without legal permission. 
 
What's the CUD Agenda? 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Berhanu denied that CUD Chairman Hailu Shawel had 
called for "bringing down the government" in the recent 
statements in the U.S. (ref B).  Charge and others replied 
that USG observers had heard the statements and believed they 
invited a strong GOE reaction.  Berhanu indicated that CUD 
demonstrations or strikes would reiterate the opposition's 
call for a government of national unity.  This demand was 
based on the opposition's continuing belief that it had won 
the May 15 elections, and that only a government of national 
unity would have the moral and political authority to 
organize new elections and institutional reforms over a 
two-year period.  Charge told Berhanu that the USG and Carter 
Center did not believe that the opposition had won and did 
not view a government of national unity as a realistic 
objective. 
 
¶7. (C) The mayor-elect acknowledged that the EPRDF had 
emphatically rejected calls for a national unity government. 
He indicated that in an eventual private dialogue with the 
GOE, the opposition would be prepared to accept an EPRDF 
government for the next five years.  What the opposition 
needed, however, were guarantees that future elections would 
be truly fair, that it would be able to participate 
meaningfully in parliament, and that other institutional 
weaknesses would be addressed.  Emboffs argued that 
parliament was the place to pursue this agenda, and that the 
international community would be engaged with Ethiopian 
institutions to assist with democratic reforms.  Berhanu 
expressed skepticism that the international community would 
be any more effective in checking government abuses in the 
future than it had been during the election dispute thus far. 
 He pointed to the alleged failure of the Donors' Group to 
ensure follow up on negotiations to create a "conducive 
environment" under a ten-point plan for investigating 
electoral complaints.  He also questioned the effectiveness 
of providing money to develop the capacity of the new 
parliament if the GOE remained bent on stifling multi-party 
debate.  "Remember that the EPRDF are masters at delay, 
divide and rule," he warned. 
 
¶8. (C) When asked what would be sufficient 
confidence-building measures to bring the opposition into 
parliament, Berhanu answered that a negotiated series of 
commitments to end harassment and make key democratic 
institutions truly independent, whose implementation would be 
monitored by ad-hoc commission outside parliament, would 
adequately address opposition concerns.  The mayor-elect 
alluded to differences of opinion within the opposition, but 
suggested that a dialogue with the government along the above 
lines would enable moderates (like him) to resolve the 
electoral dispute.  Berhanu predicted that if the opposition 
took its seats in the absence of some concessions from PM 
Meles, however, much of its base would abandon existing 
parties in favor of more radical alternatives. 
 
Where is International Community on Human Rights? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9. (C) Berhanu again bemoaned what he considered misguided 
activism by the international community.  Rather than simply 
urging the opposition to accept its parliamentary seats with 
no conditions, why didn't the U.S. and the rest of the 
international community apply more pressure on the GOE to end 
harassment and other human rights violations, he asked? 
Pol/Econ Chief referred Berhanu to tough language on these 
issues in the recent Ambassadors' Donors Group statement (ref 
C).  Charge also assured Berhanu that she and other local 
ambassadors would continue to press PM Meles for an end to 
harassment -- which they knew was indeed occurring -- as well 
as outreach to the opposition. 
 
Comment: Encouraging Signs, But No Compromise in Sight 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶10. (C)   The basic disagreement -- dialogue before 
parliament, or parliament before dialogue remains -- remains, 
and no direct channels of communication between the 
opposition and the EPRDF appear open.  However, if we get 
past the October 2 demonstration it may ease the pressure 
allowing PM Meles to call for democracy and dialogue. 
Although high levels calls from the UN, EU and Washington are 
important and needed, Meles may find it difficult to reach 
out as he has to demonstrate his strength to his partisans 
and -- possibly -- to his northern neighbors. 
HUDDLESTON