This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004644 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KISL AL MO FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MUSLIM COUNCIL ELECTION RESULTS 
 
REF: 2003 PARIS 3213 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) 
held elections June 19, with Interior Minister Sarkozy 
lauding an estimated 85% turnout rate.  The Morocco-linked 
National Federation of French Muslims (FNMF) consolidated its 
position as the leading group within the CFCM, winning an 
additional three seats to claim 19 of the 43 elected seats on 
the administrative council.  The fundamentalist-leaning Union 
of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF) lost three seats to 
put it even at 10 seats each with the moderate Grand Mosque 
of Paris, which picked up four seats.  The Union of Reunion 
Island kept two seats, while the independent Al-Islah Mosque 
of Marseille and the Coordination Committee of France's 
Turkish Muslims (CCMTF) won one seat each. The CFCM met June 
26 to choose a new executive board, reelecting Grand Mosque 
of Paris Rector Dalil Boubakeur president -- a move described 
in private discussions with Ministry of Interior, FNMF and 
UOIF contacts prior to elections as a fait accompli.  While 
increased participation (1,221 places of worship participated 
-- up from 992 in 2003), moderate gains for the Grand Mosque, 
and a decline by the UOIF are positive developments for the 
CFCM, many problems persist, not the least of which being 
that the CFCM represents only a fraction of the estimated 5-6 
million Muslims in France.  End Summary. 
 
UOIF Strength Wanes 
------------------- 
¶2. (C) Most press headlines describing the CFCM elections 
focused on the loss of seats by the fundamentalist-leaning 
UOIF, suspected of having ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Analyses of the election results note the UOIF was unable to 
forge the same alliances with independent mosques and other 
organizations that it had in 2003, resulting in a loss of 
three seats in the administrative council.  (Note: Two seats 
have been added since the election in 2003.  End note.)  In a 
pre-election meeting with PolOffs, UOIF secretary general 
Fouad Alaoui anticipated losing clout, acknowledging that by 
joining the CFCM and becoming more mainstream, the UOIF lost 
some of its supporters.  In another pre-election meeting, 
Slimane Nadour, Communications Director at the rival Grand 
Mosque of Paris, said the UOIF appeared to be losing ground 
within the CFCM and the French Muslim community in general, 
and described the UOIF as part of a larger, long-term effort 
by the Muslim Brotherhood to destabilize moderate Muslim 
regimes in the Arab world, such as Algeria and Morocco. 
Nicolas Sarkozy, who resorted to everything short of sheer 
force in order to bring about the initial CFCM elections 
during his first term as Interior Minister in 2003, was 
criticized by some at the time of the CFCM's inception for 
including more fundamentalist groups like the UOIF.  After 
the June 19 elections, however, Sarkozy pointed to the UOIF 
decline as a vindication of his strategy to moderate French 
Islam by including all factions.  Some observers warn about 
writing off the UOIF, however, noting that they are still 
entrenched in regions such as Alsace and Rhone-Alps. 
 
Grand Mosque Improves Standing 
------------------------------ 
¶3. (C) The Grand Mosque of Paris, linked to Algeria and 
representative of a moderate form of Islam, significantly 
improved on their dismal, disjointed performance in 2003 
(reftel), gaining four seats.  However, media reports 
indicate that the Grand Mosque used unusual alliances to 
secure its gains, including pairing with Turkish orthodox 
group Milli Gorus.  Their showing puts them on equal footing 
with the UOIF on the administrative council and gives comfort 
to the GOF. 
 
FNMF Extends Plurality 
---------------------- 
¶4. (C) The big winner in the June 19 CFCM elections was the 
FNMF, closely linked to the Moroccan government, which 
extended its plurality within the CFCM.  However, media 
reports attribute much of the FNMF's success to pressure 
placed on independent mosques by the Moroccan consulates. 
Contacts at the Grand Mosque of Paris dismiss the FNMF as 
disorganized, and media reports describe the organization as 
a loose federation with a great deal of diversity in thought 
amongst its partisans.  As such, the FNMF remains the least 
easily characterized of the leading factions within the CFCM. 
 In a pre-election meeting with PolOff, FNMF president 
Mohamed Benchari stressed his organization encouraged modern 
Islam, contextualized Koranic interpretation, and obedience 
to the state, stating there was "no contradiction in being a 
good Muslim and a good French citizen."  However, Benchari's 
position within the FNMF is uncertain, with Nadour of the 
Grand Mosque of Paris noting that Benchari was well liked by 
the Moroccan government, but unpopular in France and within 
the FNMF because of his frequent overseas travel and his 
widely photographed, 2004 public embrace of exiled Algerian 
Islamic Front for Salvation (FIS) leader Abbas Madani -- an 
act deemed "unforgivable" to the Grand Mosque. 
Boubakeur Reelected President of CFCM 
------------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, 
was reelected June 26 to a two-year term as president of the 
CFCM.  Although officially elected president along with 16 
other executive board members by the 43 member administrative 
board of the CFCM, Boubakeur's reelection was described prior 
to the June 19th general elections by Ministry of Interior, 
FNMF, and UOIF contacts as a fait accompli ordered by Chirac. 
 The executive board elections were not without drama, 
however, as the UOIF declared that the results of the June 
19th election had been falsified, and stated that they would 
not participate in the June 26 vote.  Sarkozy intervened, 
meeting with UOIF leaders on the eve of the executive board 
elections, and convinced them to participate.  In addition to 
Boubakeur's reelection, members of the FNMF and UOIF were 
elected to the two vice-presidential positions and the CCMTF 
retained the secretary general position.  Sarkozy declared 
that "Islam is much more complex" than simply labeling groups 
moderate or extremist, and that the goal was for "the French 
to understand that mosques are not a den of terrorists and 
that a practicing Moslem is not a follower of Bin Laden." 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶6. (C) The UOIF's threatened boycott of the executive board 
elections seem to indicate that the inertia and internecine 
competition which have plagued the CFCM since its inception 
are likely to continue.  Its three lead component groups show 
few signs of common cause and remain prone to mutual sniping. 
 The one issue on which the CFCM's three rival factions 
appear to agree is welcoming the return of Nicolas Sarkozy to 
the Interior Ministry.  Unfortunately, the CFCM has become a 
classic example of a French top-down, state-provided answer 
to a problem.  From its very beginning, the CFCM has 
succeeded only through the heavy-handed efforts of the French 
state, usually in the person of Sarkozy. However, even 
Sarkozy seems to misread the tea leaves of the recent 
elections -- the decline of the UOIF is unlikely due to any 
substantial moderation on the part of extremist Muslims. 
Instead, fundamentalists who see the UOIF as "selling out" to 
the French state shun participation in the CFCM, regarding it 
as irrelevant to their daily concerns. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment Continued: Above all, the primary shortcoming 
of the CFCM is that it only speaks for the approximately 10% 
of French Muslims who are considered "practicing."  The 
remaining 90% of France's Muslim population, mostly North 
African-origin first-generation immigrants and second- and 
third-generation "Beurs," are often concentrated in 
neighborhoods outside France's main cities, where they may 
suffer from lack of educational opportunities, racism, and 
discrimination.  As a result, born-in-France Muslims are 
often less integrated than their parents.  They feel -- and 
are often seen by fellow citizens -- as if they are not truly 
French, breeding resentment and a lack of national identity 
that causes some to instead seek a sense of belonging in 
fundamentalist Islam and geopolitical causes such as the 
plight of the Palestinians and the Iraq insurgency.  The GOF 
has yet to find the solution to these more widespread, 
far-reaching issues.  The CFCM, even if successful, is 
unlikely to be the answer.  End Comment. 
STAPLETON