This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001560 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD PASS TO HWG - MARK WILDERMUTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL AG IZ
SUBJECT: MINISTER DELEGATE MESSAHEL CONFIRMS ALGERIAN 
EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD STILL OPEN 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 1538 
     ¶B. GERMAIN-SIEVERS E-MAIL 7/25 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Marc Sievers, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
 ¶1.  (S) Summary and Comment.  Minister of State Abdelkader 
Messahel confirmed to Charge and UK Ambassador Tesoriere July 
26, in a meeting held at our request, that the Algerian 
Embassy in Baghdad remained open officially.  Messahel said 
there had only been three Algerian diplomatic staff in 
Baghdad, and with two kidnapped it made sense to evacuate the 
remaining diplomat, as well as the wife of the kidnapped 
Charge, Ali Belaroussi, to Amman.  Messahel welcomed U.S. and 
UK offers of support and assistance to Algeria and said, "We 
are fighting the same enemy and need to work together."  In 
response to Ambassador Tesoriere's comment that the Iraqi 
government was concerned that Algeria not appear to be 
withdrawing from Iraq under terrorist pressure, Messahel 
agreed it was important "not to hand the terrorists a 
victory" by withdrawing from Iraq.  Messahel noted that 
Algeria had extensive experience in combatting terrorism, and 
suggested that the Algerian intelligence service was 
"pursuing every route" to determine which sources were 
credible.  Charge noted that the GOA had not yet responded to 
our request, delivered by Charge to MFA on July 23, for GOA 
officials working on this issue to be in contact with the 
Hostage Working Group at Embassy Baghdad (see ref a). 
Messahel appeared to be unaware of our previous request, but 
instructed his assistant, Ambassador Aiouaz, to follow up. 
We and the British remain puzzled at the GOA's hesitancy to 
engage us directly in Baghdad, but our joint sense in Algiers 
is that Messahel's reassurances about the embassy represent 
an important indication of GOA determination not to give in 
to terrorism.  End summary and comment. 
 
¶2.  (C) As previewed by ref (b) e-mail from NEA/MAG, British 
Ambassador Andrew Tesoriere phoned Charge the morning of July 
26 to ask if the U.S. was interested in delivering a joint 
demarche to the GOA to seek clarification of various reports 
in the Arab and Algerian media July 25-26 that Algeria had 
closed its embassy in Baghdad.  Charge agreed the demarche 
was a good idea, and noted that he would also like to press 
the Algerians to respond to our outstanding request that they 
establish direct contact with Embassy Baghdad's Hostage 
Working Group.  Tesoriere and Charge agreed that the demarche 
should be delivered to Minister Delegate Abdelkader Messahel. 
 (Note:  Messahel normally is responsible for African and 
Maghreb affairs, but with Foreign Minister Bedjaoui in 
London, Messahel is the senior MFA official in Algiers, and 
he also had made a press statement July 25 that the Algerian 
Embassy in Baghdad remained open.) 
 
¶3.  (C) Tesoriere and Charge began the meeting by noting the 
interest and concern with which Washington and London were 
following news of the July 21 kidnapping of two Algerian 
diplomats in Baghdad.  We stressed that we appreciated the 
opportunity to meet with Messahel in order to clarify the GOA 
position, particularly media reports that Algeria had closed 
its Baghdad embassy.  Messahel thanked the U.S. and UK for 
their support and offers of assistance on the ground in Iraq. 
 Terrorism, he noted, has become a global phenomenon and it 
requires a global response.  "We are fighting the same enemy, 
and need to work together," Messahel stated.  He also 
expressed appreciation for the security support provided by 
the Iraqi authorities.  Messahel observed that he had read 
the statement issued by Zarqawi's group earlier in the day 
declaring that the group's "Shari'a court" had tried the two 
diplomats and sentenced them to death, but he said that such 
statements were often issued by terrorists to shock and 
spread fear and were not necessarily authoritative. 
 
¶4.  (C) Turning to the status of the Algerian embassy, 
Messahel assured us that it remained open.  The embassy's 
staff had only consisted of three diplomats, and now that two 
had been kidnapped it made sense to evacuate the remaining 
diplomat and the wife of the kidnapped Charge, Ali Aroussi. 
Both had left for Amman July 25.  Algeria had not closed the 
embassy, however.  The Algerian flag continued to fly in 
Baghdad, and the embassy was still staffed by Algerian 
citizens who did not have diplomatic status.  In addition, 
former Algerian Ambassador to Iraq Moustafa Boutourah was 
based in Amman and was following events in Iraq from Jordan. 
In response to a question from Tesoriere, Messahel said 
Boutourah had not yet presented his credentials to the Iraqi 
Transitional Government, but he implied that Boutourah would 
do so soon.  In response to Charge's comment that State 
Minister Soltani had been interviewed on Arab satellite 
television and stated that the embassy was closed, Messahel 
said that only statements released by the Algerian official 
press agency were authoritative. 
 
¶5.  (S) Tesoriere asked about the "methodology" Algeria was 
pursuing to free the two hostages.  Messahel responded that 
Algeria had suffered greatly from terrorism; terrorism had 
been the GOA's top priority for over a decade.  The GOA and 
its intelligence services had a vast experience on which they 
could draw in order to analyze terrorist incidents.  In this 
case, there were "various routes" to pursue, but expertise 
was needed to determine which of the routes might be credible 
in leading to the kidnappers.  Charge noted that he had met 
with MFA Director General for the Americas Chikhi July 23 and 
given him the name and contact information of Embassy 
Baghdad's Hostage Working Group coordinator Mark Wildermuth, 
but so far, no one from the Algerian side had contacted him. 
With all due respect for Algeria's expertise, the U.S. and 
the UK, along with the Iraqis, were the ones with 
capabilities on the ground and we needed to coordinate 
urgently in order to avoid any mistakes or working at cross 
purposes.  Messahel appeared surprised and unaware of 
Charge's July 23 meeting, but he instructed his assistant, 
Ambassador Aiouaz, to follow up.  Charge gave Aiouaz 
Wildermuth's name and contact information.  In response to 
Charge's request for a point of contact at the MFA, Messahel 
identified Director for Information and Communications 
Abdelhamid Chebchoub as the head of the MFA's crisis working 
group.  We will follow up with Chebchoub July 27. 
 
 
 
SIEVERS