This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000976 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR DAS T. WOODS 
AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON EFIN SOCI ZI VIP
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SIMPKINS ENGAGES ON RESTORE ORDER 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 928 (B) HARARE 760 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires a.i., Eric T. Schultz under Section 1. 
4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) On a visit to assess and discuss the effects of 
Operation Restore Order, Majority Staffer Gregory Simpkins 
and Minority Staffer Pearl-Alice Marsh from the House of 
Representatives International Relations Committee (HIRC) 
traveled to Harare and Bulawayo, July 2-6.  The staffdel saw 
first hand the devastation in former settlements and 
high-density suburbs.  In meetings with government officials, 
they expressed outrage over the human rights violations 
surrounding Restore Order.  In his meeting with them, 
Minister for State Security Didymus Mutasa took credit for 
the operation, expressed no remorse at the plight of its 
victims, and showed no interest in reengagement with the U.S. 
 Reserve Bank (RBZ) Governor Gideon Gono said the operation 
had been carried out without proper consultation but had his 
support.  He desired engagement from the West in restoring 
Zimbabwe,s economy. 
 
¶2. (C) In meetings with opposition and civil society, the 
staffdel expressed the warmly welcomed message that the 
United States was aware of their struggle and continued to 
support their efforts.  MDC officials emphasized the need for 
continued U.S. support, including encouraging Nigeria and 
South Africa to increase pressure on Mugabe.  They said that 
Operation Restore Order had created unrest within ZANU-PF but 
that the time might not be right for Zimbabweans to rise up 
in peaceful protest.  However, the MDC was taking steps to 
ready the people for that moment.  Bishops Trevor Manhanga 
and Patrick Mutume said that the churches were trying not to 
be political but that all deplored Operation Restore Order 
and were speaking out about it.  The staffdel suggested to 
the Bishops, the MDC and others in the opposition that it was 
important to engage with U.S. religious leaders, especially 
African-Americans.  They added that Congressman Payne might 
consider a trip to Zimbabwe in the near future.  End Summary. 
 
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Staffdel Agenda 
--------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In Harare, the staffdel met with Government officials 
Didymus Mutasa and Gideon Gono and several MDC officials. 
They spoke with Jonathan Moyo (septel).  They met with 
Catholic Bishop Patrick Mutume and Evangelical Bishop Trevor 
Manhanga.  They spoke with UN special envoy Anna Tibaijuka 
and other UN officials (ref A).  The staffdel also attended a 
number of other meetings and events.  They attended a church 
service the Fountain of Hope Church, an evangelical church, 
and met with congregants afterwards to discuss with citizens 
the U.S. interest in Zimbabwe.  They visited Porta Farm, a 
settlement area on the outskirts of Harare that had been 
destroyed by Operation Restore Order.  They spoke with 
businesswomen in Harare and University of Zimbabwe Economics 
professor Tony Hawkins about the effects of Operation Restore 
Order on the economy.  They attended a roundtable discussion 
with human rights and HIV/AIDS NGOs about the human effects 
of Restore Order.  They also spoke with reporters from the 
Daily Mirror, the Standard, and ZimOnline. 
 
¶3. (C) In Bulawayo (septel), the Staff Delegation met with 
activists from Women of Zimbabwe Arise! (WOZA) and MDC MP 
David Coltart.  They also visited a church providing 
assistance to the displaced and one of the destroyed 
settlements, escorted by officials from World Vision. 
 
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Mutasa on Restore Order and International Relations: 
Leave Us Alone 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Minister for State Security (and fifth-ranking 
Politburo member) Didymus Mutasa proudly told the staffdel in 
his office on July 5 that he was among those principally 
responsible for the GOZ decision to move forward with 
Operation Restore Order.  He showed no remorse for the 
suffering the operation had caused.  Recounting familiar 
purported justifications, he said the operation was 
necessitated by illegal activities (money-changing, 
prostitution, robbery) stemming from areas of illegal 
construction and asserted that the operation had been 
successful in stemming the national crime rate.  He dismissed 
reports of hundreds of thousands displaced and claimed "only 
40,000" had lost their homes.  Questioned about court rulings 
that aspects of Restore Order were illegal, he said that the 
courts could do what they wanted, the government would do 
what it wanted.  The operation would continue and the West 
was welcome to work with the GOZ on reconstruction efforts. 
 
¶5.  (C) The staffdel stressed that Restore Order had set back 
prospects for improved bilateral relations in the wake of the 
GOZ's relatively peaceful administration of elections in 
March.  Queried about GOZ views on bilateral relations with 
the United States, Mutasa said he was not interested in 
engaging with the USG or in soliciting any bilateral 
assistance.  He asserted that the USG consistently applied a 
double standard to Zimbabwe that was evidence of its intent 
to effect regime change.  Why did the USG speak out about 
dead babies in Zimbabwe and not about the "tens of thousands 
of babies" it had "murdered" in Iraq?  The GOZ wanted only 
two things from the USG:  more honest public statements about 
Zimbabwe and to be left alone.  He said he would welcome the 
opportunity to explain Zimbabwe to Americans but did not care 
to be removed from the travel sanctions list.  The GOZ 
understood the USG perfectly but the USG did not understand 
the GOZ; in that vein, he invited the staffdel to visit his 
farm so they could learn more for themselves.  He said he was 
polite to them only because they were black and despite the 
fact that they were tools of President Bush.  The staffdel 
stressed that the United States was not implacably opposed to 
ZANU-PF; its concerns revolved around process, not 
personalities or choosing parties. 
 
¶6.  (C) Responding to the staffdel's questions about growing 
African concern about Zimbabwe and the reported visit of an 
AU envoy, Mutasa claimed that African governments 
increasingly were being bought off by America and Britain, 
who were out to destroy all governments that came from 
liberation movements.  In particular, the GOZ had "no regard" 
for the Nigerians, who were largely responsible for crime in 
Zimbabwe and the need for Restore Order.  The regime would 
listen to SADC, which remained staunchly behind the GOZ 
(except perhaps Botwsana, he allowed), but not the rest of 
Africa. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Gono: Central Bank Still Seeking Re-Engagement 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (C) In a rambling presentation in his office on July 5, 
Reserve Bank (RBZ) Governor Gideon Gono told the staffdel 
that Restore Order had been undertaken without adequate 
consultation, notice, or "communication of vision."  The GOZ, 
especially the RBZ, was remedying that now as his bi-monthly 
meetings with "all stake-holders" attested.  For its part, 
the RBZ was supportive of Restore Order, in part to steer 
informal economic activity toward the formal sector and in 
part because it could not be seen to condone corruption.  The 
staffdel reiterated Restore Order's negative ramifications 
for any prospective Zimbabwean rapprochement with the West 
and urged that it be ceased. 
 
¶8.  (C) Asked by the staffdel how the country would recover 
economically and at what cost, Gono recounted familiar 
measures advanced in his May monetary policy statement, such 
as export subsidies and concessionary loans in the 
agricultural sectors (ref B), and purported 
confidence-building measures (grandly named new "operations" 
that are thin on details and resources) in the wake of 
Restore Order.  The RBZ was deploying highly-paid staff 
throughout the country to work with provincial governors and 
to be his "eyes and ears."  He shared a copy of his five-page 
charge to them, which instructed them on comportment but said 
nothing about their objectives.  Gono emphasized that 
restoring Zimbabwe's economy was a mammoth task that 
ultimately would require international reengagement; he 
intended to build a platform to support that reengagement. 
The staffdel noted that the GOZ's execution of economic 
policy seemed at odds with Gono's often more orthodox, 
market-oriented rhetoric.  In response to staffdel inquiries 
about his rumored attempted resignation, he stressed he would 
never resign but would never refuse to be fired either. 
 
-------------------------------- 
MDC Seeks Continued U.S. Support 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) On July 5, MDC MPs Welshman Ncube (also party 
Secretary-General), Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga (party 
 
SIPDIS 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Nelson Chamisa (party Youth 
 
SIPDIS 
Wing Chair), Job Sikhala, and Tendai Biti (party Secretary 
for Economic Affairs), asked for continued U.S. support and 
said Operation Restore Order had weakened the government. 
There was rising internal unrest within the ruling ZANU-PF 
party, linked to the succession struggle but also a result of 
the government,s crackdown on the poor, which was unpopular 
with many in the party.  Misihairabwi claimed that a third 
faction was forming within ZANU-PF that intended to draft 
former Finance Minister Simba Makoni to challenge the Mujuru 
and Mnangagwa factions for party leadership. 
 
¶10. (C) Simpkins asked why the people of Zimbabwe were not 
rising up in protest.  MP Job Sikhala said he had tried to 
organize peaceful resistance in his constituency of St. 
Mary,s (part of the mammoth high density suburb of 
Chitungwiza) but that it had failed in the face of 
overwhelming Government intimidation.  Misihairabwi noted 
that in many countries people had put up with decades of 
repression before reaching a critical moment where resistance 
was possible.  The MDC realized it had to build up a level of 
confidence within the people for them to reach that critical 
moment.  The MDC was working on reshaping its approach to the 
regime and was planning unspecified measures to step up 
democratic resistance.  The MDC continued to need external 
support but Zimbabweans had to step up and take action and 
learn from peaceful uprisings in other countries. 
 
¶11. (C) Simpkins said that Operation Restore Order was 
clearly systematic abuse and he did not understand why the 
international community, especially Africa, did not challenge 
Mugabe.  The MDC MPs responded that SADC could only be 
effective in pressuring Mugabe to change if South Africa,s 
position on Zimbabwe changed.  Ncube said there was genuine 
unhappiness about Zimbabwe in other SADC countries but that 
they would follow South Africa,s lead.  He said that, while 
he understood other strategic interests governed U.S. 
relations with these countries, the U.S. should use its 
influence with South Africa and Nigeria to put more pressure 
on Zimbabwe.  He said it was also important for the U.S. to 
continue to support democratic elements in Zimbabwe.  Chamisa 
singled out support for Voice of America as key.  The group 
said that Western governments had been too timid in their 
criticisms of misgovernance in Africa because leaders like 
Mugabe would always play the racial card.  Marsh agreed that 
the twin specters of colonialism and racism had neutralized 
criticism of the GOZ in the Congressional Black Caucus.  She 
said that the African-American community in the U.S. would be 
outraged by the staffdel,s report and that there was a need 
for the opposition and civil society to better engage that 
community, especially African-American religious leaders. 
She added that Congressman Payne was reconsidering a trip to 
Zimbabwe. 
 
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Bishops 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) On July 5, the staffdel met with Bishops Patrick 
Mutume (Catholic) and Trevor Manhanga (Evangelical), who 
spoke about Operation Restore Order and the role of religious 
institutions in dealing with the country,s political 
turmoil.  Marsh said she had hoped that, after the flawed but 
improved March elections, the GOZ would next move toward 
reconciliation with civil society and the opposition and did 
not understand the GOZ,s motives.  The Bishops said that the 
Government,s actions in Operation Restore Order were showing 
people that the Government could target anyone, not just 
white farmers.  Mutume said the churches had tried not to be 
political but that the Catholic Church had started issuing 
pastoral letters protesting the operation.  Manhanga said 
Mugabe was not quite ready to attack the churches directly 
but that it was clear he wanted to control them as evidenced 
by the NGO bill, which would classify churches doing 
humanitarian work as NGOs and subject them to the same 
intense scrutiny as human rights NGOs.  They said that Mugabe 
was not easily subject to influence from outsiders but that 
the churches, shuttle diplomacy might eventually work on 
someone who had influence with Mugabe.  The staffdel 
emphasized the need for the Bishops to reengage with 
religious leaders they had previously met in the United 
States and offered their support in making those 
reconnections. 
 
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Comment 
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¶13. (C) The staffdel,s meetings with ruling party and 
opposition officials and civil society offered a window into 
the activities and motives of Zimbabwe's key political 
players.  Meetings with government officials underscored that 
the GOZ remains apparently uninterested in reengagement with 
the U.S. on political issues, despite interest by Gono and 
others in the ruling party (who remain uninclined to speak 
out) in rapprochement with the West.  Civil society and 
opposition officials enthusiastically received the 
staffdel,s message that the U.S. was aware of the plight of 
ordinary Zimbabweans and had not given up on them. 
 
¶14. (U) The StaffDel did not have the opportunity to clear 
this message. 
SCHULTZ