This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KDEM KMCA KMPI YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: SALEH'S WITHDRAWAL: TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN? 
 
REF: A. SANAA 1910 
     ¶B. SANAA 1571 
 
Classified By: CDA Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. President Saleh shocked many with his July 17 
announcement that he would not be a candidate for reelection 
in 2006.  His statement came days before the ROYG's decision 
to implement unpopular economic reforms resulting in hikes in 
oil and gas prices of over fifty percent.  While recent riots 
have detracted attention from the President's surprise 
announcement, the question in political circles around the 
country remains whether or not Saleh is really serious and, 
if not, what is he up to?  End Summary. 
 
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Can Saleh Be Serious? 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) During a speech commemorating his 27 years in power, 
President Saleh stunned an audience of 1200 ministers, 
officials, tribal leaders and foreign diplomats on July 17 by 
announcing that he would not be a candidate for reelection in 
¶2006.  "It is time for the youth to step forward, proclaimed 
Saleh. "I will support any person from any party who believes 
he is able to rule the country but I will not nominate 
myself."  CDA, present at the event, described the audience's 
murmurs of dissent with one man shouting out "No, this can't 
be!  You can't leave us!" (ref A).  Western diplomats chatted 
afterwards, and their consensus was that Saleh was bluffing. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Probably Not, So What's He Up To...? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Serious political observers are skeptical, as was Post 
when Saleh told the Ambassador last month that he was old and 
tired and might not run in 2006.  "Yemen is not an easy 
country to govern," complained Saleh, "it is like dancing in 
a circle of snakes." (ref B).  While Saleh can certainly be 
unpredictable, it is highly unlikely that he would step down 
from power at a time when he is still very healthy and very 
much in charge.  So, what is he up to? 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
...Deflecting Blame For Painful Economic Measures 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3. (C) The timing of Saleh's announcement, not long before 
the lifting of oil subsidies and ensuing unrest, may suggest 
that he was trying to distance himself from the reform 
package.  From the beginning, the ROYG has refused to take 
ownership of the IMF-WB recommended reforms, failing to 
properly lobby Parliament for passage or to explain the 
long-term economic benefits to the Yemeni people.  Many 
observers suggest that Saleh hopes to blame others for the 
painful measures, and use the public outcry to get rid of 
unpopular Prime Minister Bajammal, and possibly other 
ministers. 
 
-------------------------------- 
...Setting The Stage for His Son 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  Saleh's reference in his speech to handing over the 
reigns to Yemen's youth has led some to claim his motivation 
is to lay the groundwork for his son, Commander of the 
Republican Guard Ahmed Ali Saleh, to assume the Presidency. 
Ahmed Ali figures strongly into any succession scenario, but 
this theory does little to explain Saleh's recent move. 
Ahmed Ali will be 36 in September 2006, but the Yemeni 
Constitution stipulates a President must be 40 years of age 
or above.  In a non-emergency situation, the Yemeni 
opposition and public would probably oppose strongly a 
constitutional amendment simply to allow for a Ahmed Ali 
candidacy in 2006.  If Saleh is indeed intent on installing 
his son in power, he is not likely to set him up with such a 
divisive and inauspicious beginning. 
 
--------------------------------- 
...Calling the Opposition's Bluff 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Although the ROYG may have been caught off guard by 
the violence and looting,  significant public protest of the 
price hikes was anticipated.  It is possible Saleh's 
announcement was meant to call the opposition's bluff to run 
its own candidate, pressing home the point(by stopping the 
violence and then partially acceding to popular demands) that 
not only is he the only viable leader, but the only one 
capable of restoring and maintaining order in a crisis. 
 
¶6. (C) Saleh's surprise announcement also coincides with the 
anticipated release of the opposition's Joint Meeting Party 
(JMP) coalition reform program, promised to be the first step 
in announcing a JMP candidate for President.  By withdrawing 
from the race 14 months before the elections, Saleh may be 
trying to cripple his already weak opposition by calling 
their bluff, knowing full well they will be unable to 
nominate a viable candidate.  What Saleh and many local 
observers expect is that rather than fielding their own 
candidate, that the opposition will actually nominate Saleh 
(as Islah did in the last election). 
 
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...Rising Above Politics and Saving the Day 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  The public lacks trust in the ROYG and fears 
additional public revenue gained by lifting subsidies will be 
lost to official corruption.  Saleh, we are told, has already 
succumb somewhat to public and tribal pressure, having 
decided, we believe, to partially rescind the price hikes. 
Some suggest he would do well to resign from the ruling GPC 
party and run as a populist candidate. 
 
----------------------- 
The Opposition Responds 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) representative to the JMP 
opposition coalition Abdul Ghani Khader shared his view with 
Emboffs on July 24.  Khader pointed out that Yemen lacks the 
institutions necessary for a democratic transition.  "Saleh 
knows this," he said.  "He is sending a message to the people 
that it is either me or the flood.  This whole thing is a 
lie," continued Khader.  "Saleh knows there is no real 
opposition." 
 
¶9. (C) Islah's JMP representative Mohammed Qahtan also shared 
with us his party's thinking. "It was a surprise and we are 
still making up our minds as to why he did it," said Qahtan, 
adding that some within the party believe the President is 
sincere.  "Regardless of Saleh's motive and sincerity," 
Qahtan explained,  "Islah is looking for anything we can do 
to make it real."  As for JMP prospects for 2006, Qahtan 
confided that the coalition has yet to find a candidate, but, 
"Even if we did, and he won, the state (read: military) would 
not obey him." 
 
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Shaming Saleh into Making Good On His Word 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) The ray of hope for pro-democracy advocates is that 
Saleh will be pressured into standing by his statement. 
Egyptian opposition "al-Ghad" leader Aiman Noor reportedly 
telephoned Saleh urging him not to retract his decision as it 
would "close all doors for peaceful reform."  Other Yemeni 
and Arab journalists are trying to embarrass Saleh into 
standing by his statement by commending him as a "historical 
Arab leader" and urging him not to nominate his son in his 
place.  A Kuwaiti liberal columnist wrote, "Mr. Saleh, please 
give us the Arab World's first former president!" 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Saleh is most likely motivated by a desire to force 
the opposition into nominating him.  He is likely weary from 
the Saada conflict, pushing through economic reforms and 
opposition media criticism.  In our view, however, Saleh has 
another presidential term left in him -- time he could use to 
properly groom and prepare his son to succeed him in 2013. 
End Comment. 
Khoury